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Be sure of this, 0 young ambition, all
mortal greatness is but disease.
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I.

PRELIMINARIES: QUESTIONS AND DEFINITIONS

Punish the wrongdoer, treat the sick, and (if they do no wrong)
leave the healthy well enough alone. There is probably a consensus
that the preceding expression satisfies certain minimum requirements of being a sentence, in the imperative mood, of the English
language. But the predicates (and their surrogates)-"wrongdoer,"
"sick," "healthy"-cannot be well-defined; the verbs are vague;
and, even when we can posit paradigm cases and processes to which
the predicates and verbs apply, the several rules suggested by the
expression might be challenged in any number of circumstances. We
thus may have reached the limits of consensus rather abruptly.
People nevertheless are in fact punished, treated, or ignored (more
or less in accordance with such rules), and we are, I think, rationally
required to give reasons for these actions and omissions.
The limited tasks addressed in this Symposium contribution
should be rehearsed. Its focus will be on purported therapeutic justifications for intervention' into mentation and behavior-i.e.,
1. The term "intervention," as indicated in the text, is used here to refer to the use of
organic therapies for the purpose-or with the proximate effect-of substantially altering
mentation and behavior. In some contexts, it will also be used loosely to refer to therapies
generally, including those for physical illness, and to physical confinement. For descriptions
of organic therapies for controlling mentation and behavior see Shapiro, Legislating the
Control of Behavior Control:Autonomy and the Coercive Use of Organic Therapies,47 S. CAL.
L. REV. 237, 240-48 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Legislating]; Note, Conditioning and Other
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justifications which are premised upon the ground that the subjects
are thought to suffer from or display some mental/behavioral anomaly.' The inquiry will comprehend the ministrations of both healers
treating "diseases" and of behavior therapists altering "maladaptive behavior." The account will be discursive, and the obviously
necessary task of interpreting the principal action-justifying3 labels-e.g., "mental disease"-will of necessity be pursued rather
briefly.
Our review will advance, in part, by undertaking a summary review of Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health4 (in which the
chief mode of intervention proposed was psychosurgery); and by
applying certain behaviorist principles to the customary substantive requirements of the civil commitment process (a process which
may well result in coercive therapy). Some attention will be given
to the problems of selection of therapies under a disease model5 on
the one hand, and under a behaviorist model on the other. We will
also consider why the presence of mental anomaly is thought necessary at all to justify confinement. A concluding note will adumbrate
the difficulties of analyzing non-therapeutic justifications for
Technologies Used to "Treat?" "Rehabilitate?" "Demolish?"Prisoners and Mental Patients,
45 S. CAL. L. REV. 616, 623-33 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Conditioning]. See also
Symposium: Psychosurgery, 54 B.U.L. REv. 215 (1974).
2. The term "mental/behavioral anomaly" will be used to refer to any mentation, behavior, or pattern of mentation or behavior which is thought to be constitutive of or evidence of
illness, disorder, abnormality, defect, deficiency, maladaptation (and the like-the list might
grow rather long). "Anomaly" is ambiguous in that it encompasses deviations defined as such
by reference to substantive rules and standards (which might be framed as moral rules, rules
of efficiency or functionality . . .), as well as simple statistical abnormalities. WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 89 (1966). It thus serves to reduce the incidence of

question-begging and of making unwarranted assumptions about the nature of the condition
or status under discussion.
3. The notion of "reasons for action" is of course a prime target for ethical analysis, and
some recent efforts include D. RICHARDS, A THEORY OF REASONS FOR ACTION (1971) and T.
NAGEL, THE PossIBmrrY OF ALTRUISM (1970). The present project focuses upon the processes
of diagnosis and of identification of maladaptive behavior as providing reasons for action. See
P. WENDER, MINIMAL BRAIN DYSFUNCTION IN CHILDREN 72-73 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
WENDER], quoted in note 48 infra.
4. Civil No. 73-19,434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne Co., Mich., July 10, 1973), reported in part
in 2 PRIS. L. REP. 433 (1973) and 42 U.S.L.W. 2063 (1973). The court's opinion is reproduced
in A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 902-24 (1974) [hereinafter

cited as BROOKS]. (References to the Kaimowitz opinion will be made by citing or quoting
from BROOKS.) The opinion also appears in R. SINGER & W. STATSKY, THE RIGHTS OF THE
IMPRISONED 226-47 (1974).

5.

On the interpretation of "model" see notes 10, 13 and 49 infra.
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intervention-e.g., custodial control, or the furthering of certain
"punitive" goals. There will be no extended discussion of such justifications (nor of the oxymoronic notions of "punitive therapy" or
"therapeutic punishment").
The discussion will assume some rough familiarity with the concept of behavior control, and, in particular, behavior control effected through organic therapies (e.g., psychochemotherapy, psychosurgery, electrical stimulation of the brain, convulsive therapy,
certain forms of behavior modification or conditioning using mentally or physically intrusive forms of stimuli).' The term "intervention" will be used as a word of art designating both the process and
product of using organic therapies for the purpose-or with the
proximate effect-of substantially altering mentation and behavior.7 And the term "anomaly" will be used to designate any mentation, behavior, or patterns of mentation or behavior which are
thought to constitute (or to evidence) illness, disorder, defectiveness, deficiency, abnormality. . . . As a matter of ordinary language, "anomaly" encompasses conditions defined solely by reference to departure from a purely statistical norm as well as conditions determined (at least in part) by purportedly nonstatistical
criteria such as dysfunctionality, irrationality, pain, and acceleration of death (though these criteria too may not be wholly independent of statistical notions of an "average"). 8 Since the term is am6. See authorities cited note 1 supra. See generally BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY (J. Mendels
ed. 1973); FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION PROGRAMS (Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administrationof Justice of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); THE SURGICAL CONTROL OF BEHAVIOR: A
SYMPOSIUM (A. Winter ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Winter]. See also E. ABEL, DRUGS AND
BEHAVIOR: A PRIMER IN NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY (1974); A. BANDURA, PRINCIPLES OF BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION (1969) [hereinafter cited as BANDURA]; Wexler, Token and Taboo: Behavior

Modification, Token Economies and the Law, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 81 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Wexler]. Cf. Note, Guilt By Physiology: The Constitutionality of Tests to Determine
Predispositionto Violent Behavior, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 489 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Violent
Behavior].
7. See note 1 supra for additional remarks on this term.
8. See note 2 supra for additional remarks on this term. For a discussion of the conceptual
difficulties encountered in distinguishing statistical from non-statistical concepts see Alexander, Normality, 48 PHILOS. 137, 140-43 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Alexander]. See generally
D. OFFER & M. SABSHIN, NORMALITY: THEORETICAL AND CLINICAL CONCEPTS OF MENTAL HEALTH
(rev. ed. 1974); The Concept of Health, 1 HASTINGS CENTER STUDIES 3 (1973), for discussions
of the relations among the concepts of disease, normality and health. The concepts of "genetic
health" and "genetic disease" (as applied either to individuals or groups) are complex and
deserve separate attention. Cf. Motulsky, The Significance of Genetic Disease, in ETHICAL
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biguous in this way (or pleasantly neutral if you prefer), it will serve
to justify a delay in taking a position on the interpretation of "disease" and related terms until it is unavoidable (if indeed it is
unavoidable).
II.

THERAPEUTIC JUSTIFICATIONS IN BRIEF

Note: The descriptions below of assorted therapeutic justifications for intervention suggest that there are a number of "medical
models," "disease models," and submodels. Some embrace notions
of mental illness based on physical causes which can in principle be
precisely described (e.g., neurotransmission anomalies in the
brain); others endeavor to interpret such illness by reference to various psychic states and processes; and probably all focus on repeated patterns of mentation and behavior. (Assortments of behaviorist models also abound, as suggested in §§ II-F and V-C.) We will
not try to construct some sort of unitary medical or disease model
which comprehends the varieties discussed here and in the technical
literature. But the fact that there are indeed varieties is of considerable import, since the application of different models and submodels may entail (among other things) different empirical claims
(about neurochemistry, genes, psychic causes, . . .), different
therapeutic regimens, different views on the propriety of coerced
intervention, and different ascriptions of moral and legal responsibility".
ISSUES IN HUMAN GENETICS

59 (B. Hilton, D. Callahan, M. Harris, P. Condliffe & B. Berkley

eds. 1973).
The discovery of new techniques for the control of mentation and behavior may generate
pressures for the identification and labeling of "new" disease entities; and also for more
precise identification of what are already regarded as clinical entities. Cf. Gardner, Implications of Psychoactive Drug Therapy, 290 NEW ENG. J. MED. 800 (1974) (observing that the
pharmaceutical industry is "redefining and relabeling" various human behaviors as "medical problems" although they were previously considered within the range of normal human
variations) (quoting other sources). Cf. also Guze, Woodruff & Clayton, The Significance of

Psychotic Affective Disorders, 32

ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIAT.

1147 (1975) (noting that the availabil-

ity of medication and electro-convulsive therapy has "contributed to renewed interest in
classification of affective disorders"). See generally Klerman, Psychotropic Drugs as Therapeutic Agents, 2 HASTINGS CENTER STUDIES 91 (1974). Discovery of neurophysiological "explanations" of mentation and behavior patterns may also spur such "medicalization." See
generally text §§ 1-C, III-B infra.
8.1. Cf. Blaney, Implications of the Medical Model and Its Alternatives, 132 AM. J.
PSYCHIAT. 911

(1975).

The daily events that are influenced by the various models are the decisions clinicians
make regarding patient disposition and those researchers make regarding investigative
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strategy. That such decisions should be colored by the perspective of the decider is as
inevitable as the diversity of models in a young and complex field,
Id. at 914. (On uses of the term "model" see notes 10, 13 and 49 infra.) In describing the
"medical model," Blaney states:
Most persons who use the term "medical model" in scholarly discourse evidently
assume that it is unambiguous and stands for one view of the nature of emotional
disorders; however, this view varies from user to user ...
There appear to be four different implications of the statement that emotional
disorders are sicknesses or are like physical illnesses ...
1. Mental disorders are in fact organic diseases. Here the use of the term model is
questionable, since a good deal more than an analogy is being asserted. The assertion
is more a theory of etiology than just a source of suggestive propositions to guide one's
thinking. It represents the faith that all emotional disorders will, just as was the case
with general paresis, be found to have an organic basis ...
2. The visible evidences of the disorder are but manifestations of an underlying
condition (not necessarily organic) ...
3. The individual has no responsibility for his behavior ...
4. Just as sense was made of the once-confusing array of medical symptoms by
ordering them into disease entities, the best way to understand psychiatric symptoms
is by ordering them into syndromes ...
It is important to note that these four theoretical implications of the medical model
are independent of one another.
Id. at 911-12.
The "implications" may indeed be independent, but (1) and (2) appear to be descriptive of
disease submodels; item (3), on responsibility, may apply to either or neither (1) and (2); and
item (4) seems to designate a classification procedure again applicable to either or neither
(1) and (2). Further, there is no reason why a set of propositions constituting a "theory of
etiology" should not be regarded as a model of sorts which may be a "guide to thinking."
Blaney then goes on to discuss the "alternatives" to the medical model: the "psychological
model"; the "behavioral model"; the "moral model"; and the "diagnosis-is-a-counterproductive-waste-of-time" model:
1. To adhere to the psychological model is simply to claim that not all emotional
disorder can be traced to organic pathology ...
2. The behavioral model (the learning model) is much more specifically opposite to
the implication of underlying pathology of the medical model. The behavioral model
says that the symptom is the condition rather than a manifestation of an underlying
process. (Note the awkward phrasing with which the medical legacy leaves the behaviorist: a symptom symptomatic of nothing beyond itself.) . . .
3. The moral model . . . has arisen in opposition to the no-responsibility facet of the
disease model, which claims that many or all persons with psychiatric disorders should
be viewed as less accountable for their behavior than anyone else. The moral model
rejects the view that individuals are passive victims of their psychiatric maladies. ...
[The author then describes a (nameless) fourth view that "diagnosing and labeling
individuals is counterproductive."]
This account of the nature of various models should be revised because it seems to contrast
models which are not necessarily "rivals." A "psychological model" (as used in the above
descriptions) is principally a model describing the causes of disorder-and might very well
not be an "alternative" to a medical model but simply a particular kind of medical submodel
(at least under prevailing medical/psychiatric terminology). A "behavioral model" does not
usually embrace a different theory of causation of disease or disorder; by dispensing with
notions of disease and disorder, it dispenses with the need to discover their causes. The
"maladaptive behavior" identified by behaviorists is causally accounted for, in such a model,
by environmental conditions (and, one would suppose, genetic endowments). Cf. B.F. SKIN-

1975

Therapeutic Justifications

A physician or other therapist might address the question of justification for intervention in this way: when confronted with a patient/subject's complaints, he may decide that the complaint itself,
or a disease/disorder/defect, or some "maladaptive behavior", justifies intervention. This decision might be explicitly rationalized as
an application of some sort of general "justificatory rule" or "postulate," e.g.,
[may]

[with]
X's informed consent.

X has disease D; therefore X [should] be treated

[must]

0

[with or
without]

NER, ABOUT BEHAVIORISM 36, 116, 171 (1974). The principal functions of such a behaviorist

model would seem to be to describe the conditions for and kinds of intervention to be used
for dealing with anomalous behavior. (A "psychological model" might also, in addition to
dealing with causation, prescribe therapeutic practices; such a model would then be a more
appropriate contrast to a behaviorist model.) The function of the "moral model" in the
preceding account is to guide the ascription of responsibility, praise and blame for various
kinds of conduct under various kinds of conditions: It addresses moral evaluation, not just
problems of description, causation and therapy. It thus cuts across the first two models.
(Various models dealing with description and causation (including "diagnosis" within a
disease model) are also sometimes classified as "continuous" or "discontinuous," a usage
which is apparently related to "dimensional" and "typological" approaches to diagnosis.) I
will not go on to try to construct an adequate taxonomy of the different sorts of models
concerning mental/behavioral anomalies. See generally Lazare, Hidden ConceptualModels
in Clinical Psychiatry, 288 NEW ENG. J. MED. 345 (1973); Panzetta, Toward a Scientific
PsychiatricNosology, 30 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIAT. 154 (1974); Strauss, Diagnostic Models and
the Nature of PsychiatricDisorder, 29 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIAT. 445 (1973). See also M. SIEGLER
& H. OSMOND, MODELS OF MADNESS, MODELS OF MEDICINE (1974) [hereinafter referred to as
SIEGLER & OSMOND]; Wales, The Rise, The Fall, and the Resurrection of the Medical Model,
63 GEO. L.J. 87 (1974).
I will not consider issues concerning the ascription of moral and legal responsibility for
various actions of persons who are thought to be "ill" (in whatever sense and with respect to
whatever model) or whose conduct is thought to be "maladaptive"; nor issues concerning
varying degrees of stigmatization attending attributions of sickness, badness or maladaptiveness. Cf. Blaney, supra at 913; Moore, Mental Illness and Responsibility, 39 BULL. MENNINGER
CUN. 308 (1975).
9. Some comparisons between disease concepts on the one hand and behaviorist notions
of maladaptive behavior on the other are suggested in the text, §§ 11-F and V-C infra.
10. A more or less complete system of justificatory postulates can, in principle, be constructed, whether for disease, behaviorist, or other models. One would develop a formalized
or semi-formalized language, containing, inter alia, a set of relevant and appropriate definitions, rules of inference, and postulates (perhaps such as those in the text). The language
would enable one to identify individuals, diseases (or maladaptive behaviors), therapies,
qualified thel'apists, and an assortment of rules governing conditions under which informed
consent may or must be obtained, or when it is unnecessary, when judicial authorization is
required, and the like. When all the relevant information had been gathered, one would, in
principle, have a set of instructions specifying when certain therapies (or no therapy, or
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confinement rather than therapy) could properly be applied. There is no occasion to go into
any great detail here in an effort to describe such alternative languages. Anyone bent on such
an enterprise might consult D. RICHARDS, A THEORY OF REASONS FOR ACTION (1971); Montague,
Logical Necessity, Physical Necessity, Ethics and Quantifiers, 3 INQUIRY 259, 263 (1960) (an
effort, among other things, to construct a formalized language containing ethical postulates).
In formulating such a language, consider the relationships among terms such as "disease,"
"illness," (these two are used interchangeably here), "trauma," etc.; and compare the meanings of "X has no disease, illness or anomaly of any kind," "X is healthy," "X is normal," X
is well," etc. Cf. Boorse, On the Distinction Between Disease and Illness, 5 PHILOS. & PUB.
AFF. 49, 60-61 (1975), and the sources cited in note 8 supra. For a review of some of the
philosophical/legal problems of using "mental illness" language see Moore, Some Myths
About Mental Illness, 32 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIAT. 1483 (1975); text §§ III-A, III-B. Consult also
C. HEMPEL, FUNDAMENTALS OF CONCEPT FORMATION IN EMPIRICAL SCIENCE (1952); R.
BRAITHWAITE, SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION (1954). See generally the references cited in note 8.1
supra.
As indicated in the text, we will not discuss at length the differences between "therapeutic
justifications" and "punitive justifications" for intervention. (For present purposes, we can
subsume "custodial control" measures under "punishment.") The problem may be of considerable legal import-e.g., in determining whether certain procedures dubbed "therapy" constitute "punishment" (at least when coerced) within the meaning of the eighth amendment.
Cf. Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974); Knecht v.
Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973); Note, Limits on Punishment and Entitlement To
Rehabilitative Treatment of InstitutionalizedJuveniles: Nelson v. Heyne, 60 VA. L. REV. 864
(1974). The distinction may be rather difficult to draw-where it can be drawn at all-in a
number of contexts-e.g., where aversion therapy is used. (Roughly, an aversive conditioning
program attempts to associate unpleasant stimuli (which may be "punishments" in an ordinary sense) with unwanted behavior patterns. See Ayllon, Behavior Modification in Institutional Settings, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 3, 7 (1975).) Because of the difficulties in making the
distinction, the term "behavior therapy" may be ill-chosen. The purpose of any behavior
therapy (and perhaps at least in part, of any sort of therapy whatever for mental/behavioral
anomalies) is amelioration of behavior. That purpose overlaps (and in some cases may be
identical with) most of the customarily cited rationales of punishment (general and specific
deterrence, rehabilitation, moral education, incapacitation . .) save retribution simpliciter.

(The categories may overlap.) See generally J.

ANDENASES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE

(1974). Thus, differences in means for generating altered behavior (and not just in the intentions of the captors) arguably must be specified as part of any endeavor to distinguish therapy
and punishment. Cf. Friedman, Legal Regulation of Applied Behavior Analysis in Mental
Institutions and Prisons, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 39, 70-71 n.159 (1975); Opton, Psychiatric Violence
Against Prisoners: When Therapy is Punishment, 45 Miss. L.J. 605 (1974). Cf. also Ferster,
The Difference Between Behavioral and Conventional Psychology, 159 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL
Dis. 153 (1974). It may be that construction of a "disease model" in formulating a justificatory
system for therapeutic intervention could aid in the task of distinguishing punishment from
treatment (at least in some cases). See generally Opton, Institutional Behavior Modification
as a Fraud and Sham, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 20, 24 (1975):
Recent years have witnessed increasing use of the medical metaphor. The language
of behavior modification is ideally suited to this defensive operation, for it is abstract
enough to include, yet disguise, any exertion of institutional power through reward and
punishment. Best of all, the language of behavior modification exorcises entirely the
troublesome concept of punishment. There is no punishment in behavior modification,
only negative reinforcement.
See also Bazelon, Institutionalization,Deinstitutionalizationand the Adversary Process, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 897, 899 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Bazelon]: "There is a dangerous tendency today to justify retributive or punitive measures as treatment and not on their own
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This set of propositions (excluding those dispensing with consent)
intuitively seems to be so appealing or "axiomatic" to most denizens of western civilization that it apparently reflects operational
postulates implicitly followed by both therapists and patients/subjects alike. To inquire further as to why disease justifies
intervention might well be regarded as perverse by both therapist
and patient," but it is precisely one of the questions which must be
considered in fully analyzing the limits of justification for intervention. What role does or should the presence of disease, defect, disorder, or certain maladaptive patterns of behavior play in such justification? Since intervention may take the form of overruling a patient/subject's objections to therapy or his demands for therapy, the
question appears obviously to be a moral question-although voluntary intervention (by the therapist, or by the subject himself
through self-administration of interventional modalities) also raises
moral issues. Ought we to interfere with someone's decision whether
to forego or undertake therapeutic'" intervention into his/her own
mental processes and behavior and, if so, when and why? In venturing some tentative analyses of these matters let us consider some
basic variations in patient/therapist settings.
A.

Therapy for Disease in General-the Medical Model 3

Assume someone has leukemia. Everyone counts this as a disease.
In responding to a challenge to explain why leukemia is a disease
ground, as pure punishment." Cf. H.L.A. HART,

PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN
208 (1968):
Surely there are two features which, at present, are among those distinguishing punishment from medical treatment. . . .One of these is that, unlike medical treatment,
we use deterrent punishment to deter not only the individual punished but others by
the example of his punishment and the severity of the sentence may be adjusted
accordingly. . . . The second feature distinguishing punishment from treatment is
that unlike a medical inspection followed by detention in hospital, conviction by a
court followed by a sentence of imprisonment is a public act expressing the odium, if
not the hostility, of society for those who break the law.
(Does this account apply to "aversion therapy" as well as "medical treatment"?)
11. It seems about as perverse as asking "Why should promises be kept?" but, to appropriate Prof. Herbert Morris's phrase, such inquiries are in the philosophers' stocks of bread
and butter. H. MORRIS, FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY: READINGS IN PHILOSOPHY AND LAW iii
(1961).
12. Non-therapeutic justifications for intervention will be discussed very briefly in the
text accompanying notes 253-58 infra.
13. Terms like "disease model" and "behaviorist model" might for simplicity be thought
of as referring to different (and, at least in part, rival) sets of postulates, rules and various
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
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and should be treated, physicians and informed laity would no
doubt cite the gravely enhanced risk of early death; physical incapacity and discomfort; and an assortment of other symptoms and
signs.14 They might also offer some hypotheses concerning the cause
or causes of the disease." We will ignore, for present purposes, the
related propositions (see note 10 supra) which both describe and prescribe the nature of and
occasions for intervention. (They constitute rule systems of a sort.) "Disease model" might
thus designate a set of postulates in which the crucial therapy-justifying predicates name
diseases (however defined); "behaviorist model" might designate a set of postulates in which
the key therapy-justifying predicates involve a description of behavior characterized as "maladaptive" and an account of the reasons for such an attribution. The two sets of postulates
would also vary (inter alia) in the nature of the therapies involved. (The sets are, of course,
not exhaustive of the models which might conceivably describe methods of identifying anomalous behavior and trying to alter it.) Different disease models, whether for physical or mental
disease, would be defined by different sets of postulates, and by different "causal models"-sets of empirical propositions describing the etiologies of disease ("psychological
model," "organic model").
A number of different behaviorist models might also be generated. Terms like "punishment
model" and "therapeutic model" are somewhat grander. They refer to sets of rules (again
partly in conflict) governing and justifying official responses by the state to aberrant conduct
(defined, say, by reference to criminal codes or social customs). (For a brief discussion of the
differences between the two models see Legislating, supra note 1, at 296-97 n.201; cf. the
remarks of Prof. H.L.A. Hart, quoted note 10 supra.) Such models cut across the distinctions
made between disease and behaviorist models. A therapeutic model for dealing with unwanted conduct may embrace either a disease model or behaviorist model (or portions of
both) as submodels dictating appropriate therapeutic responses to certain kinds of behavior.
A punishment model may embrace a mental or physical disease model by, say, recognizing
an insanity or automatism defense or a diminished capacity plea. So far, no behaviorist model
has been expressly absorbed into any punishment model, nor is it clear how this might be
done. Compare United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 960-65 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon,
C.J., referring to the "irrationality" of the medical model and commenting on behaviorist
lore); N.H. REv. STAT. § 135-B:2 (XII) (Supp. 1973) (discussed in text accompanying notes
215-19 infra.). See text §§ II-F and V-C infra. See also United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d
969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) for recent ruminations on the relationship between disease models and
the insanity defense. See generally SIEGLER & OSMOND, supra note 8a, for elaboration of the
nature of various sorts of models. On the various functions of models in causal analysis see
M. SUSSER, CAUSAL THINKING IN THE HEALTH SCIENCES 32-34 (1972) (discussing predictive and
explanatory functions, and "representation" -i.e., describing known or posited relationships
in simplified form). Compare A. PAPANDREOU, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODEL CONSTRUCTION IN
MACROECONOMICS (1962). Further explication of the term "model" seems unnecessary. (Cf.
note 49 infra on "paradigm," which is sometimes the intended meaning of "model.")
14. "Signs" are "objective" symptoms of disease-those discoverable by physical examination without inquiring about the patient's own perceptions, e.g., of pain or discomfort. A
"symptom" is "any morbid phenomenon or departure from the normal in function, appearance, or sensation, experienced by the patient and indicative of disease." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL

1231 (22d ed. 1972).
Cf. King, What is Disease?, 21

DICTIONARY

15.

as King].

PHILOS. OF SCIENCE

193, 198 (1954) [hereinafter cited
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question of what are the defining characteristics of "disease," and
go straight to the justification question. "Why should leukemia be
treated?" would likely be regarded by most as a silly question. If
pressed, the respondent would probably cite the very indicators of
leukemia already tendered. "One should try to avert death, discomfort, etc. To the extent that death or discomfort are generated by
disease, the disease (or, to use another locution, the person) should
be treated in order to avert death, discomfort, etc. That's all there
is to it." The argument surely appeals to ordinary intuition, and
might be embodied in generalized postulates such as those articulated above. 6 Justification for treatment in a given case, however,
may be defeated by the protests (or at least the competent protests)
of the patient. In other cases, treatment might be thought
obligatory, consent or no, because of the seriousness of the malady,
the hardships to dependents or the state, or the decisional incapacity of the victim.' 7 If the disease is not serious or life-threatening,
we again are likely to approve of certain ministrations; but we are
also, in such cases, likely to avoid sharp criticism of either the
physician or patient in deciding to forego treatment (e.g., for the
ordinary cold-a case where the relative futility of most treatments
suggests "may be treated" rather than "must be treated" is the rule
or postulate to be followed).
B.

Therapy for Certain Discrete Organic Diseases Resulting
in Both Physical Dysfunction and Mentational and
Behavioral Anomalies-Still the Medical Model

There are several physical diseases involving relatively discrete or
easily identifiable organic etiologies which result both in physical
disabilities and mentational/behavioral anomalies. The American
Psychiatric Association's list of such diseases-"Organic Brain Syndromes"-includes, for example, the final stages of syphilis, and
various gross abnormalities involving brain structure, such as clots,
tumors, and bone fragments. The purposes of therapy would for the
most part be dual: to correct conditions posing fairly direct physical
danger (brain hemorrhage, interference with motor or autonomic
functions); and to eliminate whatever mentational/behavioral aberrations result from the organic brain abnormality or disease. (It
16.
17.

See text accompanying note 10 supra, and the additional commentary in note 10.
Compare BROOKS, supra note 4, at ch. 14 ("The Right to Treatment").
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might be that "trauma" is the more appropriate term in some of the
examples cited.) Indeed, in some cases where the physical danger
of the disease to its victim may be relatively slight, the principal
object of therapy may be to ameliorate mental and behavioral
anomalies resulting from the disease or trauma. These latter possibilities suggest some of the more intractable difficulties of the disease justification for intervention-e.g., those in which it is arguable
that there is a causal connection between discrete physical brain
disease and violence (or between neurotransmission anomalies of
the brain (discussed later)' 8 and violence). Suppose (and this is very
suppositious) we have successfully identified certain kinds of lesions, tumors, or other relatively discrete abnormalities in the brain
as causes of certain kinds of violence. 9 May, should or must the
person be treated through surgery upon the brain?'" What other
See text § III-C infra.
Compare V. MARK & F. ERVIN, VIOLENCE AND THE BRAIN (1970) [hereinafter cited as
MARK & ERVIN]; E. VALENSTEIN, BRAIN CONTROL 209-38 (1973) ("The Surgical Control of
Violence and Aggression") [hereinafter cited as VALENSTEIN]. See also VALENSTEIN, supra at
208:
The surgical treatment of violence and aggression shares many common elements with
the operations performed for movement disorders and epilepsy. In only some of these
instances is it possible to provide convincing evidence implicating a specific area of
the brain. Implanted electrodes are used in an attempt to better localize the cause of
the disorder, but in many instances parts of the brain are destroyed which are probably
perfectly normal.
See also Dr. Valenstein's observations quoted in note 84 infra.
20. An analysis of the justifications for intervention into anomalous behavior or mentation
plainly requires data on the effects of putative "therapies" such as psychosurgery. In endeavoring to make such assessments of organic therapies, it is quite distressing, to say the least,
to review the rather sorry state of some entries in the literature on this procedure. Thus:
There are many behavior disorders which are amenable only to stereotaxic interruption
of the various parts of the limbic system. These are characterized by hyperkinesis,
aggressive acts toward others, destructive tendencies, and hyperoral tendencies. In
some cases there has been a tendency to set fire to objects or persons. This report is
based on the management of 128 cases over a period of six years (1964-1970).
Balasabrumaniam, Ramanujam, Kanaka & Ramamurthi, Stereotaxic Surgery for Behavior
Disorders, in PSYCHOSURGERY 156 (E. Hitchcock, L. Laitinen & K. Vaernet eds. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as Balasabrumaniam]. There is not a hint in this or other passages of the
difficulties in describing and diagnosing "hyperkinesis" (cf. WENDER, supra note 3; Grinspoon
& Singer, Amphetamines in the Treatment of Hyperkinetic Children,43 HARv. ED. REV. 515
(1973); Sroufe & Stewart, Treating Problem Children with Stimulant Drugs, 289 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 407 (1973)); no account of the sorts of "aggressive acts toward others" (other than
setting fires) which might justify surgical destruction of brain tissue; and no explanation of
prior therapeutic regimens (e.g., administration of stimulants to "hyperkinetic" children)
which led to the conclusion that some disorder (such as it was) was "amenable only to
stereotaxic interruption ....
" The results, described in a "Proforma" rating scale, were
18.
19.
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therapies may, should, or must be tried or offered first? Should
his/her informed consent be a prerequisite, or are the dangers (to
others, to the person in question) so grave that the prima facie
injustice of enforced treatment is justified? Is confinement a required less onerous alternative for controlling certain forms of violence? 2 (The disease may or may not impair the capacity for in2
formed consent.1 )
classified as: "No need of any drug. Patient is able to mingle easily with others." "Very docile
with occasional outbursts only." "Manageable when given drugs, though not leading a useful
life." "Transient improvement but relapsed." "No change." "Died." (Balasabrumaniam,
supra at 159.) Really. It seems rather a mystery how anyone-surgeon, psychiatrist, scientist
or lay person-could, in assessing psychosurgery, rely on this "study."
On psychosurgery, see generally NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, PSYCHOSURGERY:
PERSPECTIVES ON A CURRENT PROBLEM (1973)) (DHEW PuB. No. (HSM) 73-9119) [hereinafter
cited as DHEW]; Memorandum on Psychosurgery from the Director of NIMH, Dr. Bertram
S. Brown, M.D., to the Assistant Secretary for Health (1974) (received by this author at
U.S.C. on May 14, 1974) (recommending that psychosurgery be considered "experimental"
(at 5); that it should not be performed on "involuntarily confined persons or persons incapable of giving consent, either by reason of age or mental condition" (at 6); and registering "full
and complete accord" with the decision in Kaimowitz; Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Health of the Senate Comm. on Laborand Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 (1973).
Stereotaxic (or stereotactic) psychosurgery is performed by inserting fine wire electrodes
into the brain and stimulating or destroying selected small amounts of tissue by electrical
discharge; or by inserting small tubes and passing substances through them which will affect
or destroy minute areas of tissue. MARK & ERVIN, supra note 19, at 29-30, 69-87. These
techniques are to be contrasted with older forms of "lobotomy," which destroy much larger
portions of brain tissue. DHEW, supra at 4. See also Andy, Neurosurgical Treatment of
Abnormal Behavior, 252 AM. J. MED. SCIENCES 232-38 (1966). See generally Gobert,
Psychosurgery, Conditioning,and the Prisoner'sRight to Refuse "Rehabilitation," 61 VA. L.
REv. 155 (1975).
Psychosurgery in any of its forms should be distinguished not only from brain surgery to
repair damage from clots, bone fragments, foreign bodies, and the like, but also from brain
surgery to relieve pain. Telephone interview with Benjamin Crue, M.D., Chairman, Clinical
Neurology Division of the Department of Neurosurgery, City of Hope National Medical
Center, Duarte, California, Dec. 12, 1973. (Electrical stimulation of the brain is also used for
that purpose.) Such surgery or stimulation does not seem to involve the purposeful manipulation of mentation and behavior connoted by "mind/behavior control." The distinction, however, blurs when the means of alleviating the suffering from pain involves the inducing of
more or less "pleasurable" states of mind. Cf. Scoville, Psychosurgery and other Lesions of
the Brain Affecting Human Behavior, in PSYCHOSURGERY 5, 7 (E. Hitchcock, L. Laitenen &
K. Vaernet eds. 1972):
Prefrontal lobotomies and leukotomies rostral to the thalamus do not alter the appreciation of pain but do remove the anticipation and the remembrance of pain. Consequently it is of no benefit in the organic pain of pathological fractures or nerve compressions and in fact will cause the patient to be less inhibited in his outcries. It is of benefit
to patients dying of cancer with drug addiction and the fear of pain and death. It may
sweeten their last months of living.
21. See Legislating, supra note 1, at 299-300.
22. Cf. Gaylin, The Problem of Psychosurgery 13 (Hastings Center Readings, No. 905,
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Since we are talking of operating on the brain, we need also to ask
what mentational and behavioral consequences might result from
intervening into the brain's complex ecosystem, because the integrity of the victim's very identity is threatened, perhaps as much by
the treatment as by the disease 2. 3 Indeed, the principal object of the
intervention is to alter behavior, personality and identity in certain
ways. The very prospects which seem to call for therapy-ameliorating mental dysfunctions, avoiding various dangers to others or to
1975-76): "[W]here psychosurgery is considered, the consenting organ is the damaged organ.
But to what extent is it damaged, and should this damage impede our acceptance of informed
consent?"
23. Thus, cognitive deficits may result from brain surgery (cf. VALENSTEIN, supra note 19,
at 203; Shatin & Winter, Frontal Lobotomy, Mental Illness, and Pain: A Psychological
Perspective in Winter, supra note 6, at 69, 71-72 [hereinafter cited as Shatin & Winter]) as
well as affective deterioration (Shatin & Winter, supra at 72).
Psychologists have studied the cognitive and intellectual changes after frontal
lobotomy more extensively than the personality changes. Reports of loss of general
intelligence after lobotomy are in the minority. The major investigations did not demonstrate permanent deficit on intelligence tests, but the length of time between surgery
and postoperative study can be a moderating factor in the results. For example, in one
twenty-year follow-up study of the hospitalized subjects of full lobotomy, the substantial presence of mild to severe intellectual deterioration was reported [citing Dynes,
Lobotomy-Twenty Years Later, 95 VA. MED. MONTHLY 306 (1968)]. Another longterm study of the effects of topectomy in schizophrenia shows that eight years later
there were significant losses not present shortly after psychosurgery in eight of fourteen
psychological test measures [citing Smith & Kinder, Changes in Psychological Test
Performances of Brain-OperatedSchizophrenics After Eight Years, 129 SCIENCE 149
(1959)]. The results were influenced by age, type of test, and site of operation. Some
deficits have been reported on some specialized tests. Among these are preseverative
rigidity and errors in sorting tasks, although data to the contrary are also reported.
Consistently, there has been loss in performance on the Porteus maze test. Fluency of
word production seems to decrease. Memory and retention are usually unimpaired
though a few investigators have reported otherwise.
In summary, data from these psychological tests suggest that special types of cognitive deficit probably do occur after extensive surgery but that little deficit ensues from
the more selective operative procedures, at least over shorter-term postoperative intervals. The general intellectual capacity tends to be unimpaired, but the long-term
results of the more restricted procedures remain to be tested by sensitive psychological
instruments.
Shatin & Winter, supra at 71-72. See also VALENSTEIN, supra note 19, at 398 n.43:
Dr. Ward Halstead . . . studied lobotomized patients on a battery of different subtests, many of his own design, and concluded that the "frontal lobes, long regarded as
silent areas, are the portion of the brain most essential to biological intelligence." Drs.
Aaron Smith and Elaine Kinder also reported significant deficits in performance on
the Wechsler-Bellevue Intelligence Tests 8 years after topectomy. The deficits, which
were evident only on certain subtests, were not detected during testing administered
only 120 days after surgery.
Topectomy is described in VALENSTEIN, supra note 19, at 281.
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the subject-also suggest hesitation: surgery may impair both
affective mentation and cognition, and thereby cause dysfunctions
and psychic suffering. Indeed, some of these consequences may
resemble the diesase-caused adversities" which occasioned the call
for therapy in the first place.
C.

Therapy for Mental Disease: NeurotransmissionAnomaliesStill the Medical Model

Despite the studied and frequently cogent attacks that have been
made on the concept of mental illness/disease, that idea endures,
and remains the basis of psychiatric diagnostics (indeed, it seems
tautologous to say so). "Mental illness/disease" (and related mental
anomaly terms) also remain in use as (1) action-justifying predicates for treatment, both voluntary and coerced, and for confinement, voluntary or coerced; and as (2) basic responsibility-assessing
predicates, e.g., as used in the insanity defense, pleas of diminished
capacity, the issue of competence to stand trial, to make wills, etc.
As will be explained in somewhat more detail later, a good many
physicians and scientists believe that they have discovered, or will
soon discover, reasonably precise causal correlations between aber24.

Cf. VALENSTEIN, supra note 19, at 230-31:
There is a very evident tendency to describe the postoperative behavior of the amygdalectomized patients in terms of improvement of the symptoms that are most disturbing to others, particularly uncooperativeness and aggressiveness. Less attention is paid
to the intellectual and emotional changes that may have been induced. Ruth Anderson, a psychologist studying some of the amygdalectomized patients of Vaernet and
Madsen, reported evidence of a loss of ability to shift attention and to respond emotionally. Although 13 of the 15 patients studied by Anderson received only unilateral
lesions and her tests were mainly designed to detect memory deficits (it was not
disturbed), she concludes:
Typically the patient tends to become more inert, and shows less zest and
intensity of emotions. His spontaneous activity tends to be reduced and he
becomes less capable of creative productivity, which is independent of the
intelligence level. . . .
With these changes in initiative and control of behavior, our patients resemble
those with frontal lesions. It must be pointed out, however, that the changes are
very discrete and there is no evidence of serious disturbance in the establishment and execution of their major plans of action . . .
Presumably he will make the most of this gain [certain aspects of retention
are improved] in well structured situations of a somewhat monotonous and
simple character.
Dr. William Sweet of the Massachusetts General Hospital indicated in a conversation
with the author that he has observed deficits following amygdalectomy that were
similar to those described by Ruth Anderson.
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rations in the electrochemical activity of certain portions of the
brain and various conditions that diagnosticians regard as constituting or evidencing "mental disease. 21 5 It would be tempting, of
course, to urge that we had simply discovered some physical diseases which provide a causal explanation of mental/behavioral
anomalies with which we were already familiar. There is, however,
some contrast to be made between neurotransmission anomalies on
the one hand, and physical abnormalities of the sort described earlier (e.g., syphilitic conditions, tumors, etc.) on the other. The latter
usually pose obvious physical dangers to the brain and to the entire
organism. (Since this may not always be the case, and neurotransmission difficulties might someday be shown to threaten directly
the physical organism, the distinction drawn between neurotransmission anomalies and "grosser" brain defects is not entirely clearcut.) But it appears that when neurotransmission anomalies are
posited, the principal adverse effects which can be cited are mental
and behavioral. The physical organism itself seems in most cases
not to be directly or seriously threatened. The point to be made
here, however, is that anomalous patterns of thinking and acting
which many already describe as mental diseases of one sort or another are now thought to be capable of being accounted for (at least
in some part) by electrochemical aberrations in the brain. The process of justifying therapy in such cases may exhibit what initially
seem to be some oddities: some healers may venture to treat such
(arguably) electrochemically caused diseases with nonorganic therapies (the psychotherapeutic modalities); others may use organic
therapies such as psychochemotherapy or convulsive therapy; and
obviously both sets of therapies might be employed to complement
each other. (Such problems of "fitting the therapy to the anomaly"
will be considered below. 2 )
D.

Therapy for Mental Disease Interpreted Without Reference to
Physical Causes-And More of the Medical Model

As Dr. Thomas Szasz has frequently observed, an historic
difficulty plaguing users of the concept of mental illness has been
the incapability or difficulty of discovering any sort of cause for
anomalous mentation and behavior, whether the cause sought is
25.
26.

See text § III-B infra.
See text § III-C infra.
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"physical," "psychological,"" or based on conscious or "nonconscious" thought. "Traditional" diagnosticians, therefore, have of
necessity developed their nosologies and diagnostic techniques by
attempting to discern recurring patterns of mentation and behavior
which are regarded either as evidence of disease (however caused)
or as constitutive of disease itself (again, however caused). Therapies for mental diseases thought to have been identified in this way
of course include (as with other mental diseases) both the
psychotherapeutic and organic modalities. We will later refer again
to the problems of causation in suggesting methods of explicating
the concept of mental illness. It should suffice for the present enterprise to conclude tentatively that talk about psychic causes (like
talk about wants and beliefs) of anomalous thought and action is
cognitively meaningful (though perhaps vague, or, worse, simply
false); and it is at least equally meaningful to talk, even without
adverting to causation, of recurring linked clusters of mental/behavioral aberrations which constitute or evidence disease.
Indeed, it may well be that the idea of recurring linked clusters of
mental/behavioral events and processes is central to the concept of
mental disease, just as recurring patterns of organic signs and symptoms are central to the concept of physical disease. (Notions of
causation-and physical causation in particular-may, however, be
more important to the idea of physical disease than to the idea of
mental disease.)
E.

Therapy Without Disease-Another Form of the Medical
Model

Suppose that certain forms of violence have been linked with
27. The expression "of psychological origin" is not very illuminating even to those who
find behaviorist principles or neurophysiological theories generally unacceptable. A reasonable philosophical position would seem to be that the use of such an expression does not
conflict with any scientific hypothesis correlating mentation and behavior with neurophysiological states; it simply reflects the possibility (1) that such states may be so complex that it
is of little or no theoretical or therapeutic value to advert to the physical correlates of the
condition said to be "of psychological origin"; and (2) that there may be a useful causal
hypothesis framed in the language of non-physiological psychology which may aid in accounting for the mentation and behavior in question. A third connotation of the expression might
be that the anomaly in question owes its origin in large part to certain environmental conditions or events. The mentation patterns involved would still have neurophysiological correlates, diffuse or otherwise. Cf. text accompanying note 67 infra. Cf. also note 29 infra on
"correlates." See generally A. GOLDMAN, A THEORY OF HUMAN ACTION ch. 5 (1970) ("Explanations of Action in the Behavioral Sciences") [hereinafter cited as GOLDMANI.
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certain neural tissue or regions of the brain in this way: although
there appears to be nothing structurally or "architecturally" wrong
with any brain tissue, and no neurochemical disorder is discovered
(though it might be posited"9 ), the person's violence can be stopped
or reduced in frequency or intensity by destroying a certain bit of
neural tissue, which (arguably) presents itself as being normal. (We
leave open the question whether this might be a causal link.)
Tersely: there is recurrent episodic violence, but no disease of the
brain and arguably no mental illness of any sort;29 nevertheless, the
violence can be stopped by destruction of certain "normal" brain
tissue. Should the surgeon "cut"? We must, of course, inform this
decision by attempting to predict and assess the mental and behavioral consequences of such a procedure. It is conceivable, though
unlikely, that all that we could discern (in both the short and long
run30 ) as a result of the surgery would be the elimination of, say,
violent rages, and no other traits or characteristics or propensities
would be altered.3 Is the procedure less justified because of the
absence of physical disease? If so, should we after all look for mental
disease? How would that help? Does it make any difference whether
there is any sort of disease? Is confinement simpliciter ever justified
28. See text § II-C supra and § Ill-B infra.
29. The discovery of neurophysiological correlates of mentation and behavior-and the
attending possibility of identifying differential correlates of anomalous mentation and behavior-suggests the usage "physical illness with (primarily) mental/behavioral effects." This is
not, it is suggested, a very felicitous expression: the mental/behavioral anomalies resulting
from the "disease" in question appear to be the principal (though probably not the only)
effects which are dysfunctional or otherwise noteworthy, and neurotransmission (unlike a clot
which might affect neurotransmission by destroying or impairing cell functions) seems to be
the very physical process-stuff correlated with mentation. See discussion in text § III-B infra.
(The terms "correlates" and "substrates" are being used here without any precise interpretation. The former term is ambiguous because (among other things) it does not distinguish
correlates which seem to be "direct causes" of something, from those which are more or less
constant accompaniments of something (e.g., because the correlates derive from the same
cause as the something). "Substrates" perhaps suggests closer causal connection. There
seems little point in fussing with these terms or becoming enmeshed in cosmic issues such as
the mind-body problem. There is much point, however, in recognizing that establishing the
existence of empirical correlations of any sort may be exceptionally difficult. For analyses of
"causation" and "correlation," see generally T. COLTON, STATISTICS IN MEDICINE 214, 271
(1974); M. SUSSER, CAUSAL THINKING IN THE HEALTH SCIENCES (1972).
30. See notes 23, 24 supra and note 115 infra for a brief discussion of and references to
follow-up studies of psychosurgery.
31. See text accompanying notes 23, 24 supra and note 115 infra for references to certain
"movement disorders" which may be correctible through brain surgery; such surgical procedures should probably not be considered "psychosurgery."
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in such circumstances (assuming no crime has been committed)? It
might well be suggested that since here we are dealing with the
harmful effects of a person's condition-diseased or not-we are
misguided in worrying about disease at all. The question (so it
might be argued) is not so much one of treating diseases as it is one
or preventing harms; whether a given mode of prevention of harms
to oneself or others ought to be effected has nothing to do with
whether a disease is present as a cause of such harms.2 As we shall
see, this appears to be precisely the view of many or most behaviorists, and this will be discussed in the next section.33
To shift briefly to a constitutional perspective concerning therapy
within the medical model: If we assert a first amendment right
against procedures which significantly intrude upon mentation,34
32. MARK & ERVIN, supra note 19, seem (possibly inadvertently) to talk this way. They
refer to the case of Clara T. "to illustrate the value of stereotactic surgery in controlling the
violent behavior accompanying bilateral temporal lobe epilepsy." Id. at 70. And, "[miedical
and neurological tests showed that Clara had extensive disease in her remaining temporal
lobe." Id. at 71. Later, they describe the effects of stereotactic surgery:
We have watched Clara's progress for nearly 6 years. The frequency of her epileptic
seizures has diminished and her rages and unprovoked assaults have not recurred at
all. She has been able to resume a more normal life, both in the community and at
home. We did not achieve our goal of controlling her epileptic seizures; nonetheless,
we did stop her rage attacks and the results of the operation are thus gratifying.
Clara's case is important for several reasons. First it shows that surgical treatment
can be used effectively to stop abnormalattacks of rage. Secondly, it demonstrates the
separationof rage and epilepsy. The operation had a striking effect on the former even
though it had but a slight effect on the latter.
Id. at 85 (emphasis added). Since their goal was to demonstrate the value of surgery in
preventing violence "accompanying" (precisely what this means is not clear) temporal lobe
epilepsy, why they think the particular demonstration with Clara was so terrific is something
of a mystery. It is at least arguable that they have "treated" the violence, rather than the
disease. As Hodson has put it: "Stereotactic surgery controls only the violence, not the disease
which supposedly causes it, and thus cannot be defended as a technique which treats disease." Hodson, Reflections Concerning Violence and the Brain, 9 CRIM. L. BuLL. 684, 699 n.42
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Hodson]. Hodson also points out that, after discussing Clara T.,
Mark and Ervin quite confusingly state that " 'Julia's case clearly illustrates the point that
violent behavior caused by brain dysfunction cannot be modified except by treating the
dysfunction itself.' " Id. at 700, quoting MARK & ERVIN, supra note 19, at 98. It is also arguable that seizures and violence or rage are both (more or less) concurrent effects of a disease
(here, temporal lobe epilepsy), but that surgery affected only the rage. There seems to be
nothing in MARK & ERVIN. however, which might clarify the problem noted by Hodson. If
Mark and Ervin have not contradicted themselves, they seem to have obscured their point.
33. Cf. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN § 135-B: 2(XII) (Supp. 1973), which evidently seeks to join
the disease and behaviorist modes by defining "mental illness" as "maladaptive behavior
and/or recognized emotional symptoms that can be related to psychological, physiological
and/or sociologic factors" (emphasis added). See additional discussion in text § V-C infra.
34. See Legislating, supra note 1, at 255-69, for an elaboration of the first amendment
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can the state establish a compelling interest35 in treatment over
competent protest because a disease has been determined to be the
cause of certain dangerous behavior? Why would the presence of
such a disease enhance the state's case? Or, why would absence of
a disease entity hurt the state's case, as long as the state's proposed
"therapy" could promise a reduction in violence?" Why indeed is
the issue relevant? These questions will be raised again below.
F. Therapy Without Disease-The Behaviorist Model
The proposition that there exist ongoing conditions called "diseases" which are substantially responsible for dangerousness, disability, incompetence . . . is sharply contravened or regarded as
irrelevant or meaningless by many or most behaviorists. A careful
explication of both the dispute and of the concept of mental disease-if it can be explicated at all-are thus plainly crucial for the
generation of a coherent therapeutic logic. A slightly more extended
discussion of behaviorism is ventured below, 7 but it is enough, for
now, to say this: the aim of behaviorists apparently is to identify
"maladaptive behavior" 38 and shape it into more appropriate forms.
Whether for purely pragmatic reasons or upon well-considered philargument and the concept of intrusiveness of therapy.
35. See Legislating, supra note 1, at 276-307, for a discussion of the state's possible
"compelling interests" in enforced therapy.
36. Compare the "dilemma" posed by Chief Judge Bazelon in United States v. Alexander,
471 F.2d 923, 964 n.120 (D.C. Cir. 1973): therapies which "work" are coercive and should not
be used; only therapies which "don't work" are permissible. It is suggested that the effective/intrusive distinction is of particular aid in guiding the state's choice of therapy; relatively
effective therapies which are relatively non-intrusive are to be preferred over equally effective-and perhaps over some more effective-therapies which are highly intrusive. See Legislating, supra note 1, at 287. For a general discussion of effectiveness and intrusiveness see id.
at 262-69. Both these concepts appear to be polythetic or cluster concepts in the sense
discussed in the text, § III-A infra. In brief, such concepts are applied by referring to a set of
properties, none/few of which is/are necessary condition(s) and none/few of which is/are
sufficient condition(s) for the correct use of the concept. If a "quorum" (of sorts) of these
properties exists then the concept is arguably applicable. See generally J. HOSPERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 71 (2d ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as HOSPERS].
37. See text § V-C infra.
38. This term is frequently used in the behaviorist literature, e.g., BANDURA, supra note
6, at 77. There appears to be some tendency to frustrate conceptual analysis of "maladaptive
behavior" by trivializing it so as automatically to affix that label to whatever behaviors a
subject complains about. Cf. D. RIMM & J. MASTERS, BEHAVIOR THERAPY: TECHNIQUES AND
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 14 (1974) [hereinafter cited as RIMM & MASTERS]: "Behavior therapists
are . . . likely to accept the client's presenting complaints as valid (if he did not suffer
from these complaints, he would not have sought professional help)."
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osophical grounds, they dispense with the notion of disease-or so
they say. The "or so they say" is added because, as will be suggested
later, certain isomorphisms exist between therapeutic decisionmaking processes based upon a disease model 9 on the one hand, and
such decision-making processes based upon a behaviorist model on
the other. Despite the similarities, however, some striking and quite
important moral and constitutional issues are raised when the therapeutic model prescribed is a behaviorist one: all-or very nearly
all-civil commitment statutes which set forth standards for confining dangerous or gravely disabled persons require that such danger
or disability be attributable to (or caused by) mental anomaly. 0
What if that requirement were excised? Constitutional? Fair? Socially beneficial? Is it operationally excised anyway because the
commitment process does not and cannot adjudicate issues turning
upon the murky set of mental anomaly terms now at our disposal? 4 ' If a behaviorist model were widely adopted (and it may
39. Because of the possibility that physicians may be at work even where no disease is
apparent (text at § II-E supra), the terms "disease model" and "medical model" are not fully
interchangeable. It may be that the term "medical model" ought not be interpreted to include
those classes of situations where a physician's ministrations seem appropriate, but no disease
is present-e.g., cosmetic surgery. Cf. Veatch, The Medical Model: Its Nature and Problems,
1 HASTINGS CENTER STUDIES 59, 76 (1973). (It is arguable, however, that (a) disfigurement of
some sort might be considered a disease (at least by the patient); or (b) that a strong or
obsessive desire for cosmetic improvement is a constituent or product of some mental disease
of the patient.)
40. We are excluding from the discussion statutory authorizations for detaining persons
in quarantine as health hazards, "protective custody" of witnesses or homeless juveniles, and
other "social welfare" processes. One might well urge that the juvenile justice system is so
lax that, even when explicitly required by law, neither criminal or other unlawful acts nor
mental anomaly are operationally the basic requirements for detention. Some aspects of the
juvenile justice system, however, might well be regarded as constituting a major theoretical
(and not just an operational) exception to this proposition-and perhaps an unconstitutional
variation. Cf. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 601 (Supp. 1975):
Any person under the age of 18 years who persistently or habitually refuses to obey
the reasonable and proper orders or directions of his parents, guardian, or custodian,
or who is beyond the control of such person, or who from any cause is in danger of
leading an idle, dissolute, lewd, or immoral life, is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge such person to be a ward of the court.
Cf. also id. §§ 601.1, .2. Constitutional attacks of various sorts upon § 600 have so far been
unsuccessful. See Maillard v. Gonzalez, 416 U.S. 918 (1974) (mem.).
(The "detention" effected upon being drafted into the armed services is also obviously
excluded from what we are referring to as "civil commitment" procedures.)
40.1. It is difficult (but not impossible) to resist inferring, from a finding of dangerousness
or disability, some mental anomaly as a cause of such states. To do so casually would of course
approach an operational deletion of the mental anomaly requirement. Cf. Bazelon, supra note
10, at 900 n.9:
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well be, given its increasing popularity), what effect would this have
upon notions of "insanity" in criminal trials, and upon the bases for
various sorts of civil commitment? Of this, more later. Let us turn
now to a somewhat fuller articulation of the concepts involved in
formulating justifications for intervention into mentation and behavior.
III.

PREVIEWS OF THINGS WHICH SHOULD COME

A complete account of therapeutic justifications for intervention
or confinement would require, among other things: (a) an extended
explication of the principal action-justifying predicates now used by
therapists-"physical disease," "mental disease" and "maladaptive behavior"; (b) a reasonably complete description of nontherapeutic justifications for intervention. Neither will be done
here: we will focus instead upon certain concrete legal/constitutional and moral issues raised by therapeutic justifications, and
assume that some core of cognitive meaning attaches to the justificatory predicates in question. Obviously, some of these problems
of law and morals owe their existence to the partial ineffability of
the mental/behavioral anomaly terms, and so we are to a degree
putting the cart before the horse. There are, nevertheless, significant problems which can be addressed without having first essayed the full explicatory ventures just described, and these problems will be aired below. The nature of the projected explication
process for the anomaly terms, however, should briefly be described.
The distinction between confinement on the basis of pure dangerousness and dangerousness coupled with a mental disability, however, is largely nonexistent in practice
since any person found to be dangerous will most likely manifest some kind of personality disorder.
But in a meaningful and coherent diagnostic system, dangerous acts-or dangerousness inferred from dangerous acts-should be non-decisive evidence (if it is to be evidence at all) of
mental anomaly. In order to choose that inference over competing inferences (the subject had
rationally chosen a life of crime as the easiest way to make money; the subject was a Mafia
lieutenant; the subject was evil) more specific descriptions of prior acts, including nondangerous acts, and of patterns of mental functioning (evidenced, of course, by behavior)
would have to be identified; and these showings would have to be established as relevant
under rules of inference deriving from the definition of the anomaly in question. Compare
the so-called "caveat paragraph" of the Model Penal Code: "The terms 'mental disease or
defect' do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct." MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(2) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962), quoted and
discussed in United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 992-94 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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The Mental/BehavioralAnomaly Terms as Cognitively
Meaningful "Cluster" or "Polythetic" Concepts4"

"What do you mean by 0 ?" is frequently a reasonable, if annoying, request during many confabulations. A respondent's impulse (if
at all civilized) is quite likely to be to try to determine the necessary
and sufficient conditions (or defining characteristics") which determine the correct use of the term. For a great many general terms,
however, this goal is impossible because there are few or no such
necessary conditions, and few or no such sufficient conditions. Such
terms can be explicated,43 if at all, by reference to a set (frequently
indeterminate in size or membership) of "properties" (including
conditions, processes, events) which constitute relevant but nondecisive criteria for use of the cluster/polythetic term. "Man,"
"dog,"" "negligence," "democracy," "games," "physical disease,"
"mental disease," and certain scientific terms (e.g., names of various taxa in biology) are examples of cluster terms. "Theorem,"
"electromagnetic field," "numbers," and a variety of mathematical
and physical science terms are non- (or less-it may be a matter of
degree) polythetic. To be somewhat more precise, the core of the
explanation of cluster concepts, as worked out by philosophers and
biologists interested in taxonomy seems roughly to be this:
(a) Few or no necessary conditions (criteria, characteristics
-including "signs" and "symptoms" of "diseases") for application of the term naming the concept can be specified.
(b) Few or no sufficient conditions can be specified.45
41. See note 48 infra and accompanying text for an explanation of this terminology.
42. The term "defining characteristics" is used here to refer to both the necessary and
the sufficient conditions for proper application of a concept or predicate. It is usually used to
designate necessary conditions only. Cf. HOSPERS, supra note 36, at 23-24.
43. The term "explication" is used in the Carnapian sense: R. CARNAP, MEANING AND
NECESSITY: A STUDY IN SEMANTICS AND MODAL LOGIC 7 (enlarged ed. 1956): "By the explication
of a familiar but vague concept we mean its replacement by a new exact concept .... "
(Perhaps the term "exact" is rather too strong.) See also R. CARNAP, LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF PROBABILrrY 576 (2d ed. 1962): "Sometimes a theory is offered as a 'rational reconstruction'
of a body of generally accepted but more-or-less vague beliefs." Carnap's goal of explicating
concepts and rationally reconstructing bodies of concepts will regrettably not be achieved
here.
44. HOSPERS, supra note 36, at 70-74.
45. The "few or no" restriction in conditions (a) and (b) entails that polytheticity, as
explicated here, is a matter of degree. The present explication also entails that polytheticity
is not a polythetic concept. (The vagueness entailed by being "a matter of degree" is different
from the vagueness attending polytheticity of a concept.)
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(c) A number of relevant conditions can be specified, although
the set of such conditions may be indeterminate in the sense
that we may not be sure we have specified or could in principle
specify the nature of all the members of the set (finite or infinite).
(d) Although individually non-decisive, such conditions may
vary in importance for a variety of reasons.
(e) If an "adequate" number or "quorum"'" of appropriate or
important" conditions are satisfied, we may (arguably) correctly apply the term naming the concept."
Actual usage of such terms may turn in large part upon comparing
a cluster of conditions presented in a given case with that of a
"paradigm" case."
46. HOSPERS, supra note 36, at 71.
47. Cf. Slote, The Theory of Important Criteria, 68 J. PHios. 211 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Slote]. Physical characteristics of parents might form the "property set" containing
the criteria for applicability of a cluster concept involving membership in some family.
Wittgenstein's notion of "family resemblances" may thus be embraced by the concept of
cluster concepts. Cf. text accompanying note 187 infra.
48. Compare Morton Beckner's formulation of "polytypic" concepts in Biology, 1 ENCYC.
OF PHILOS. 310 (1967; reprint ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Beckner]. Prof. Beckner now uses
the term "polythetic" because biologists already use "polytypic" for other purposes. For an
analysis of polytheticity by biologists see R. SOKAL & P. SNEATH, PRINCIPLES OF NUMERICAL
TAXONOMY 13 (1963) [hereinafter cited as TAXONOMY]. (Sokal and Sneath there suggest use
of the term "polythetic concept" which seems roughly equivalent to the term "cluster
concept" as used by philosophers.) For extensive analyses of "cluster" or "polythetic" concepts see W. ALSTON, PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 88-90 (1964) [hereinafter cited as ALSTON];
HOSPERS, supra note 36, at 69-74; TAXONOMY, supra at 13-16; Beckner, supra; Kaplan,
Definition and Specification of Meaning, 48 J. PHILOS. 281 (1946); Putnam, The Analytic and
the Synthetic, 3 MINN. STUDIES IN THE PHILOS. OF SCIENCE 358 (1962); Slote, supra note 47.

It would seem in principle possible to specify some necessary conditions for the use of any
general term by referring to some very broadly defined class containing its referents, or whose
members it characterizes. Thus, a disease-whatever it is-is predicated only of living things;
a chair-whatever else it is-is a physical object. To pursue the matter by seeking to narrow
the set, however, will soon produce precisely the discord which marks the use of cluster terms:
it would not do, for example, to describe diseases as "attributes of living things which kill
them (or make them feel uncomfortable .. )"; or to describe chairs as "physical objects
which have four legs (and which one can sit in without causing them to crumble, ...)."
Similarly, "democracy" ispredicated only of sets of living entities, where the sets have more
than one member. Again, it will not do to add "and in which 'minority group' members have
certain rights against the majority." Cf. Slote, supra note 47, at 212-20. Such identification
of necessary conditions-describing a broadly defined class in this manner-is likely to be a
trivial operation, because the knowledge that something is in the class does not serve to
distinguish it in important ways (for purposes of a given discussion) from other things,
entities, attributes, processes, etc. It is not particularly informative to observe that a necessary condition for an X to be a Y is that X be a member of a class all of whose members can
be characterized as "existing."
49. Loosely, a paradigm might be described as an entity which most persons who are
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relevantly knowledgeable would regard not only as described by the concept or predicate in
question but (perhaps) as "the very model" of something so described. (Note that the "persons who are relevantly knowledgeable" requirement (left undefined) has nothing to do, in
this context, with invoking an "ideal observer" to resolve value disputes.) Consider, e.g., a
disease involving high risk of death, great pain or discomfort, dysfunctionality of certain
organic systems, dysfunctionality with respect to achieving various important goals, infection
or other well-defined etiology, discrete lesions or trauma, specifiable biochemical anomalies,
deviation from statistical norms, amenability to well-defined treatment: tuberculosis or the
plague, perhaps. These conditions would of course be interrelated in a single disease (for
simplicity, we assume there is only one disease). We then compare other entities with the
paradigm, even though the paradigm itself (as the term is used here) may not possess all the
(known) members of the property set in question. (Some readers may wish to restrict the class
of paradigms to those entities exhibiting all the properties found to be relevant.)
With regard to manifest characteristics [of "minimal brain dysfunction" in children],
the symptoms are grouped together in a syndrome simply because they are associated
with one another on a greater than chance basis. Such groupings pose no problems in
the "classical" instance in which almost all symptoms are present in a given individual. The syndrome was initially described in children who were hyperactive and impulsive, had cognitive defects, and were emotionally labile. As a world-famous professor
of medicine observed, "In such cases even the janitor can make the diagnosis." But
should the syndrome be said to exist when only a few of these characteristics are
present? What of the child who is hyperactive and distractible, but shows no cognitive
defects and is not emotionally labile? Or the child who is impulsive but hypoactive
and undistractible?
WENDER, supra note 3, at 62-63. It is fair to ask why the paradigm is indeed a paradigm-how
can you tell it is such without rules concerning defining conditions or specifying what is a
"significant proportion"? It is also fair to respond by saying, for example, "almost all (the
important) symptoms or properties are present," where the symptoms or properties in fact
present may be particularly striking, or have peculiar historical significance, or may be linked
in certain ways (causally or otherwise) or may be in fact present in an overwhelming majority
of those entities which an overwhelming majority of relevantly educated persons would regard
as being described by the concept in question.
Applying these remarks to a particular disease: in his analysis of minimal brain
dysfunction, Wender states that
In general it is impossible, a priori, to specify meaningful and exact rules for a syndrome by which one may decide whether a particular individual is to be included or
excluded. Rules for inclusion can be arbitrarily decided upon but the usefulness of such
assignment rules must eventually depend on other criteria for defining the syndrome.
A technique's efficacy in diagnosis (i.e., categorization) can ultimately be assessed only
against another method of defining the state in question. This method of evaluation
poses many fewer problems for medicine than it does for psychiatry. . . . Since etiological and prognostic knowledge about MBD is in an elementary state, it is difficult
to know which pattern should be defined as criteria of the MBD syndrome. As with
acute rheumatic fever or schizophrenia, it is easy to define "core" cases; the important
problem exists at the periphery. . . . I will attempt to show that many of the diverse
behavioral characteristics of the MBD child can be seen as superficial variations on a
more simple psychological theme-that is, that children with the syndrome are characterized by a few underlying psychological abnormalities which are constantly present
in all instances of the syndrome, despite the varying outward manifestations. This is
directly comparable to Bleuler's method of solving the classification problems of dementia praecox.
Id. at 63-64. Good luck, Dr. Wender, and may you have the same spectacular success as
Bleuler did in "solving" the classification problems of dementia praecox!
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The point to emphasize now is that failure to discover a complete
or even partial array of necessary conditions and sufficient conditions for use of a term does not alone demonstrate that it is meaningless. It may be a perfectly presentable cluster/polythetic term.
Most general legal terms are at least partly polythetic-indeed, your
local Socrates simply could not do much business if most legal terms
weren't so "afflicted." (Their utility may just happen to lie in their

affliction! )50
"Mental disease/illness" is, it is suggested, such a term: demonstrating a paucity of necessary or sufficient conditions for use of the
term-or terms naming particular mental diseases-does not establish that such terms are meaningless. The required task is to identify the "property set" for "mental disease"-an enterprise which
would usefully be preceded by doing the same for "physical disease." If such property sets could be at least partly determined, we
might then have a usable explication of these cluster terms. In particular, we should be able to say that there is a set of properties P,,
P2 ....Pn such that for any Pi the following holds: If person X has
property Pi, that is a relevant but non-decisive argument for holding that X is (mentally) (physically) ill, despite the absence of certain other properties; and if X does not have property Pi, that is a
relevant but non-decisive argument for holding that X is not ill,
although certain other properties are present. (The mentational and
behavioral properties would, for the most part, probably be considered dispositional, as would some of the neurochemical properties.)
Constructing such property sets would be a considerable task. 5'
50. It should be painfully apparent at this point that we are not dealing with simple forms
of "vagueness" (e.g., "X is tall") or ambiguity ("X is high"); the difficulties associated with
cluster concepts are far more ferocious. See generally ALSTON, supra note 48, at 84-96 (1964);
HOSPERS, supra note 36, at 69-74; Slote, supra note 47, at 213. Cf. note 45 supra.
51. Consider as a candidate for inclusion in the property sets of both physical and mental
disease the subjective feeling that one is held in the thrall of something "alien" or "non-me,"
and that outside assistance might be necessary for relief. (One would expect immediate salvos
about demonic possession and rescue by exorcists, but the notion of being "gripped" is
nevertheless useful as a relevant but non-decisive characteristic of disease.) Consider Professor Herbert Morris' suggestions:
[Ilt is not simply that the person is disabled and suffering that pulls toward the
concept of sickness. The person may feel shackled and unable merely by some act of
will to rid himself of suffering. . . . We may be responsible for the habits we have and
we may bear ultimate responsibility for changing them; but it may nevertheless be true
that, having the habit, we are unable to change by exertion of will any more than we
can rid ourselves of a disease of the brain by exertion of will. It is, then, the operation
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of habits of various kinds that leads to our sense of being bound and to the thought
that we are in the grip of something alien and it is this, conjoined with the need for
some assistance from the outside, perhaps more than anything else, that accounts for
thinking in terms of illness.
Morris, Book Review, 18 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1164, 1167 (1971) (hereinafter cited as Morris].
Perhaps, in light of Professor Morris's observations, we should consider as a relevant criterion
for disease (i.e., as a member of the property set for "disease") the fact that we cannot rid
ourselves of the purported malady simply by "willing" or wishing or wanting it away. Even
if so, however, this does not get us too much further; we cannot by wishing or willing modify
our height or intelligence either. And so the notion of mental disease probably must incorporate ideas of irrationality, dysfunctionality, and recurring linked patterns of such anomalous
behavior and mentation. Cf. H. FINGARETTE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY (1972).
On comparing the locutions "physical illness" and "mental illness" cf. J. FEINBERG, DOING
AND DESERVING 257-58 (1970) [hereinafter cited as FEINBERG]. (Feinberg posits a cancerous
gland that produces "powerful moods of melancholy alternating with consuming inner rages,"
and leads the victim "to his own dismay, [to] rehearsing assaults and murders.") Id. at 257.
We should . . . agree that he is sick. Because one of his component parts (in this case
a physical organ) is not performing its regulative function, it is impossible for the
organism as a whole to "function properly." In our imaginary case, there is no other
conspicuous impairment of bodily function-no fever, nausea, debility, or pain. If we
classify diseases by their causes, this is a physical disease; but if we classify by the
type of impairment caused, it is a mental disease, since its symptoms (on the
macroscopic level) are primarily emotional. It is the victim's mental life that is disordered.
Let us change the example, so that the symptoms are the same but cannot be
accounted for by any physical dysfunction. Now our victim's moods and rages are a
mental illness in the strongest sense, namely, the impairment of mental function from
no discoverable physical cause. Note that there need not be any cognitive impairment.
The victim may still be capable of consecutive reasoning and valid inferences; he may
suffer no perceptual aberrations; and although he may enjoy entertaining paranoid
fantasies, he does not really believe them.
The chances are good that our unhappy fellow will sooner or later commit a crime
of violence . ...
Id. at 257-58. On the possibility of correlating mental/behavioral anomalies with neurophysiological anomalies see text § 1I1-B infra. (We may wind up talking about "hypodopaminism"-a functional deficit of the neurotransmitter dopamine. Cf. note 75 infra.)
If mental illness shares the generic character of sickness, it must then consist in the
disabling impairment of some vital mental function, such as reasoning, remembering,
feeling, or imagining. The most conspicuous mental illnesses are those that involve
impairment of the cognitive faculties and consequent chronic irrationality of one kind
or another. Most forms of "proper functioning" are quite impossible for a person whose
memory has totally failed, or who is incapable of drawing inferences or of distinguishing fact from fantasy. There is general agreement among us that the sorts of incapacities directly consequent upon these functional failures constitute "being out of proper
working order" and, therefore, being sick.
Much more difficult questions are posed by the mental dysfunctions that are noncognitive . . ..
FEINBERG, supra at 255. (Feinberg then explains his notion of noncognitive mental illness.)
Successful efforts at rigorous explication of the concept of mental disease will have to be
marked by rather more accurate diagnoses than those which apparently characterize current
clinical psychiatry. See Spitzer & Fleiss, A Reanalysis of the Reliability of Psychiatric
Diagnosis, 125 BRIT. J. PSYCHIAT. 341, 344-46 (1974):
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Consider the notion of physical disease. A brief inquiry suggests the
importance, though arguably not the necessity, of being able to
posit, in principle, a verifiable physical cause or causes for whatever
we claim is a disease. (Much of medical therapeutics for physical
disease would surely be in a sorry state were it not for such notions
There are no diagnostic categories for which reliability is uniformly high. Reliability
appears to be only satisfactory for three categories: mental deficiency, organic brain
syndrome (but not its subtypes), and alcoholism. The level of reliability is no better
than fair for psychosis and schizophrenia and is poor for the remaining categories. . ..
In spite of the obvious.unreliability of psychiatric diagnosis, there exists evidence
for sensitivity to and agreement on the major psychiatric problems experienced by a
patient. . . . A number of patients in the New York sample were identified by the
project psychiatrists as suffering from severe depression but not from any signs of
schizophrenia. The hospital psychiatrists diagnosed most of these severe depressives
as schizophrenic, but treated the majority of them with anti-depressant medication or
with ECT [electroconsulsive therapy]. The hospital staffs obviously recognized the
depression in their patients, when it was present, but failed to incorporate that recognition into their diagnoses . ..
. .[One
[
study] found poor agreement between psychiatrists in judging the presence or absence of symptoms in technical terms. With respect to ratings on the
[Inpatient Multidimensional Psychiatric Scales], however, there were striking similarities in the psychiatrists' perceptions of psychopathology. . . [A~ll psychiatrists
were in excellent agreement as to the most serious and the least serious problem
areas . ..
The reliability of psychiatric diagnosis as it has been practiced since at least the
late 1950's is not good. . . . [Certain investigators] found that a significant amount
of the variability among diagnosticians was due to differences in how they elicited and
evaluated the necessary information, and that an even larger amount was due to
inherent weakness and ambiguities in the nomenclature. . . .
[The authors then discuss two major innovations, including "structured interview
schedules . . . [with] a standardized sequence of topics ....
"I
• . . Whereas in the standard system the clinician determines to which of the various
diagnostic stereotypes his patient is closest, in the St. Louis system the clinician
determines whether his patient satisfies explicit criteria. For example, for a diagnosis
of the depressive form of primary affective disorder the three requirements are dysphoric mood, a psychiatric illness lasting at least one month with no other pre-existing
psychiatric condition, and at least five of the following symptoms: poor appetite or
weight loss; sleep difficulty; loss of energy; agitation or retardation; loss of interest in
usual activities or decrease in sexual drive; feelings of self-reproach or guilt; complaints
of or actually diminished ability to think or concentrate; and thoughts of death or
suicide.
These two approaches, structuring the interview and specifying all diagnostic criteria, are being merged in a series of collaborative studies on the psychobiology of the
depressive disorders . . . . We are confident that this merging will result not only in
improved reliability but in improved validity which is, after all our ultimate goal.
Id. at 344-46.
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of organic etiology!) Necessary condition or not, it may not follow
from such an analysis of "physical disease" that the term "mental
disease" also requires in its property set some verifiable causes, or
candidates for the title of "cause," or posited kinds of cause which
might one day yield particular verifiable causes. Le., such specific
descriptions need not be in the property set, even though the "causal principle" suggests the possibility in theory of finding such
causes. (We leave open whether the causes may be physical,
psychic, or may include both.) So, mental illness is not said to be
causeless: we say only that the concept of mental disease may significantly differ from that of physical disease because of the lesser
importance, or perhaps lack of necessity, of adverting to the nature
or possibility of describing and verifying a cause or causes in order
to explicate "mental disease."
Though they have never been able to specify the purported
physical pathology underlying insanity, the courts, medical
men, and laymen have for centuries been able to identify cases
of insanity (with near universal agreement in the more extreme
cases). Likewise, without any knowledge of the physical
aspects of insanity, the courts, medical men, and laymen have
appreciated and have nearly universally acknowledged that
insanity precludes responsibility. [This suggests] that the
concepts of insanity and mental disease, as relevant to the
criminal law, must have a meaning and a rationale that are not
tied to any specific causal or physical hypothesis at all. The
meaning and rationale must be rooted in our everyday notions
of human nature and human relations, rather than a special,
esoteric, or technical notion tied to some particular causal or
physical hypothesis or technical formulation."
More should be said about what the notion of disease (physical
or mental) would be like if it incorporated no explicit reference to
causation (but of course did not posit causelessness). "Disease"-like any theoretical term in a scientific language 3 and like
52. H. FINGARETTE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY 23 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
FINGARETTE]. The full text of Prof. Fingarette's remarks is rather stronger than indicated
here; Prof. Fingarette believes that historical usage "almost certainly proves" that our notions
of insanity and mental disease are not linked to any specific causal theories. Compare Moore,
Mental Illness and Responsibility, 39 BULL. MENNINGER CLIN. 308, 315 (1975) (urging the
irrelevance of notions of physical or psychological causation in ascriptions of moral and legal
responsibility).
53. For an explanation of "theoretical terms" see Hempel, Operationism, Observation,
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most non-mathematical general terms-is not reducible in meaning
to any finite concatenation of observation terms. We thus cannot
say that, e.g., recorded behavior is (is identical with) the disease in
question: this would be a simple reductionist error. 4 The disease
arguably might be understood as referring to a condition which is a
dispositionalstate;55 or (perhaps) to the condition which causes that
disposition; or. .

.

. It is, plainly, something of a problem to deter-

mine where one is to stop in this regress, but that need not be settled
now. The conceptual structure of the disease concepts involved,
however, seems a bit bizarre: we posit dispositions, or their causes,
or their causes . . . but are not to worry over the next level of

causation because, by hypothesis, it is unnecessary to analyze it in
order to have a coherent and meaningful concept of disease. Bizarre
or not, evidence of a disposition to engage in certain identifiable
patterns of conduct or to think in certain predictable ways might,
in principle, suffice for concluding that we may appropriately talk
of disease-whether the disposition constitutes or evidences the disease. The core concept, then, is that of describable recurrences of
clusters of mentation or behavior patterns (all "signs" and "symptoms").
Consider what may be two substantial criticisms of this view of
mental illness. (a) As a matter of practice a concept of disease-or
of a specific disease-which does not include in its property set the
requirement of specifically describing causes for the disease is likely
to degenerate into a concept in which disease is too loosely and
frequently identified with vaguely defined dispositional conditions
-i.e., propensities to think or behave in certain ways, to display
various signs and symptoms. Indeed, one might well argue that
excising notions of causation so weakens the already unacceptably
flabby interpretations of "mental disease" that such an excision
operationally reads out the mental anomaly requirement of most
commitment statutes. (b) The forget-about-causation view may
also be tantamount (for reasons similar to those suggested in (a))
to adoption of a behaviorist model. The principal evidence for
and Scientific Terms, in PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 101 (A. Danto & S. Morgenbesser eds. 1960).
54. On reductionism and some of its errors see HOSPERS, supra note 36, at 387-89.
55. Consider this example in roughly distinguishing between "dispositional states" and
"occurent states": compare sugar which is in fact dissolved in a liquid with still solid sugar
which is soluble. If the right circumstances prevail (e.g., being immersed in a suitable liquid
at a suitable temparature, etc.) the solid sugar will dissolve. See again Hospers' description,
id. at 125-27.
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the existence of a dispositional condition to think or behave in certain ways is likely to be behavior (but note the theories of neurophysiological causes of mental illness below56 ). And if the dispositional
condition is amorphously explained, we may come close simply to
identifying the disease with its expanding sets of behavioral effects.
If that odd result occurs, then we are dealing with what is in effect
a behaviorist model.' Of course, diagnoses (other than self diagnoses5 7 ) of mental illness (whatever the diagnostic school) ultimately rest solely on observations and analyses of behavior, even
where neurophysiological events, states and processes are correlated
with such behavior-including the subject's behavior purporting to
describe his own mental functioning.58 For all these reasons, dispensing with the idea of specifically described causes as a necessary
part of the concept of mental illness may make virtually indistinguishable the following sorts of propositions: 1. "X has physically
assaulted many persons." 2. "X has a propensity to assault people."
3. "X's propensity to assault people is a condition which is caused
by another condition-a disease." 4. "X's propensity to assault people is not a causal result of another condition which is a disease-that propensity is the disease itself."
If these criticisms of the program described for explicating "mental illness" are substantial, then we may have unearthed some at
least colorable constitutional and moral objections to structuring a
concept of mental disease which does not expressly advert to notions
of causation/etiology, for the result is operationally to create a behaviorist model for commitment. The possible legal infirmities of
such confinement without a coherent notion of disease are outlined
below .
Out of an abundance of caution, I add that whatever one thinks
of the importance of identifying causes for the condition we consider
a disease, all disease models require a reasonably precise description
56. See text § III-B infra.
57. "Self-diagnosis" may entail introspective observation of mentational states. I do
however, propose to investigate the problems of analysing the meaningfulness and verification
of sentences purporting to describe mentational states. Cf. G. MANDLER & W. KESSEN, THE
LANGUAGE OF PSYCHOLOGY (1959).
58. To consider mental events and processes (sensations, perceptions, thoughts) as simply
forms of "behavior" seems to be an unacceptable conflation of physical and mental events
and processes, and a trivialization of the distinction between physicalist and mentalist language (perhaps through an erroneous application of reductionist notions-see note 55 supra).
59. See text § V-C-2 infra.
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of what that disease condition itself causes. If disease is identified
with certain dispositional conditions, however, then much of what
we might consider effects of the disease are in part constitutive of
the disease. (Such partially constitutive events or processes are also
evidence of the "entire" disease-i.e., the dispositional condition
-or

its cause(s), or .

. .

. -)

One would expect, in general, that if we could specify property
sets for disease (or particular diseases) of any sort, we would discover sub-clusters of frequently linked properties among the cluster
constituting the property set. Indeed, one of the central ideas of
disease is that of recurring groups of linked properties (though we
may be unable to account for the linkage).
[Disease] refers to a pattern of factors which somehow hang
together and recur, more or less the same, in successive individuals. Thus, pain in the right lower quadrant of the abdomen,
with nausea, vomiting, a fever, and a high white count, spell
out the features of acute appendicitis. With variations this
combination tends to recur. .

.

. Each of these diseases, so

called, is a congeries of factors, and no single factor, by itself,
identifies the disease. It is only the recurrence of a pattern of
events, a number of elements combined in a definite relationship, which we can label a disease. .

. If we can find enough

similar features which recur as a cluster, we can organize these
features into a logical coherent order."
For physical disease in general, we expect recurrences of linked
properties which include, for example, enhanced risk of death (relevant, but not necessary, and probably not sufficient-is death by
drowning due to the disease of "anoxia"?)"1 ; dysfunctionality (itself
hard to explicate, but a leading candidate for a necessary, though
not a sufficient condition); pain or discomfort (neither necessary
-as with scarcely detectable diseases-nor sufficient-the ordinary pains of pregnancy do not betoken disease); an identifiable
physical etiology, or a reasonable prospect of finding one (a major
criterion, but arguably not necessary, and clearly not sufficient-a
virus which raised IQ's and had no other effects would probably not
be called the cause of a disease); an inability simply to wish or will
60.
61.

King, supra note 15, at 197.
Perhaps death by drowning should be regarded as death due to "trauma." Cf.
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1320 (22d ed. 1972). We will not investigate the matter further
at present. See generally Annot., 61 A.L.R.3d 822 (1975).
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away the condition (perhaps necessary, but not sufficient-we cannot by wishing alter our height or intelligence); and the recurrence
of linked sub-clusters of properties (though we may find only one
instance of some disease because of the improbable concatenation
of circumstances under which it could develop).
For mental disease, we appear to expect some sort of irrational
or dysfunctional conduct or mentation ("irrational" and "dysfunctional" are themselves cluster concepts, difficult to explicate); and perhaps a notion of being gripped by something "alien"
which cannot be overcome simply by force of will;"2 and, again,
recurrences of particularized linked sub-clusters of properties, e.g.,
cyclic feelings of worthlessness, diurnal variation in such feelings,
loss of appetite, etc.,6 3 which characterize certain depressive psychoses. (We need not now consider whether such patterns are the
disease or simply evidence it.) Prof. Michael Moore's interesting
investigation of the concept of mental disease and of Dr. Thomas
Szasz's withering attacks made upon that notion should be consulted in pursuing such an enterprise. One of Prof. Moore's observations may serve as a useful prolegomenon to constructing the property sets for mental illnesses:
There are questions to be raised about the diagnostic categories
of psychiatry, but they are not questions of category difference.
The aggregation of symptoms into particular symptomatologies associated with hysteria, schizophrenia, etc., form inductive claims whose nature is clear-as clear as the nature of the
claim that people who tend to look in the mirror often tend to
feel pleased when flattered, avoid conversations in which others are praised, etc. (Ryle's partial unpacking of the character
trait of vanity.) There is nothing logically suspect about the
inductive process by which we classify familiar as well as bizarre behavior, into character traits and mental diseases."4
B.

Neurophysiology and Mental Disease

Although, as suggested, precise notions of causation of particular
62. Morris, supra note 51, at 1167.
63. Telephone interview with Dr. Jerome E. Jacobson, M.D., Clinical Director, Gateways
Hospital and Community Health Center, Los Angeles, June 4, 1975.
64. Moore, Some Myths About Mental Illness, 18 INQUIRY [typescript at 35] (to be published in 1975) [hereinafter cited as Moore, with page references to the typescript]. (The
passage in the text was quoted with the author's permission.) The reference to Ryle is to G.
RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND (1949).
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illnesses may not be necessary for the structuring of a concept of
mental illness, verifiability in principle of causes of some sort might
well be a member of the property set for mental illness, and thus
be relevant, though not decisive. Psychoanalytic explanations, for
example, are familiar methods of attempting to account for mental/behavioral anomalies." Recent developments in neurophysiology suggest other relevant notions of causation which may be entitled to membership in the property set. Thus, it appears that some
neuroscientists and psychiatrists believe that they can (or will soon
be able to) adequately specify certain mental/behavioral events,
processes or patterns on the one hand, and their neurophysiological
correlates or causes on the other (though one could scarcely think
this possible-at least for some anomalies-by inspecting the American Psychiatric Association's official terminology"0 ). If so, this possibility might be entered as a relevant, though non-decisive member
of the property set of "mental disease." Drs. Akiskal and McKinney, reviewing some of the literature on affective (mood or feeling)
disorders, observe:
Biological hypotheses concerning the biochemical correlates
of affective disorders, enunciated in the mid-60s, were based on
pharmacological inference. A group of drugs that elevates the
central level of catecholamines [a member of a group of substances thought to be "chemical mediators" for the transmission of electrical energy among neurons (cells of the brain and
nervous system)] and indoleamines [another member] in animals was found effective in alleviating clinical depressions in
man, while another class of drugs, known to decrease these
neurotransmitters, precipitated depressive illness in certain
individuals. It was hypothesized that these same
neurotransmitters were involved in naturally occurring human
depressions. The line of reasoning that links behavior to brain
chemistry has been appropriately labeled the "pharmacological bridge" by Schildkraut. The extensive literature on the
possible role of biogenic amines [a group of substances which
include the neurotransmitters] in the pathogenesis of depressive illness has been summarized in several scholarly
reviews. ...
65. Cf. the critical discussion of psychoanalytic causal explanations in BANDURA, supra
note 6, at 9-19. Compare GOLDMAN, supra note 27, at ch. 5.
66. See generally AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS

(2d ed. 1968) [usually cited as DSM-H].
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[A] provocative study by Mendels and Frazer
[emphasizes] the difficulties one encounters in building
"pharmacological bridges" with the biogenic amines. After a
careful review of [certain clinical and experimental literature], these investigators concluded that depletion of brain
norepinephrine, dopamine, or serotonin [all neurotransmitters] was not sufficient to account for the clinical phenomena of depression. They suggested that, along with the chemical changes, one should consider the genetic and constitutional
background, the cognitive state of the organism . . . , and the
differential ability of the individual to cope with the altered
physiological and psychomotor state.
Bridges are supposed to handle two-way traffic. Whereas in
the psychiatric literature the focus has largely been on behavioral alterations occurring secondary to changes in biogenic
amines, there is another line of research that indicates that the
reverse may also be true. That is, one can selectively manipulate social variables and induce major changes in brain
amines1 7
Some cautions should be entered about specifications of correlations-including causal connections-between observable neurophysiological events or processes and mental diseases. We are, by
hypothesis, talking about correlating certain physiochemical processes with something else-mentation and behavior. In order to
specify the correlation, it is necessary to specify the something else
and the possibility of doing this is, perhaps, something which "demythologizers" of mental illness 8 might deny, or at least strongly
67. Akiskal & McKinney, Overview of Recent Research in Depression:Integration of the
Conceptual Models into a Comprehensive Clinical Frame, 32 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIAT. 285,
296-98 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Akiskal & McKinney]. See generally E. ABEL, DRUGS AND
BEHAVIOR: A PRIMER IN NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY (1974); BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY (J. Mendels ed. 1973); J. COOPER, F. BLOOM & R. ROTH, THE BIOCHEMICAL BASIS OF NEUROPHARMACOLOGY (2d ed. 1974); D. LESTER, A PHYSIOLOGICAL BASIS FOR PERSONALITY TRAITS: A NEW
THEORY OF PERSONALITY (1974); PHYSIOLOGICAL CORRELATES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL DISORDER (R.
Roessler & N. Greenfield eds. 1962); W. SARGANT & E. SLATER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PHYSICAL
METHODS OF TREATMENT IN PSYCHIATRY (5th ed. 1972). See also NEURAL BASES OF VIOLENCE
AND AGGRESSION (W. Fields & W. Sweet eds. 1975).

68. It is not immediately apparent just what frequently articulated sentences like "there
is no such thing as mental illness" mean. (Cf. Szasz, Mental Illness as a Metaphor, 242
NATURE 305 (1973): "[Tlhere can be no such thing as mental illness. The term 'mental
illness' is a metaphor." The same thesis appears in T. SZASZ, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS
at ix (rev. ed. 1974).) It is surely not an empirical claim like "there are no such things as
unicorns" (they are mythical, you know), or "there is no King of France." And it is not
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question. 9 We cannot posit or verify such a correlation without
being able to indicate patterns of recurring behavior and mental
activity for which we wish to assign a neurotransmission anomaly
as a cause, or at the very least as a correlate, leaving the causation
necessarily part of a more general claim that mental entities or processes do not exist. (Ontological claims like "there are no such things as numbers, ideas, sensations . . ." are not
ordinarily considered to be empirical.) The point intended by the sentence denying the
existence of mental illness seems to be this: a claim that someone is mentally ill is either (a)
cognitively meaningless; (b) a euphemism for a covert value judgment ("X is an evil person"-which I do not think is cognitively meaningless); (c) a misleading (if true) circumlocution for an empirical conclusion about deviation from a purely statistical norm ("X is behaving oddly in the sense that most persons do not behave that way in similar circumstances");
(d) an empirical claim about deviation from a cultural norm; (e) a misleading trope for a
claim that perhaps anomalous mentation and behavior are attributable to physical disease
or anomaly of some kind. Failure to accept this claim that there is no such thing as mental
illness reflects, so it might be argued, conceptual confusion (not a factual error). The arguments marshaled to demythologize mental illness in the above ways are frequently cogent,
and nearly always based upon deep suspicions and fears of a "therapeutic state" (many of
which I share). Cf. Szasz, Medicine and Madness, in ENCYC. BRIT. YEARBOOK 454 (1974).
The summary observations in the present article, however, are intended to suggest the possibility that some attributions of mental illness C'X has, or suffers from, mental illness D")
are meaningful and are not merely renditions of simpler empirical claims about deviation
from a solely statistical or cultural norm; nor merely masked value judgments; nor clumsy
statements about physical illnesses; nor mordant trivializations ("I'm treating someone with
Thorazine-he's suffering from a Thorazine deficiency"). If, however, attributions of mental
illness are meaningful but not simply statistical claims, they should, in principle, be capable
of being supported by something other than lame appeals to "clinical judgment" ("I know it
when I see it").
The literature on the interpretation (if any) to be given to "mental disease" and related
terms is large and growing. See generally T. SZASz, THE MANUFACTURE OF MADNESS (1970);
Szasz, Illness and Indignity, 227 J.A.M.A. 543 (1974). For some responses to Szasz's contentions see Ausubel, Personality Disorder as Disease, in THE STUDY OF ABNORMAL BEHAVIOR
21 (3d ed. M. Zax & G. Stricker 1974); Morris, supra note 51. Cf. Fingarette, Addiction and
Criminal Responsibility, 84 YALE L.J. 413 (1975). The works of R.D. Laing have also been
influential in forming current general views about the proper use of "mental disease." See
generally R.D. LAING, SANITY, MADNESS, AND THE FAMILY 11-27 (2d Pelican ed. 1970); R.D.
LAING, THE DIVIDED SELF (Pelican ed. 1965); R.D. LAING, THE POLITICS OF THE FAMILY AND
OTHER ESSAYS 43-58 (1971). I do not think the notion of "irrationality" alone can capture the
set of defining characteristics for all forms of mental disability. But cf. Fingarette, supra.
69. Cf. T. SZASZ, IDEOLOGY AND INSANITY: ESSAYS ON THE PSYCHIATRIC DEHUMANIZATION OF
MAN

13 (1970):

[A] defect in a person's visual field may be explained by correlating it with certain
lesions in the nervous system. On the other hand, a person's belief-whether it be in
Christianity, in Communism, or in the idea that his internal organs are rotting and
that his body is already dead-cannot be explained by a defect or disease of the
nervous system. Explanations of this sort of occurrence-assuming that one is interested in the belief itself and does not regard it simply as a symptom or expression of
something else that is more interesting-must be sought along different lines.
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hypothesis aside.7" Unless we have some notion of regularly recurring mentational and behavioral patterns, then, neurotransmission
theory will be of limited value in filling out a notion of mental illness
(or even of physical illness generating mental and behavioral anomalies).
[W]e suggest . . . that if [temporal lobe epilepsy] is
heterogeneous and ill defined and human aggression is
complex to allow definite interpretations of correlations
tween them at present, the same applies to correlations
tween TLE and sexual disturbances or psychosis."

too
too
bebe-

The closing remarks of Drs. Akiskal and McKinney, above,72 suggest another caution about correlating neurophysiological states,
events and processes with mental/behavioral anomalies: the correlation may not establish the direction of causation. Whatever the
direction, the presence or occurrence of any member of a pair of
correlates may serve as a sign that the other is near 73-but our notions of the nature and springs of disease require specification of
what is cause and what is effect. Still another problem concerning
neurophysiological explanation or analysis of mentation and behavior is to avoid the mistake of inferring "B implies A" from "A implies B."74 If it were discovered that some identifiable brain damage
or lesion or biochemical anomaly is correlated with, or has indeed
caused, certain patterns of episodic rage and violence, that would
be enough to set a good scientist to work pursuing the ramifications
of this clue-in particular, that some other occurrences of rage and
70. For discussion of some of the philosophical problems of analyzing purported correlations between physical and mental events or processes see GOLDMAN, supra note 27, at 16165; HOSPERS, supra note 36, at 387-91; Akiskal & McKinney, supra note 67, at 287; Edwards,
Introduction, in A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 174, 178 (rev. ed. A. Pap & P.
Edwards 1965).
71. Kligman & Goldberg, Temporal Lobe Epilepsy and Aggression, 160 J. NERVOUS &
MENTAL Dis. 324, 336 (1975).
72. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
73. Cf. GOLDMAN, supra note 27, at 161 (on "simultaneous nomic equivalents"). See
generally Violent Behavior, supra note 6, at 498-505 ("Summary of Current Biotechnological
Research into Organic Correlates of Violent Behavior").
74. It has been suggested that MARK & ERVIN, supra note 19, make this error. Howard,
The Use of Psychosurgery as a Treatment for Mental Disorders 60, Mar. 30, 1973 (Senior
Honors Thesis in Social Relations on file in Psychology & Social Relations Library, William
James Hall, Harvard University). It may indeed be so (cf. note 32 supra); but discovering
that some A's lead to some B's is, in scientific investigation, a worthwhile clue: other B's
might be caused by other A's. See text following this note.
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violence may be correlated with or caused by brain damage or lesion
or biochemical anomaly. But that must be established in each case
(or kind of case).
It may be that if such correlations or causal analyses were well
worked out, some would suggest that we speak of "physical illnesses
which produce mental or behavioral anomalies" rather than of
''mental illnesses characterized by various mental or behavioral
anomalies."7 5 It is not clear that this is a "mere verbal dispute";"
75. Cf. Szasz, An "Unscrewtape" Letter: A Reply to Fred Sander, i25 Am.J. PSYCHIAT.
1432 (1969):
I choose to distinguish between medicine and psychiatry not so much because of a
logical but rather an empirical, or factual, difference between them. It is a matter of
fact, not logic, that the patient with cancer, stroke, or heart disease manifests a demonstrable physicochemical abnormality of his body, whereas this is not true of the
"patient" with agoraphobia, compulsive hand washing, or other diagnoses of "functional mental illness" (especially when these are ascribed to him in a legal context for
a specific strategic purpose, such as to justify an abortion or an acquittal on the ground
of insanity.
Id. at 1434.
Suppose "physicochemical abnormality" (e.g., neurotransmission anomalies) could be correlated with agoraphobia, etc. Would Dr. Szasz consider persons with such abnormalities to
be physically ill-the illness having various mental and behavioral effects-or mentally ill?
Would someone with anomalous variations in his/her supply of effective dopamine be considered physically or mentally ill if such variations were soundly established as being the principal causes of spe.cific variations in mood-e.g., alternating depression and euphoria? Clearly
he would describe such persons as having a bodily illness identifiable by physicochemical
methods, with mental and behavioral accompaniments or effects. Cf. T. SZASZ, IDEOLOGY AND
INSANITY: ESSAYS ON THE PSYCHIATRIC DEHUMANIZATION OF MAN 12-14 (1970):
The notion of mental illness derives its main support from such phenomena as
syphilis of the brain or delirious conditions-intoxications, for instance-in which
persons may manifest certain disorders of thinking and behavior. Correctly speaking,
however, these are diseases of the brain, not of the mind. According to one school of
thought, all so-called mental illness is of this type. The assumption is made that some
neurological defect, perhaps a very subtle one, will ultimately be found to explain all
the disorders of thinking and behavior. Many contemporary physicians, psychiatrists,
and other scientists hold this view, which implies that people's troubles cannot be
caused by conflicting personal needs, opinions, social aspirations, values, and so forth.
These difficulties-which I think we may simply call problems in living-are thus
attributed to physicochemical processes that in due time will be discovered (and no
doubt corrected) by medical research.
Mental illnesses are thus regarded as basically similar to other diseases. The only
difference, in this view, between mental and bodily disease is that the former, affecting
the brain, manifests itself by means of mental symptoms; whereas the latter, affecting
other organ systems-for example, the skin, liver, and so on-manifests itself by means
of symptoms referable to those parts of the body. ...
[A] disease of the brain, analogous to a disease of the skin or bone, is a
neurological defect, not a problem in living. ...
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it may be inappropriate to speak of "physical illnesses" in this way
because the very point of using the locution "mental illness" is to
call attention to the fact that the illness manifests itself

principally-though perhaps not exclusively-in the form of anomalous mentation or behavior. (On the possibility of referring to "behavioral illness" see the remarks below.") In particular, the most
important facts we deal with concerning a putative mental illness
have to do with someone thinking and acting in ways variously
described as irrational, inappropriate, senseless ....
1s This is not
how we would describe the usual mentation and behavior attending
the physical pain caused by a kidney stone or the superficially odd
gait of someone with a broken ankle. (Consider also the mental and
behavioral results of administering psychotropic drugs, whether to
* . . For those who regard mental symptoms as signs of brain disease, the concept
of mental illness is unnecessary and misleading. If they mean that people so labeled
suffer from diseases of the brain, it would seem better, for the sake of clarity, to say
that and not something else.
Dr. Szasz would further suggest that such a determination of physical disease demonstrates
the lack of justification for involuntary treatment of these persons-who might still be described by others as "mentally ill." Cf. T. SzAsz, THE SECOND SIN 98 (1973):
[TIhe contemporary mythology and rituals of psychiatry make it virtually impossible
for professional and layman alike to distinguish between phenomenon, label, and
policy. This explains, for example, the persistent belief that if the phenomena now
often labeled as schizophrenia were to be shown to be brain diseases, like neurosyphilis, that would justify the involuntary psychiatric treatment of patients so diagnosed. But that would no more justify such treatment than would the diagnosis of
brain tumor justify the involuntary treatment of persons afflicted with this disease.
Thus, so Dr. Szasz would argue, just as we believe that someone with bacterial pharyngitis
should not be compelled to take antibiotics, so someone purportedly suffering from "hypodopaminism" (formerly known as the mental illness "bogglemania") should also not be forced
to take psychotropic drugs as medication. I have confirmed that these are indeed Dr. Szasz's
views. Telephone interview with Dr' Thomas S. Szasz, M.D., Professor of Psychiatry, State
University of New York Upstate Medical Center, Syracuse, N.Y., Sept. 9, 1975. Cf. T. SzAsz,

101-02, 40-41 (rev. ed. 1974). On efforts to correlate "functional
deficits" of the neurotransmitter dopamine with depression see RESEARCH TASK FORCE OF
NIMH, RESEARCH IN THE SERVICE OF MENTAL HEALTH 181 (1975) (DHEW PuB. No. (ADM) 75THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS

236); on efforts to correlate high levels of dopamine ("hyperdopaminism") with schizophrenia
see id. at 71, 175. Of course, research attempting to correlate levels of dopamine and other
neurotransmitters with these and other mental/behavioral anomalies is proceeding rapidly.
The possibility of naming diseases after the neurotransmitters implicated in their etiology
was suggested by Dr. Jerome E. Jacobson, M.D., Clinical Director, Gateways Hospital and
Community Mental Health Center, in an interview with the author June 24, 1975.
76. The dispute seems to be about the importance of certain properties in determining
the applicability of a concept. See generally Slote, supra note 47. See also Morris, Verbal
Disputes and the Legal Philosophy of John Austin, 7 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 27 (1960).
77. See text accompanying notes 213-20 infra.
78. See generally FINGARETTE, supra note 52, at 23; Moore, supra note 64, at 25.
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persons diagnosed as mentally ill or to "normals." 75 The side-effects
of such drugs may include profound mood changes, cognitive confusion, and behavior inconsistent with the person's customary behavior patterns. Have we induced mental illness or abnormality (at
least of a temporary sort), or a physical illness or abnormality? It
may well be appropriate to speak of both; but this question (like
others before it) will be left dangling here.)
C.

On "Fitting"the Therapy to the Anomaly"°

The following remarks, too, are by way of cursory introduction to
certain notions needing far more development. The problem of defining "therapy" is seldom addressed because of our understandable
preoccupation with the (probably) more difficult notion of
"disease." But "therapy" too is a cluster concept: therapies may be
"causal" and attack the basic etiological processes generating the
disease (antibiotics for bacterial infections); they may be "symptomatic" and relieve or change various signs and symptoms while
leaving unchallenged the ongoing causal mechanisms of the disease
process (aspirin); and so on."' (The effectiveness and intrusiveness
of therapies are in part related to the manner in which they attack
the collection of events and processes involved in disease.)
A common misconception about therapy is that the therapy for
a particular problem must direct itself to the root cause of that
problem. In this view, disorders of biological origin should be
treated with biologically based therapies, while those with psychological origins should be treated psychotherapeutically.
In fact, there is no necessary relationship between the
etiology of a problem and the nature of the treatment that is
effective in ameliorating it. A disorder with an organic or
neurophysiological etiology may be responsive to a biological
therapy, but it may also be markedly improved by behavior
therapy. Similarly, difficulties that have an environmental origin may be responsive to biological intervention, such as psychopharmologic treatment, as well as to a behavioral treatment. 2
79. See the brief discussion of non-therapeutic justifications for intervention in text accompanying notes 253-58 infra.
80. Compare Dershowitz, Indeterminate Confinement: Letting the Therapy Fit the
Harm, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 297 (1974).
81. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1287-88, 1320-21 (22d ed. 1972).
82.

AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION,

TASK FORCE REPORT: BEHAVIOR THERAPY IN
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The notion of "fittingness" of therapy is introduced partly for the
purpose of aiding the analysis of Kaimowitz v. Departmentof Men3 discussed below, and also to aid the analysis of behavtal Health,"
iorism. Let us introduce the idea of the paradigm of ideally fitting
therapy: it precisely, without side effects, effectively and nonintrusively obliterates both the cause of the disease and its signs and
symptoms. In particular, it attacks the cause by eliminating an
anomalous condition (e.g., a bacterial infection) and restoring the
patient to a sound state-and does no more than that. Now, in
Parkinson's Disease and certain other dyskinesias the motor disorder's symptoms can be ameliorated by destroying what appears to
be perfectly normal brain tissue (which is not, so far as can be told,
working in tandem with some identifiable disordered portion of the
brain). The signs and symptoms are thus modulated by dealing with
normal tissue.84 The therapy may surely be appropriate, but it is less
"fitting" in the sense suggested by the paradigm. Some claim that
aggression is associated with temporal lobe epilepsy; s5 yet certain
PSYCHIATRY 29 (1973) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE]. Cf. Ausubel, PersonalityDisorder
as Disease, in THE STUDY OF ABNORMAL BEHAVIOR 21, 26 (3d ed. M. Zax & G. Stricker 1974):
Once we accept the proposition that impairment of the neural substrate of personality
can result in behavior disorder, it is logically consistent to accept the corollary proposition that other kinds of manipulation of the same neural substrate can conceivably
have therapeutic effects, irrespective of whether the underlying cause of the mental
symptoms is physical or psychological.
Cf. notes 27, 29 supra and text accompanying note 67 supra.
For further observations on the relationship between therapy and etiology see Durell,

Introduction, in BIOLOGICAL

PSYCHIATRY

1, 4 (J. Mendels ed. 1973).

83. BROOKS, supra note 4, at 902-24.
84. The probability has to be considered very high that in most cases [of alleviating
Parkinson's Disease] the brain tissue destroyed is perfectly normal as far as anyone
could detect; nevertheless, a number of patients have found relief following these
surgical procedures. It should not be assumed, however, that the neurological area
destroyed played a role only in motor functions. In a multidisciplinary investigation
with a group of psychologists, Cooper and his collaborators observed that there were
often persistent problems in communication that developed postoperatively. Patients
frequently displayed mild (58%) or moderate (28%) difficulties in speech articulation,
phonation, and selecting appropriate words. There is almost always a cost-benefit
factor in neurosurgery. This fact should be kept in mind when psychosurgical procedures are evaluated.
VALENSTEIN, supra note 19, at 203 (italics deleted). See also the remarks of Valenstein in note
19 supra.
I am advised that surgical procedures for Parkinson's Disease are now rarely used; chemotherapy with L-Dopa and other agents is preferred. Interview with Jeffrey Berlant, M.D.,
Ph.D., Fellow in Law, Science, and Medicine, Yale Law School, Sept. 4, 1975.
85. MARK & ERVIN, supra note 19. For a critical review of the research and literature on
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stereotactic procedures have reduced rage/violence episodes without
greatly affecting the occurrence of the epileptic psychomotor
seizures.8" Of course, it may simply be that psychosurgery happens
to be rather effective only against one aspect of the disease
(rage/violence-if indeed that is an effect of the disease, which is an
issue much in doubt'), but is less effective against another aspect
(seizures). If rage/violence is not an effect of the disease, then psychosurgery, while possibly a fitting therapy with respect to seizures,
is not in any other respect a therapy at all (except in some very
strained sense-it surely is not "behavior therapy"), and simply
represents an effort to control violence, not brain disease. If the
violence is thought to be evidence of mental disease, we have a
somewhat less than perfect "fit" of organic therapy to a mentational
disorder not specifically associated with the organic brain matter
directly affected by the surgery. But "therapy" it remains, in the
language of physicians:
Neurosurgery is the surgical treatment for physical disorders
within the nervous system. Psychosurgery is the surgical
treatment of mental disorders; the psychosurgeon relieves
mental abnormalities in a nervous system anatomically normal 87
One further example: tricyclic antidepressants are thought to rectify in some part the specific neurotransmission anomalies which (so
some urge) are causal correlates of some extreme depression. Stimulants also relieve depression by masking it with an arguably intrusive side effect of stimulation; that effect is also connected with
changes in the neurotransmission characteristics of the brain,
but-for the most part-the effects do not as fully or directly challenge those specific neurochemical anomalies thought to be mainly
responsible for the depressive episode."8
temporal lobe epilepsy and aggression see Kligman & Goldberg, Temporal Lobe Epilepsy and
Aggression, 160 J. NERvoUs & MENTAL Dis. 324 (1975).
86. See note 32 supra.
86.1. Kligman & Goldberg, Temporal Lobe Epilepsy and Aggression, 160 J. NERVOUS &
MENTAL Dis. 324 (1975).
87. Cf. Y. KOSKOFF & R. GOLDHURST, THE DARK SIDE OF THE HOUSE xiv (1968) (emphasis
in original).
88. Telephone interview with Dr. Jerome E. Jacobson, M.D., Clinical Director, Gateways
Hospital and Community Mental Health Center, Los Angeles, May 19, 1975. Dr. Jacobson
observes that this distinction between the action of stimulants and tricyclic antidepressants
is not a sharp one, and much new information upon the action of both classes of drugs is
accumulating.
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Now, it is not suggested that therapy is bad simply because it falls
short of the paradigm, and is thus less fitting than other therapies:
"fitting" is not that honorific a term.89 (Although paradigmatic fit89. Compare the remarks of Dr. Willard Gaylin on Dr. Vernon Mark's "confusing stipulation" that he is "against the principle that [neurosurgery] could be used to treat abnormal
behavior when there is no organic abnormality of the brain." Mark, Brain Surgery in Aggressive Epileptics, 3 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 1, 2 (1973) (emphasis in original). Dr. Gaylin states
in The Problem of Psychosurgery 17-20 (Hastings Center Readings, No. 905, 1975-76):
[T]he distinctions between organic and non-organic are not the architectural, gross
ones of the nineteenth century, nor are they simply the anatomical ones which are most
readily available to a surgeon. They may rather be located in a chemical system that
is not yet identified as structurally "organic" yet is obviously as organic as a gross
tissue change. . . . [T]he demand of [Dr. Peter] Breggin and others that psychosurgery be limited to the extirpation of abnormal tissue carries illogicalities with it ...
[A]Il surgery destroys healthy tissue. . . . The model that seems the most acceptable
to critics of psychosurgery is the removal of a malignant growth. . . . But there are
other quite different models of legitimate surgery. For example, in a paralysis or
weakness of an eye muscle which cannot be corrected, one way to improve vision is
to shorten the opposing and healthy eye muscle. . . . The purpose of all of these
examples is to demonstrate that it is the functioning of the individual that concerns
us, and that we do not treat some theoretical organic integrity. So is it true with
epilepsy-we are not treating the focus or electroencephalographic change-but the
behavior. . . . Suppose we had an electroencephalographic change which correlated
with increased intelligence, creativity or sensitivity. No one would encourage operation
on that "abnormality."
The "organic" model seems irrelevant and could lead to abuse in either direction.
By implying the medical model it invites the kind of coercion and manipulation that
the cure of organic illness invites. . . . The organic model is a false comfort, particularly when the only signs of equating the violent social behavior with epilepsy
are the [EEG] changes (notoriously crude measuring instruments). Then again, in the
opposite direction, psychiatrists are more than prepared to use organic therapies; e.g.
drugs, to cure conditions such as depression or anxiety for which there is no welldefined, clearly demonstrable organic base. It would seem monstrous to restrict the use
of those drugs to proven "organic" conditions. Organic vs. functional is not the issue.
The basic consideration should be the relative harmfulness of the procedure weighed
against the impairments of the disease.
Dr. Gaylin has, in effect, observed that "medicalizing" behavioral anomalies serves (whether
properly or not) both to justify and to limit therapeutic action. It is precisely for that reason
that the disease branch of the medical model (evidently the most important branch) is not
irrelevant. The nature (or the concept) of the disease (at least in theory) forces a selection
from what might be a large array of potential therapeutic actions, and the therapy may be
"tailored" to the disease because it attacks etiological agents, symptomatology, etc. Thus,
the therapy may be effective for a variety of reasons. But application of the model does not
alone uniquely justify therapeutic action or inaction. Given the presumption against substitution of judgment, individuals must be free to select the therapeutic modalities they wish,
whatever the degree of fit (subject, arguendo, to "mayhem" limitations). A rational choice,
as suggested in the preceding section, will attend to the effective/intrusive distinction in order
to identify an optimal therapy or therapies; and a choice by the state, in circumstances
where it may substitute its judgment for an incompetent, must as a matter of constitutional

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 13: 673

tingness is not a necessary condition for justifying therapy, its invocation is surely relevant for aiding in the selection of appropriate,
effective, and relatively non-intrusive therapies from a (possibly)
large array of potential healing mechanisms.) But, to refer to a prior
example, suppose someone exhibits episodic rage and violence, yet
no organic disease is discerned, and diagnosticians concur (possibly
a dubious assumption!) that there is no mental illness which accounts for the repeated furies. Nevertheless, someone with Aesculapian Authority" enters with drill and scalpel, excises what appears to be normal brain tissue, and aborts the violence. A case
might be made for doing so, but it seems inappropriate to regard
this as a therapeutic justification, for the behavioral anomaly is not
a disease (except to the extent that disease is interpreted simply
as a deviation from a purely statistical or cultural norm). (Such a
reductionist view seems mistaken.") It would clearly be misleading
for a psychosurgeon casually to invoke a therapeutic justification
argument in such circumstances; if the procedure is to be justified,
it must be on grounds other than those concerned with treatment
of illness. (As seen above, in some contexts-e.g., behavior therapy
-it may be appropriate to refer to therapy without disease.2 I will
not inquire into the behaviorists' views on such surgery.)
Another problem of therapeutic "fit" arises from considerations
of the following sort: suppose our episodically violent subject were
regarded as being mentally ill, and that that illness were in turn
thought to be substantially responsible for the violence. Further,
suppose the illness were "explained" (a) in purely "psychological"
or "psychoanalytic" terms; or (b) as a neurotransmission anomaly.
compulsion attend to that distinction. Since that distinction bears some relation to the way
in which a therapy attacks signs, symptoms-or the disease itself-the disease model, while
not decisive in choice of therapy, seems plainly relevant. (Disease or no disease, however,
informed refusal is decisive, both morally and (when we deal with government) constitutionally-even if the medical therapist's exhortations seem more persuasive when there is a
disease. In the "right against" context, there is thus a strong case for the irrelevance of disease
vel non. On the possibility of an exception to this per se rule where a person is incompetent
to stand trial and coerced therapy might render him/her competent see Legislating, supra
note 1, at 300 n.215.)
90. This term is used frequently in SIECLER & OSMOND, supra note 8.1; the authors (id.
at 270) attribute it to Paterson, Notes on Aesculapian Authority (unpublished manuscript,
1957). See also Siegler & Osmond, The 'Sick Role' Revisited, 1 HASTINGS CENTER STUDIES 41,
58 (1973).
91. But cf. Alexander, supra note 8.
92. See text §§ H-E, II-F supra.
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What is the relevance of the therapeutic "fit" of stereotactic surgery
under these alternatives? In the latter case-a neurotransmission
anomaly-there would be a somewhat proper fit if the specific offending neurons were destroyed, thereby obliterating the neurotransmission disorder. But the surgery is obviously highly intrusive:
it might be that chemotherapy could correct the anomaly without
destroying tissue. Here, the notion of therapeutic fit, as it relates to
the effective/intrusive distinction,13 suggests a preference for an
effective therapy which is less intrusive, and hence more fitting. In
the former case-mental illness described solely in psychological or
psychoanalytic terms-the relation between the therapy (surgical
destruction of arguably normal tissue) and the disease is (to invoke
once more the philosophers' argot) somewhat odd or perhaps "asymmetrical": organic methods are used to deal with a supposedly nonorganic disorder. Yet this is obviously not sufficient to condemn the
therapy, for there is indeed some fit: a symptom (violence) of the
disease (mental, without known physiochemical correlates) is modulated by what seems to be (for want of a better term) a medical
procedure (again, it surely does not resemble behavior therapy!).
Much more than the following should be said on the requirement
of "therapeutic fit" within the domain of behavior therapy, but the
problem will have to be described summarily. The very concept of
behavior therapy seems to define the requirement of effectiveness
into it even more explicitly than the concept of therapy for disease.
If behavior is not shaped in accordance with the therapist's (or
someone's) stipulated goals, it either is bad therapy or isn't therapy
at all. But the description of the behavior to be changed may be as
vague or precise as one pleases. And the concept of behavior therapy
also-considered alone-places no particular constraints whatever
on what fitting therapy should be except those required by definition: changing behavior in the ways desired by someone. Adverting
93. Therapies which are reasonably "effective" but relatively "non-intrusive" are likely
(oversimplifying somewhat) to restore the status quo ante illness; they "delete" the anomalous mentation (again, oversimplifying) without adding or substituting other mentation patterns foreign to the patient in question. Intrusive therapies may also eliminate anomalous
mentation but do so by introducing or producing other mentation which may be abnormal
and possibly dysfunctional for the particular patient. I.e., intrusive therapies induce anomalous mentation. Tricyclic antidepressants are likely to be effective and minimally intrusive
in relieving depression; stimulants are likely to be intrusive as well as effective because they
mask depression with another abnormal state of mind-euphoria. See Legislating, supra note
1, at 262-69.
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to the notion of therapeutic fit as a way of describing and predicting
the nature of the behavior therapy called for suggests the appalling
prospect of comparing the vagueness of the disease model with the
murkiness of the behaviorist model. The offending maladaptive
behavior may be vaguely defined; the nature of the improvement
may be vaguely defined; and the therapies to be used may be of
enormous variety. The effective/intrusive distinction may be useful in preventing subjects from being "over-conditioned" or otherwise abused. But is the state of the art such that reasonably effective but relatively non-intrusive conditioning regimes can be applied? (Can a kleptomaniac be conditioned not to steal without also
being conditioned into fearing to enter a store at all?93 ') Reported
cases may not be the best sample available, but the record of behavior therapy in venturing non-intrusive alteration of behavior in
"total institutions" is not a pretty one. Consider: Anectine conditioning (for "verbal violence" and "lack of cooperation and involvement with the individual treatment program prescribed");"4 apomorphine conditioning ("for talking, for swearing, or for lying")."
And consider (from sources other than reported cases): electronic
93.1. Cf. Singer, Psychological Studies of Punishment, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 405, 432-33
(1970).
94. Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973); Conditioning,supra note 1, at 63340 (aversive conditioning using the drug Anectine). The quotations are from Reimringer,
Morgan & Bramwell, Succinylcholine as a Modifier of Acting-Out Behavior, CUN. MED. 2829 (July, 1970).
95. Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973) (use of the emetic drug apomorphine
in a program of aversion therapy). There have been other instances of using organic modalities as stimuli in behavior modification programs. E.g., GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
PSYCHIATRY,

PHARMACOTHERAPY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY: PARADOXES,

PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS

(Mar. 1975) (Vol. IX, Rep't No. 93):
Drugs such as apomorphine, emetine and ipecac were perhaps among the first pharmacologic agents to be used in behavior therapy. They are administered to induce states
of nausea and vomiting in patients undergoing aversion training, and have been used
for treatment of sexual disorders as well.
The use of such drugs in aversion therapy has to some extent been replaced by
electric shock within the past five years. The rationale for this change in technique is
not based on proven differences in the therapeutic effectiveness of electric shock over
drugs to provide the aversive stimulus. Rather, the change is justified on the basis of
the convenience and control offered by shock administration, and the apparent efficacy
of electric shock as an aversive stimulus in animal experimentation. In view of the
recent work of Garcia and Koelling and Rogin, where nausea-inducing drugs were
administered to animals to elicit profound taste aversions, it would be worthwhile to
reconsider the use of these agents in aversion conditioning in man, particularly in
alcohol aversion conditioning.
Id. at 384 (footnotes omitted).
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stimulation of the brain;9" electrical shocks administered to genitalia (or elsewhere); 7 and token economies, generally not as appalling, but in some instances arguably denying fundamental rights to
persons confined."

While the notion of disease may in principle place more stringent
constraints in describing what is to be changed, into what, and how,
psychiatric diagnosis, treatment and prediction (as suggested in
§ V-C-2 below) are not eminently exact or accurate, at least at
present. A preference for the constraints (as well as authorizations)
of a disease model over those of a behaviorist model is thus not a
simple matter to defend.9 '
The moral and constitutional presumption against substitution of
judgment requires that a competent person wishing to undergo behavior therapy may do so (again, mayhem limitations aside). Some
conditioning regimes (particularly organic behavior modification
techniques99 ) may fall under the protections of the first amendment, 0 the doctrine of mental privacy,' 0 ' or the eighth amendment
96. Heath, Depth Recording and Stimulation Studies in Patients, in Winter, supra note
6 at 21, 29-32 [hereinafter cited as Heath].
97. Cf. Sansweet, Punishing of People to Change Behavior Gains Use, Controversy, Wall
St. J., Jan. 2, 1974, at 1, col. 1.
98. Clonce v. Richardson, 379 F. Supp. 338 (W.D. Mo. 1974) (transfer of prisoners into
"START" (Special Treatment and Rehabilitation Training) behavior modification program);
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION PROGRAMS (Hearings before the House
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (includes extensive discussion of START program). See
generally Wexler, supra note 6.
98.1. See text accompanying notes 106.1-06.2 supra.
99. Note that the therapists in both Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973)
(Anectine used in aversion therapy) and Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973)
(apomorphine used in aversion therapy) superficially appeared to be operating under the
aegis of a medical model by administering drugs with recognized medical purposes. (Anectine
is used in general anesthesia as a muscle paralytic agent and in convulsive therapy to prevent
fractures; apomorphine is sometimes used as an emergency emetic. Interview with Jeffrey
Berlant, M.D., Ph.D., Fellow in Law, Science, & Medicine, Yale Law School, Oct. 16, 1975.)
These drugs were of course used for entirely different purposes in Mackey and Knecht: social
engineering through behavior therapy using the effects of the drugs as aversive stimuli.
100. See Legislating,supra note 1, at 268-69. Compare the notion of "cognitive restructuring" used by some behavior therapists, e.g., as described in A. LAZARUS, BEHAVIOR THERAPY
AND BEYOND (1971). The author focuses on changes in mentation patterns and speech resulting
from various behavior therapies. Note that I am not suggesting that all behavior modification
or learning regimens implicate the first amendment-though they obviously entail changes
in mental functioning!):
Speech and symbolic processes add an entirely different dimension to man's
otherwise animal behavior. . ..
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ban on cruel and unusual punishment (therapy may be "punishment" in constitutionaleseI 2 ); and perhaps for some of these programs, prior judicial authorization should be required before they
are essayed on persons involuntarily confined.'"' But in considering
what is fitting, effective, and non-intrusive, the behaviorist model
of therapeutic justification for intervention is no more precise than
the disease model-and in many cases may be a good deal less so.
This is asserted in full recognition of the possibilities of benefit from
behavior therapy; the question is whether and how such benefits can
be defined and in fact generated.
Such problems of therapeutic fit suggest that a project of constructing a "logic of therapy" be undertaken: perhaps a semiformalized deductive system whose language contains explications
of the basic polythetic action-justifying predicates ("disease,"
"maladaptive behavior") that are embedded in specified postulates.
The postulates themselves would be, in part, reflections of therapeutic practice and pro tanto represent empirical hypotheses about
the healing and what might be termed "modulational" practices of
various therapists; and they would be in part prescriptive guides to
action. And the formulation of these postulates would be aided by
working out notions of the relative fittingness of alternative therapies-with those notions themselves informed to an extent by the
notions of effectiveness and intrusiveness. We might then have an
improved account of therapeutic justification-and know more or
less precisely when the justification for intervention or confinement
is not therapeutic, and must be justified by specifying goals other
Is it not obvious that B. F. Skinner's ingenious operant conditioning principles have
had the greatest clinical effects on people who have lost, or never had, the capacity to
speak and reason abstractly? . . . Stated boldly, the point at issue is that "thinking
behavior" transcends data derived from reflexology. Many disorders of language and
thought must be dealt with in their own right and at their own level ...
All forms of psychotherapy, including behavior therapy, try to teach people to think,
feel, and act differently. Cognitive, affective, and overt response patterns are not
separate units but interactive processes which constitute behavior in its broadest
sense.
Id. at 164-66 (emphasis in original). This locution is criticized in note 58 supra.
101. Cf. Legislating, supra note 1, at § rn-C.
102. Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973) (cruel and unusual punishment
under eighth amendment to administer apomorphine in a conditioning program without
prisoner's informed consent).
103. Cf. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2670.5, 2675-80 (Supp. 1975).
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than healing or therapeutic effectiveness." 4
Some additional brief observations on the notion of "fittingness"
in a behaviorist model:' if the notions of mental illness or particular mental illnesses are vague, the notion of maladaptive behavior
may be a monstrosity (particularly when trivialized into meaning
"whatever the client complains about in his behavior"). Still, the
notion of "behavior therapy" or "behavior modification" can impose some meaningful constraints upon therapists if it is tied to
eliminating/weakening or creating/strengthening specifically identified behaviors. (This does not mean that the general notion of maladaptive behavior is, after all, quite precise. It simply means that
once it is decided-by whatever means-what particularly described behavior is favored or disfavored-the therapist can choose
suitable regimens for altering such behavior.) These constraints,
however, may not constrain very much. In theory, there are an
infinite number of ways to structure behavior therapy programs and
a wide variety of goals of such therapy: a therapist might, for example, seek simply to "delete" or "subtract" unwanted behavior, or to
replace it with other behavior. 06 But what other behavior? There
104. See the review of non-therapeutic justifications for intervention in the text accompanying notes 253-58 infra.
105. See text at § V-A infra for a review of some behaviorist concepts.
106. The distinction drawn here is unlikely to be realized in actual therapeutic programs.
Cf. TASK FORCE, supra note 82, at 24-25:
[T]o the extent that a given problem behavior is a prominent part of the patient's
repertoire, is frequently emitted and is the source of reinforcement for him, a reduction
of this behavior will both allow more opportunity for other behavior to occur and result
in a loss of reinforcement. Appropriately designed therapy should anticipate this and,
as part of the therapeutic program, teach the patient new, desirable behavior.
For example, if an alcoholic who formerly drank heavily stops drinking, he will lose
whatever reinforcers he got from drinking such as anxiety reduction and avoidance of
a home situation. In addition, he will have more time available to devote to other
activities. A well designed behavioral approach to alcoholism would include not only
a procedure to stop the alcoholic from drinking, but also a therapeutic procedure such
as desensitization or assertive training to deal with the patient's entire situation.
Similarly, if it appears that a child's maladaptive behavior is maintained by attention
from his parents, a well designed behavior therapy program for that family would not
only teach the parents to ignore the problem behavior, but also show them how to
interact with their child in such a way as to support new and mutually reinforcing
appropriate behavior.
Cf. id. at 10-11 (systematic desensitization), and id. at 24-25 (symptom substitution). Another example might be to compare aversive stimuli to eliminate aberrant sexual behavior
and reinforcing stimuli to generate more appropriate sexual responses. See generally Note,
Aversion Therapy: Its Limited Potentialfor Use in the CorrectionalSetting, 26 STAN. L. REV.
1327 (1974).
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are, again, an infinite number of possible replacement behaviors.
Perhaps the notions of effectiveness and intrusiveness may aid in
establishing permissible boundaries for behavior therapy-e.g., if
there is simply unwanted behavior and no particular replacement
behavior is favored, "deletion" should be preferred. But such a rule
is not likely to be followed if a given therapist believes that
replacement of behaviors is a more effective deletion device than
deletion simpliciter-if such an outcome could possibly occur at all.
(One would hardly expect recurring suspended animation to result
from deletion of recurring maladaptive behavior.) It seems likely, in
any event, that some replacement behavior will be induced, even if
by indirection. 06- It thus seems that movement into a behaviorist
model leaves one with both theoretical and practical difficulties in
charting limits on therapeutic "fit." Wilson and Davison, for example, assert that:
Specificity is the hallmark of behavior therapy. The therapist
must find clear instances of behavior that exemplify the
client's often vague, subjective impressions. . . . Unlike many
traditional psychotherapists who use an all-purpose treatment,
behavior therapists can choose from a variety of methods
within a theoretically consistent framework, tailoring the techclient's problems into
nique to the client rather than fitting 0the
6.2
a preordained therapeutic regimen.'
They then observe: "Studies also have shown the efficacy of behavioral treatment for such problems as social withdrawal, delinquent
acts, phobias, aggression, and social disruption."'0 '6 .3 And in a broad
characterization, they allow that "[b]ehavior therapy really is a
collection of principles and techniques about how to change behavior; it says nothing about who should modify what behavior, or why
or when."'' 1 . The comments are, taken together, an apt description
of the vagueness, rather than the precision of the behaviorist model.
106.1. Singer, PsychologicalStudies of Punishment, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 405, 432-33 (1970).
Cf. Ayllon, Behavior Modification in Institutional Settings, 17 ARIz. L. REV. 3, 7 n.24 (on
"vacuums" created when sexual behaviors are extinguished).
106.2. Wilson & Davison, Behavior Therapy: A Road to Self-Control, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY
54 (Oct. 1975).
106.3. Id. at 54.
106.4. Id. at 59 (emphasis in original).
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IV.

THE NECESSITY OF JUSTIFYING INTERVENTION,

OR INTERFERENCE
WITH PERSONAL DECISIONS FOR OR AGAINST INTERVENTION

A.

The Primacy of the "Executive Organ"1 7-the Brain

Elementary notions of autonomy require that even relatively simple or relatively minor physical intrusions (from touching to appendectomies) must be justified-e.g., by claiming that the informed
consent of the subject was obtained, or that the subject was incompetent and, say, the bleeding simply had to be staunched. A fortiori,
any physical intrusions upon the brain must be justified: the brain
has substantial hegemony over being, doing and personal identity.
(This is a reasonably well-established empirical claim, and, so understood, seems entirely neutral with respect to conflicts among
mentalists, physicalists, behaviorists, and metaphysicians and philosophers generally.)
This statement of the obvious is occasioned by remarks like that
of Dr. J. M. R. Delgado: "The inviolability of the brain is only a
107. This expression was used in Brody, On the Legal Control of Psychosurgery (Editorial), 157 J. NERvous & MENTAL Dis. 151 (1973). Cf. MARK & ERVIN, supra note 19, at 2:
[W]e are not going into a detailed discussion of these social causes of violence. Instead
we shall focus on the relation of violence to the brain, since the brain is the storehouse
of all human experience-social, cultural, and educational-and the generator of all
human behavior, both peaceful and violent. We do not say that all violence is caused
by people with damaged brains. We do know, however, that all behavior filters through
the central nervous system, and we believe therefore that studying the relationship
between the brain and violence is the best way to get to understand that mechanism
of behavior. We assume that these mechanisms can be identified and described, and
furthermore, that some of them are related to a malfunction of the brain-a malfunction that can be tested for objectively. If we can only learn to identify those people
within our society who have a low threshold for impulsive violence because they suffer
from brain malfunction, we will have taken the first step toward treating these individuals; and what is more important from the public point of view, toward preventing
their violent behavior.
The relationship between the postulates outlined in the text accompanying note 10 supra and
the use of psychosurgery is considered briefly in the text accompanying notes 189-92 infra.
Some of the difficulties involved in formulating descriptive and prescriptive postulates for
surgical destruction or stimulation of brain tissue are these: behavior can be controlled
through surgical destruction of apparently normal brain tissue; diseases-mental and physical-may be posited to account for episodic violence, but the treatment may not be entirely
"fitted" to the disease-e.g., ablation of normal tissue does not "correct" the neurochemical
anomalies which may be correlated with violence, except through gross destruction of brain
cells; there are numerous movement disorders (dyskinesias) which seem plainly to be diseases, but which, again, are controlled or ameliorated by surgical destruction of healthy
brain tissue. See generally VALENSTEIN, supra note 19, at 198-203. For extensive critiques of
the work and views of MARK & ERVN see VALENSTEIN, supra note 19; Hodson, supra note 32.
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social construct, like nudity."'' 8 What sort of claim is Dr. Delgado
making? What is a "social construct," and why is the term preceded
by "only"? If he is suggesting that some kinds of human conduct or
attitudes are, might or should be based upon things other than
social constructs, what are these things, and are they more substantial rationales for behavior and opinion than social constructs? If so,
why? It is likely that Dr. Delgado's bizarre statement, which perhaps has an empirical component (whatever it is), nevertheless reflects a profound value judgment: altering basic traits of identity
and personhood is of no greater moment than, say, improving liver
functions. But in fact nearly any mental functioning or behavior can
be generated, altered, or terminated-at least in theory-by suitable changes in the structure or chemistry of the brain.'"9 Similar
physiochemical alterations of other organs no doubt may have
great effects upon mental functioning and behavior-but these
effects must be mediated through the brain. More, such alterations worked directly upon the brain are far likelier to generate substantial changes (for better or worse) in one's modes of thought,
feeling and conduct-indeed, in one's very identity. The casual
attitude toward generating physiochemical changes in the brain
may reflect a casual attitude toward individual autonomy. I do not
share that casual attitude, and I regard the implied moral views of
the quoted statement as outrageous.
The anticipated response by "brain healers" that various physiochemical therapies may in certain cases or classes of cases enhance
values of individuality and autonomy"' is probably true; but the
counter-response is that (a) a given attempt at promoting autonomy
may in fact impair it in some respects or even substantially destroy
it, and (b) the autonomy of the subject of the proposed therapy is
grossly assaulted by acting over his/her informed objection, or by
acting upon incompetents without due respect for the massive effect
upon being and identity entailed by organic therapies. The dilemma
here is compound: (1) enforced therapy (or denial of therapy) at
time-one infringes upon autonomy, but at time-two may have ef108. Delgado, Physical Manipulationof the Brain, HASTINGS CENTER REP. 11 (Spec. Supp.
May, 1973).
109. On the "bioelectrochemical hypothesis" see Legislating, supra note 1, at 247 n.19.
On correlating (perhaps, in some cases, as cause and effect) neurophysiological events and
processes with mentation and behavior see text §§ II-C, Ill-B supra.
110. For some suggestions on the analysis of "autonomy" see text §§ -B, IV-C infra,
and note 21 supra.
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fected enhanced autonomy as a result of the enforced therapy (or
may have preserved autonomy by insulating it from highly intrusive
treatment). (2) Therapy on a given patient may in some respects
enhance his autonomy (e.g., psychosurgery reducing crippling obsessional mentation such as certain drives) and in other respects
impair it (e.g., "blunting affect")."' (3) The very kind of condition
relieved by therapy may be represented as a continuum, and altering the person's condition by changing his/her "location" along the
continuum may at once promote autonomy and impair it. Thus, if
the intense emotional state characterizing depression is relieved by
diminishing one's capacity to respond with intense emotion (e.g., by
shortening one's "time horizon""'), autonomy may be furthered by
diluting "hyper"response, but the dilution may go so far as to generate a "hypo"responsive condition."'
J

B.

A PartialExplication of "Autonomy"

The foregoing suggests that there may be several notions of auton111. See notes 23, 24 supra and note 115 infra.
112. Cf. Heath, supra note 96, at 21-22:
It was my impression that the beneficial effects of frontol lobe surgery, when they
occurred, were attributable to diminution of affect, or emotion, associated with memory. This procedure seemed most beneficial in patients whose pathologic behavior
resulted from faulty anticipation of future events, reflected in painful emotions such
as anger and depression. The effect of surgery was the patient's reduced concern for
the future-a concern based on faulty memories. It seemed, too, that the intractable
pain of some patients was significantly mitigated because of lessened ability to anticipate future pain. Thus it was patients in whom painful affect was the outstanding
feature-those suffering depression, severe obsessive-compulsive neuroses, intractable
phobias, or intractable pain-who showed the most significant clinical improvement
from this operation. The surgery altered brain function and produced the behavioral
effect on the patient of living more for the present moment.
Most patients with severe psychiatric illness are not helped appreciably by frontal
lobe surgery, since relatively few patients are disabled because of symptoms of disturbed affect resulting from memory experiences. Instead, their affector mechanism
for expression of emotions and feelings is grossly impaired, usually in association with
a lowered level of awareness. The most common of these disabling disorders are schizophrenia and temporal lobe epilepsy ....
113. This is a guess on the author's part, based upon some of the literature reporting relief
of depression through psychosurgery. Compare Scoville, The Effect of Surgical Lesions of the
Brain on Psyche and Behavior in Man, in Winter, supra note 6, at 53, 54. On the possibility
of "blunting of the personality" following "complete lobotomy" see Scoville, in id. at 56.
Nothing Scoville says directly supports the hypothesis in the text. It is considered a possible
result of psychosurgery, though he knows of no case in point, by Dr. Jerome E. Jacobson,
M.D., Clinical Director, Gateways Hospital and Community Mental Health Center, Los
Angeles (interview of June 25, 1975). The problem highlights another facet of the antinomies
plaguing the use of organic therapy.
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omy-and several notions of their respective priorities-which
should be distinguished. For example, the phrases "priority of autonomy" and "the presumption against substitution of judgment"
have in some contexts been used elsewhere"' more or less
interchangeably. Here, however, they are not used as equivalents:
it seems useful to refer to impairments of autonomy caused by
means other than substitution of judgment (e.g., by the effects of
intrusive organic therapy), though substitution of judgment may
remain the most important, morally and constitutionally. The argument for recognizing more than one sense of autonomy might run
this way. Substitution of judgment is of course one means of defeating autonomy. But impairing, say, someone's cognitive powers
through organic therapy-whether he has given his informed consent to it or not-might also be called an impairment of autonomy.
The set of events called "substitution of judgment" could thus be a
proper subset of events called "interference with the priority of autonomy." (We ignore for now whether the substitution, and therefore the interference, are somehow justifiable.) Indeed, it would appear that the priority of autonomy is what rationalizes (at least in
part) the presumption against substitution of judgment. It may be
that it is in principle possible to formulate rules justifying interference with autonomy (in one sense) by substitution of judgment in
a restricted class of cases because such substitution would promote
the fundamental goal of maintaining or promoting autonomy (in
another but related sense); and that these rules themselves might
be (roughly speaking) in the form of presumptions that, under specified circumstances, the initial presumption against substitution of
judgment is overcome. Thus, we might adopt a rule that inmates
of "total institutions" must demonstrate in a judicial or administrative proceeding that they have the capacity for giving, and have
given, their informed consent to psychosurgery, a procedure in
5
which future autonomy is greatly "at risk.""
114. See Legislating, supra note 1, at pts. III-IV. I will not, at present, subject this
"presumption against substitution of judgment" to extended philosophical analysis; nor will
I inquire into how far, in fact, individuals and governments adhere to it.
115. See DHEW, supra note 20, at 4:
[W]hether lesion or stimulation techniques are used, the "modern" psychosurgeon
attempts to minimize the adverse "side-effects" of the procedures by lesioning or
stimulating only a small area of brain tissue, with the hope of eliminating the specific
behavioral problems but not producing any undesirable changes in personality, intelligence, creativity, or motivation.
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Although requiring a hearing to verify that an inmate has given
his informed consent to therapy probably does not alone conflict
with the presumption against substitution of judgment, it is arguable that placing a burden of proving the elements of informed consent upon the inmate and/or the state (the nature of the allocation
I leave open) is inconsistent with this general presumption. Only if
an opponent of the proposed therapy has the burden of negating
these elements, it might be urged, can the hearing requirement
(which indeed places some obstacles against the implementation of
the inmate's reported wishes) be consistent with the presumption
against substitution of judgment. But there is no inconsistency.
Consider the following analysis:
Since we will, for present purposes, use the term "presumption"
in its legal word-of-art sense, it may be useful to use the phrase
"policy against substitution of judgment," deleting the word "presumption," which was previously being used in an ordinary language sense. To implement this policy against substitution of judgment through the posited hearing, the court ordinarily should first
See also VALENSTFN, supra note 19, at 352:
The surgical procedures that may at times eliminate aggression and rage in humans
are not affecting innate, stereotyped response patterns, their mode of action is much
more global; they seem to be reducing responsiveness to many significant aspects of
the environment. It is very unlikely that any of the ablation [destruction of tissue]
or stimulation techniques, or for that matter, drugs presently being investigated are
capable of reducing undesirable aggression in a normal population without also reducing such qualities as sensitivity, ambition, and intellectual alertness. Unfortunately,
the nervous system is not organized in a way that makes it possible to separate functions in terms of their social implications.
And cf. Breggin, Lobotomies Are Still Bad Medicine, MED. OPINION 32, 34-35 (Mar. 1972):
The dean of American lobotomy, Dr. Walter Freeman. . . has written: "Theoretically,
on the basis of personality studies, creativeness should be abolished by lobotomy ...
A few patients can run their own businesses or resume their professional statusmedicine, law, etc. . . . Although they may not become leaders in their own professions, they serve adequately and comfortably."
This is the best the lobotomy can offer. An operation that permits some women to
be reinstated in their families as incapacitated housewives, that enables some bluecollar workers to return to their jobs, or that permits a few lucky professionals to
continue with their careers (albeit with limited achievement), is not good enough when
the price exacted is "blunting" of human personality.
It is suggested, however, that that decision belongs to the individual patient, unless he/she
is incompetent to make such therapeutic choices. I.e., we are bound to respect their
"autonomy," (see note 121 infra) to do, within limits, what they will with their "autonomy2 " (See text accompanying notes 122-25 infra, and note 121 infra on the different
"autonomies" at stake). It bears emphasis that the quoted excerpts, supra this note, aid in
illustrating the effective/intrusive distinction.
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proceed on the presumption that the inmate's report (oral or written) that he gave his informed consent is true. The court might well
go on to inquire: "Did you indeed assent? Were you told that consequences X and Y might result? Did anyone twist your arm?," and
so on. If the responses are consistent with the demands of informed
consent, the court should then stand ready to ratify the proposal for
therapy.
Suppose, now, that an opponent of the procedure (say, the inmate's guardian) wished to block the procedure. He would do so by
attempting to overcome the presumption that the inmate's report
of his (the inmate's) informed consent is correct. This might be done
by, e.g., establishing that the therapy was autonomy-threatening
and experimental; and, on the basis of (rather dubious) empirical
propositions concerning the judgmental capacities of persons in
total institutions, the court might conclude that the inmate was not
capable of giving his informed consent to the kind of procedure in
question. The opponent might also seek to prove that most significant decisions made by captives are "coerced." Having proved some
or all of this, he might then conclude that the presumption that the
inmate's report of informed consent was true had been overcome.
(I will not at this point try to specify all the kinds of conditions, or
combinations of conditions, which should be considered necessary
and/or sufficient for overcoming that presumption.) At this point,
the burden of going forward with the evidence might shift to the
inmate and/or state either to refute the opponent's factual claims
(e.g., the procedure was not autonomy-threatening, was not experimental); or conceding these claims, to prove that the prisoner, despite his confinement and confrontation with the prospect of a complex experimental form of therapy, was nevertheless perfectly capable of informed consent, had not been coerced and had given such
consent.
This shift in the burden of going forward (the burden of persuasion still rests with the opponent to show why the procedure should
not be undertaken) is the equivalent of a presumption used by the
opponent to counter the presumption that the prisoner's report of
his informed consent was true. This shifting of the burden of going
forward would not only not be inconsistent with the policy against
substitution of judgment, it would indeed implement it: by hypothesis (the opponent's showing), we can no longer assume there was
informed consent, and proceeding on that assumption would
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threaten autonomy." 6
The burden shifted onto the inmate or state might be more or less
onerous depending upon the degree to which therapy threatened
autonomy, was irreversible, experimental, etc. Inconsistency would
arise only under the following circumstances: if the propositions
urged by the opponent as a basis for shifting the burden to the
proponents of the therapy were so broad in scope that they would
nearly always be true (e.g., were not rigorously confined to, say,
autonomy-threatening therapies, or persons in total institutions
(these might be relevant though non-decisive criteria" 7 )), then we
might indeed have operationally established a general policy favoring substitution of judgment. This, of course, would be inconsistent
with the policy (or presumption, to revert to ordinary language)
against substitution of judgment. (It would require much additional
analyis to explain precisely what factors would justify such skepticism about the truth of an inmate's report of his informed consent
that the burden of going forward should shift to proponents of the
procedure, requiring them to go beyond simply presenting an apparently truthful report of the inmate. Such analysis would require
specification of factors or combinations of factors which are relevant, necessary, or sufficient in specific contexts. (Some, for example, might wish to shift the burden as above when dealing with
extremely risky and autonomy-threatening therapies in the "private" sector, and so seek to implement appropriate judicial proceedings."18 But this author is skeptical about the propriety and value of
intruding too far into domains of putatively private therapeutic
settings.)
We might conclude with some brief remarks summarizing the
choice of mistakes we wish to risk. Example: if the proposition that
an inmate's report of his informed consent is true, but we erroneously decide that he did not give such consent, we have made a
"type 1" error-which forecloses his choice of therapy and impairs
his autonomy. If the proposition that he gave such consent is false,
116. The problem of reconciling the policy against substitution of judgment with the
requirement of a fairly strict standard of proof for showing informed consent, propriety of the
proposed therapy, etc. was called to my attention by Professor Roy G. Spece, Jr. of the
University of Arizona. His particular focus was on CAL. PENAL CODE § 2679 (Supp. 1975),
which imposes such requirements on the state. This author had a hand in drafting §§ 267080 of this Code.
117. See text § I-A supra.
118. Cal. Assembly Bill 4032 (Vasconcellos).
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but we conclude erroneously that it is true, we have made a "type
2" error-and (subject, perhaps, to certain other conditions) we
proceed with an irreversible procedure which may-or may not (we
can run a similar error analysis here)-seriously impair his autonomy. Moral and constitutional autonomy values, it is suggested,
dictate a preference for erroneously concluding there was no informed consent (type 1 error) rather than erroneously concluding
that there was such consent (type 2)-if we are to make errors at
all (and that is certain)."'
A slightly more extended explication of "autonomy" is now called
for, but it is a complex "cluster" or "polythetic" concept'20 and brief
accounts of it are necessarily superficial. The core meaning concerns
the rights of individuals (and perhaps certain kinds of groups or
entities) against interference with their lives, affairs and decisionmaking by other individuals, groups or entities. But autonomy
might also encompass the state of having substantial capacities
for decision-making, functionality, productivity, and creativity,
. . .- the very mental and behavioral attributes necessary for
exercising autonomy. This account of "autonomy" as including
both an "anti-heteronomy" aspect and a "fulfillment of potential"
or "intrapsychic freedom" aspect'' may not fully correspond either
119. See generally H. ALDER & E. ROESSLER, INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS
138-39 (5th ed. 1972).
120. See text § I-A infra.
121. More should be said about the varieties of autonomy. The degree to which a person's
autonomy is infringed may depend, in complex ways, upon changes in his "opportunity set"
and "preference orderings" and "rationales." (Cf. Legislating, supra note 1, at 301-07, for a
brief explanation of this choice-theoretic terminology. See infra this note on relating autonomy to the status of, as well as changes in, opportunities and preferences.) Consider the ways
in which autonomy might be compromised. One's opportunity set might be partially
preempted through substitution of his judgment by that of others-a simple form of external
constraint. Freedom from this sort of substitution of judgment will be dubbed, for present
purposes, "autonomy,." Autonomy, is, in certain respects, protected against governmental
intrusion by the first amendment and by the notion of "mental privacy." Legislating, supra
note 1, at 255-76. One's opportunity set, however, may also be greatly affected by dysfunctional mentational patterns (perhaps a sort of "internal" constraint): episodic rage; obsessivecompulsive rumination; mania. Indeed, one may have begun with an opportunity set which
could do but poorly-e.g., because crippled by defective intelligence, particular cognitive
disabilities, etc. Thus, severely autistic persons might properly be called substantially "nonautonomous." (Autistic children are, for example, "oblivious much of the time to relevant
environmental influences." BANDURA, supra note 6, at 15.) It also may be that particular
changes in preference orderings and rationales may effectively foreclose what one might in
fact physically or mentally be able to do; preference orderings and rationales, as a clue to
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to ordinary language or to philosophical or medical argot.' 2 It seems
autonomy, must thus be assessed along with the opportunity set. And, opportunity sets may
be constricted by physical disabilities. All of these strands might be called "autonomy," and
contrasted with freedom from substitution of judgment-autonomy,.
A good deal of caution is necessary in specifying a link between autonomy, and preference
orderings and rationales. It is tempting, but dangerous, to take such orderings and rationales
for a given set of persons at a given time and endeavor to classify such persons as relatively
"autonomous" or "non-autonomous." Thus, one who prefers (for whatever reason) to do
nothing but thumb twiddling might be regarded by some as relatively less autonomous than
another who has a more standard array of inclinations. But the risk of masking value judgments by statements purporting neutrally to describe one's preferences in certain ways (if
possible at all) is obvious. The thumb twiddler may simply be different, not less autonomous, whether we also consider him good, bad, neutral, or a bozo. (The risk of normative
ambiguity seems less in venturing empirical descriptions of the status of opportunity sets.)
Yet it seems difficult to resist the conclusion that enforced behavior control programs which
intrusively alter preference orderings and/or rationales assault one's autonomy,, and in a
manner which is not captured by talking solely about constricted or altered opportunity sets
(which theoretically might remain the same even though changes in preference orderings/
rationales). Enforced changes in preferences, indeed, may closely approach what we might
regard as enforced personality or identity change. Perhaps, then, a relatively value-free
strand of autonomy, analysis might focus on certain kinds of changes in preference orderings
and rationales, without regard to an assessment of the quality of the before-and-after
preference states. Still, the notion of autonomy is not so clear that we can categorically
exclude the propriety of trying to assess autonomy by adverting not just to change, but to a
description of the status of one's preferences. An autistic child, as suggested above, might be
regarded as relatively non-autonomous both because of his narrow opportunity set and also
because of his apparent preferences (for head banging, etc.). Of course, "more autonomous"
and "less autonomous" must reflect some notion of assessing degrees of autonomy.)
Consider the following ways in which the different sorts of autonomy could be compromised. First, one could be subjected (despite competent protest) to a conditioning program
involving electronic stimulation of the brain (ESB) as the source of the learning stimuli.
Autonomy, is abridged simply by overruling such objection. Under the influence of ESB, one's
opportunity set might be "reduced" in any number of ways. See generally J. DELGADO,
PHYSICAL CONTROL OF THE MIND: TOWARD A PSYCHOCIVlLIZED SOCIETY 133-49 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as DELGADO]. Further, under the influence of ESB as a tool for conditioning, as well as
for direct psychotropic intervention, one's preference orderings might conceivably be
changed. Cf. Heath, supra note 96, at 31. Depending upon the nature of the change in
preferences, one might become "less autonomous" or "more autonomous" (compare the
effects of psychosurgery, notes 23, 24, 115 supra).
The neurotic patient . . .is maladaptive in behavior because he has inappropriate
fears developed from his learning experiences. If we could induce pleasure [by ESB]
in the phobic neurotic patient when he encounters the objects of his fears, we might
be able to correct his maladaptive pattern. Similarly, if the painful repugnant feelings
of some homosexuals toward the opposite sex could, in a programmed manner, be
converted into pleasurable feelings, their behavioral patterns might change. The effects of such physiologic maneuvering, coupled with behavioral programming, are just
beginning to be tested in the treatment of patients with pathologic behavior.
Obviously, only a very few, highly selected, hopelessly sick patients can be consid-
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nevertheless to be a useful expression, and attention to the contexts
in which the term occurs.should obviate possible confusion. 13 It may
well be, as Professor Roy G. Spece, Jr. suggests, that autonomy in
its anti-substitution of judgment aspect is "prime," and should
dominate the rule structure governing both access to therapy and
enforced therapy. Indeed, the moral rule structure proposed elsewhere'2 ' reflects just that: presumptively, an individual is free to
decide what he is going to do with his powers of autonomy -whether
to use them, abuse them, not use them, or risk them in therapy. He
may exercise "autonomy," (freedom from substitution of judgment)
ered candidates for the depth electrode procedure. Further, a principal limitation of
electrical stimulation of the brain is its temporary therapeutic effect.
Id. at 31.
Perhaps the application of controlled manipulation of pleasure has its greatest
potential in altering unhealthy patterns of behavior resulting from environmental stimuli (learning) [referring to ESB with depth electrodes].
Id.
The question whether one is more or less autonomous as a result of infringement of autonomy,
in such cases will be left open. Obviously, much depends upon the therapy used and its "net"
effect upon autonomy,. It is suggested, however, that where government uses intrusive autonomy,-attacking agencies a threshold first amendment claim arises, even though in some
respects the intervention may enhance elements of autonomy,. See citations in note 1 supra.
One might, of course, further explicate "autonomy" by drawing additional distinctions
among kinds of mentation. (One might also simply drop the locution "autonomy," and refer
instead to functionality of various sorts, -opportunity sets, and preference orderings and rationales.)
No effort will be made to fit these striations of autonomy into those developed by
philosophers. Compare J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUS'rcE 513-20 (1971) ("Autonomy and Objectivity").
122. See Legislating, supra note 1, at pt. IV. Cf. the distinction between "internal autonomy" ("the awareness of the individual that he is free") and "external autonomy" ("that
which ceases to exist when the individual's control over his own conduct is forfeited to or
usurped by society"; "freedom"). Project-The Computerizationof Government Files. What
Impact on the Individual?, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1371, 1421-22 (1968). Cf. also Peszke, Is
Dangerousness an Issue for Physicians in Emergency Commitment?, 132 AM. J. PSYCHIAT.
825, 827 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Peszke]: "[Slevere forms of mental illness in some way
affect the rational and executive powers of the individual's will or ego, i.e., severe mental
illness affects or impinges on the autonomy of the individual." Cf. J. BREHM, A THEORY OF
PSYCHOLOGIcAL REACTANCE 4 (1966) ("for specified behaviors to be free, the individual must
have the relevant physical and psychological abilities to engage in them, and he must know
. . .that he may engage in them"). The author goes on to describe the occurrence of "reactance" whenever such behaviors are threatened. Cf. note 129 infra.
123. "Freedom from intrusion"-e.g., invasions by law enforcement officers, might be
considered a species of autonomy, (their choice overrules the individual's option for privacy),
or might simply be dubbed autonomy. Cf. Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L.
REV. 1410, 1424-25 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Henkin].
124. Legislating, supra note 1, at 253-96.
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to do what he will with "autonomy," (his functionality or psychic
capacities). "5 This "per se" rule requires that competent refusal of
therapy be decisive. Under certain circumstances (no attempt to
specify them precisely will be made here) competent consent, or
even demand, also may be decisive: the subject must be free to use
mind-altering agents, and to receive therapy.' Still, to say that
autonomy, is preeminent is not to say that it is absolute. There may
be circumstances, depending upon the degree of irreversible risk to
antonomy2 and the degree of doubt attending a person's decisionmaking capacity, in which his autonomy, arguably should be impaired because of that risk to his autonomy,. (Readers may prefer
not to refer to "autonomy", and to speak instead of functionality
of various kinds, psychic freedom, opportunity sets and preference
orderings.) 7
C.

The Priority of Autonomy (or Autonomies)

Why is personal autonomy a prime value? Because it is prima
facie unjust for any person or entity to substitute his/her/its judgment for another's. 2 8 But why is it unjust? Because it interferes
with some intrinsic goods? What intrinsic goods? How do they morally "validate" autonomy? Should we simply cease inquiry by fixing
upon autonomy as an intrinsic good? One could, of course, also
praise autonomy because its recognition promotes happiness, or
because it is otherwise instrumentally good. But we are now too far
afield. Pressed to the wall, I can only, for the present, confess that
I came to value personal autonomy because I found a paean to it
on a stone tablet. I did not accept the message of the tablet uncritically. I searched further and found that the stone was sitting upon
the back of a turtle, which was itself ensconced on the back of an
elephant. It seemed prudent not to inspect the underside of the
elephant. "9
125. Compare J.S. Mill's view that one should not be allowed to sell himself into slavery
(note 130 infra).
126. Cf. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 95 S. Ct. 2486 (1975), vacating 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir.
1974).
127. The choice-theoretic terminology is explained in Legislating, supra note 1, at
301-07.
128. The latest of the major opuses analyzing justice and autonomy appears to be R.
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1975). Compare it with J. RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
(1971).
129. Lest anyone think that I regard the analysis and defense of the notion of autonomy
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The account of this adventure is offered simply to stress that the
moral context in which the inquiry into the justification for intervention is raised includes a rule that substitution of judgment is
prima facie wrong and must be justified, whether we are dealing
with treatment for disease or any other matter for human decision.
The basic outline of the arguments to be dealt with here, then, is
this: i) Intervention may arguably seem justified because of the
existence or occurrence of disease (or some related condition) or
certain kinds of conduct. ii) This justification might be defeated by
a claim that the intervention would unjustifiably infringe upon personal autonomy (of various sorts) (e.g., there was no informed consent; the intervention would serve only paternalistic goals;' 30 the
to be simple or arbitrary, I refer them to my efforts elsewhere in this essay to explicate the
concept (see text § IV-B supra and notes 121, 122 supra). Much can be said in such a defense by (among other things) adverting to notions of fairness, justice, utility and intrinsic
good; but ultimately we reach the limits of rational argumentation and rest with "Here I
stand." (It would be, I think, a misuse of the term to characterize such stands-when preceded by careful analysis-as "arbitrary.") The analysis and defense must also take account
of the assaults of determinists, but that battle will not be joined here. Compare Ladenson,
A Theory of PersonalAutonomy, 86 ETmics 30, 34, 46 (1975) (referring to Scanlon, A Theory
of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHuLos. & Pus. AFFAIRS 204 (1972)):
For Scanlon. . . . to regard oneself as autonomous is simply to consider one's own
judgment about what to do and believe as ultimately authoritative. Being autonomous
in this sense is compatible with decision making of extremely poor quality. . . . [If
so], just what is so valuable about personal autonomy? . . .
Scanlon's response . . . is . . . the plausible but unsatisfying one . . . that placing
so much power in the hands of a few people would almost surely lead to disaster ...
Since [in Ladenson's view] autonomy is identified with reason, and reason, in turn,
is thought of as the most important aspect of the person for attaining goods and
avoiding evils over the long run, the account is clear and plausible in explaining the
primary value of personal autonomy. . . . It identifies autonomy with reason, and
reason with a set of human abilities and capacities all of which are, in principle, objects
of scientific investigation. Personal autonomy . . . admits of degrees, and there is
every reason to suppose that some environmental and cultural conditions are more
favorable for its development than others.
130. The problem of assessing paternalistic limitations on autonomy. (see note 121 supra)
to opt for therapies which may in various respects both enhance and impair autonomy
merits extended commentary. For the present, readers should consider J.S. Mill's somewhat surprising remarks on the subject of voluntary indenture:
In this and most other civilised countries. . . an engagement by which a person should
sell himself, or allow himself to be sold as a slave, would be null and void; neither
enforced by law nor by opinion. The ground for thus limiting his power of voluntarily
disposing of his own lot in life is apparent, and is very clearly seen in this extreme case.
The reason for not interfering, unless for the sake of others, with a person's voluntary
acts, is consideration for his liberty. His voluntary choice is evidence that what he so
chooses is desirable, or at least endurable, to him, and his good is on the whole best
provided for by allowing him to take his own means of pursuing it. But by selling
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himself for a slave, he abdicates his liberty; he foregoes any future use of it beyond
that single act. He therefore defeats, in his own case, the very purpose which is the
justification of allowing him to dispose of himself. He is no longer free; but is thenceforth in a position which has no longer the presumption in its favour, that would be
afforded by his voluntarily remaining in it. The principle of freedom cannot require
that he should be free not to be free. It is not freedom to be allowed to alienate his
freedom.
J.S. MILL, On Liberty, in UTILTARIANISM, LIBERTY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 81, 21213 (E. Dutton ed. 1951) [hereinafter cited as MILL].
Is this view consistent with his general animus against paternalism? Since Mill implicitly
rejects governmental interference with competent decisions to commit suicide (id. at 203-05,
discussing limitation's on the state's power to protect persons against poisons and unsafe
bridges), the reconciliation of his views on voluntary indenturing and his antipaternalistic
principle seems rather difficult. Perhaps such a reconciliation might be effected through a
rule-utilitarian analysis (which Mill himself may have embraced-cf. his remarks id. at 101):
one might argue that an ongoing and generally observable practice of enslavement would
impair community values of autonomy and dignity. Suicide (so the argument might continue)
does not involve the enduring spectacle of the continued impairment or destruction of autonomy through slavery; it is generally over and done with in fairly short order. But the argument
is not persuasive even from a rule-utilitarian perspective: why wouldn't the ongoing spectacle
of numerous freely tolerated suicides also have adverse effects on presently treasured community values? And suppose slaveholding were kept a low visibility institution? (We will
leave undiscussed for now the view that values eroded under laissez-faire regimes should not
be worried over.)
Consistent or not, Mill's enslavement scenario might profitably be restated as an injunction
against permitting the substantial destruction of autonomy during the balance of one's lifespan, and then compared with various forms of organic therapy. Would certain forms of, say,
psychosurgery so impair autonomy (understood as autonomy 2-"functionality") as to merit
condemnation on the ground that it permits, in some limited sense, the voluntary "abdication
of one's liberty"? Or do the autonomy-enhancing possibilities of such procedures suggest
otherwise? Cf. notes 23, 24 and 115 supra.
Finally, consider a categorization of paternalistic governmental action into "strong" and
"weak" forms of paternalism. Mill's antipaternalistic thesis applies only to persons competent to make decisions of the sort in question. At least one of the rationales for this limitation
is, one would suppose, the possibility of enhancing the rationality of the decision-making
process. "Weakly" paternalistic barriers might, then, consist of "waiting time" requirements,
forced assimilation of information on the risks and benefits of the courses of action under
consideration by the individual, and the like. All of these barriers (on tangible barriers,
compare Hager, Controversial Golden Gate Project: Bridge Suicide Barrier Plan Revived,
L.A. Times, May 10, 1975, pt. I, at 20, col. 1) might well minimize hasty and ignorant
decisions-although one could quite persuasively argue that we are making too much of Mill's
competence limitation, and competent people should be free to act hastily or ignorantly, as
they choose. The greater the incidence of weakly paternalistic governmental action, however,
the less persuasive might be the case for strongly paternalistic governmental action-flat bans
against certain kinds of conduct, for example.
Under what conditions should weak paternalistic injunctions exist (if they are to exist at
all)? See generally Dworkin, Paternalism,56 THE MONIST 64, 81 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Dworkin]. One fairly obvious circumstance might be the risk of irreversible substantial
impairment of autonomy. Consider, for example, the possible impairment described as
"blunted affect" resulting from psychosurgery, or death or crippling injury from hang-gliding.
A suggestion of this sort has been offered by Professor Gerald Dworkin:
Some of the decisions we make are of such a character that they produce changes
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intervention would impair mentation more than it would repair
it-and offend the first amendment in the process). iii) The claim
that personal autonomy would be infringed may itself be countered
by a variety of considerations (e.g., the subject lacks the capacity
for informed consent, and so his claim of interference with autonomy2 is so irrational it should be rejected; without intervention he
might be a danger to others-or to himself, and paternalism may
not only not offend autonomy values but promote them in a given
case (at least if understood as autonomy, values)). Limitations,
limitations upon limitations, and presumptions related to each
other as thrust-and-parry must thus occupy some of our time. One
brief forward reference: Paternalistic limitations and justifications
are not categorically excluded simply by our embracing a presumption favoring autonomy. For example, one could, as suggested,
morally rationalize certain interferences with autonomy (in the
sense of freedom from substitution of judgment) on the ground
that they in fact promote it (in the sense of enhancing functionality)
or avoid its impairment. (Whether consistently with his own position or not, J.S. Mill would have flatly prohibited selling oneself into
slavery precisely because it destroyed the autonomy he sought to
nurture.' 3' It may prove fruitful-to a degree-to compare certain
interventional modalities in which autonomy is placed "at risk"
(e.g., psychosurgery) with voluntary indenture.' 32 )
The priority of autonomy (understood for present purposes as a
presumption or policy against substitution of judgment) has been
examined for this reason: to emphasize that coercive intervention
into mentation and behavior (or interference with private choices
concerning such intervention) must be justified. The claim that a
subject has a disease or displays patterns of maladaptive behavior
which are in one or another way irreversible. Situations are created in which it is
difficult or impossible to return to anything like the initial stage at which the decision
was made. In particular some of these changes will make it impossible to continue to
make reasoned choices in the future. I am thinking specifically of decisions which
involve taking drugs that are physically or psychologically addictive and those which
are destructive of one's mental and physical capacities.
I suggest we think of the imposition of paternalistic interferences in situations of this
kind as being a kind of insurance policy which we take out against making decisions
which are far-reaching, potentially dangerous and irreversible. Each of these factors is
important. [Dworkin goes on to discuss degrees of irreversibility.]
Dworkin, supra at 80-81.
131. MILL, supra note 130, at 213. See discussion in text accompanying note 130 supra.
132. Cf. Dworkin, supra note 130, at 80-81 (1972).

Therapeutic Justifications

1975

of course aids the justificatory process of establishing a threshold
need for intervention. (It also forms part of an argument that the
subject lacks the capacity for informed consent.) It is suggested,
however, that if anyone (subject, patient, client) has the capacity
for informed consent or refusal, he/she has the right to resist interferences with his/her mental functioning, disease or no, maladaptive
behavior or no. With respect to informed refusal, then, attributions
of disease or maladaptive behavior "make no difference" (though
they may well aid therapists in hortatory efforts to secure consent;
they are, after all, important elements of a therapeutic justification!). (Where the subject is incompetent, however, such attributions may be critically important, for they might aid in justifying
therapy, perhaps of the most intrusive sort.) The government must,
then, if its ministrations are completely declined, seek ways other
than the use of the rejected therapy for avoiding public harm (including impairment or destruction of the autonomy of others) or
harm to the person in question. Informed refusal ends the matter-there is to be no coerced treatment.'3 3 In short, "autonomy,"
understood in one of its senses' 3 4-a condition in which substitution
of judgment is presumptively forbidden-is a prime value, and
"first" among several, sometimes competing notions of autonomy 2
e.g., autonomy 2 (or, if you prefer, functionality, or health, or certain
states of one's opportunity set).
V.

CONSTITUTIONAL

CONSTRAINTS UPON THERAPEUTIC

OR OTHER

JUSTIFICATIONS FOR INTERVENTION OR CONFINEMENT

These are the matters which will concern us in the following
sections of this essay: first, an analysis of "medical therapeutics"
as ventilated in Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, 5
which ventured an extensive (if not entirely rigorous) investigation
of psychosurgery; second, a rather abbreviated review of the constitutional concept of privacy, principally for the purpose of trying
to shore up one of the legal mechanisms for the protection of mentation; and third, an inquiry concerning the consequences of embracing a behaviorist (or related) model which extirpates notions
133.
trary.
134.
135.

But see Legislating, supra note 1, at 286, 299-300 for some suggestions to the conSee text accompanying notes 120-27 supra and note 121 supra.
BROOKS, supra note 4, at 902-24.
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of "disease"' 3 6 as justifications for therapy or confinement. As we
shall see, the infirmities of medical therapeutics exposed in
Kaimowitz suggest a consideration of the behavioral therapeutics
(or "modulations") discussed in § V-A-3 below.
A.

The Kaimowitz Case and FirstAmendment Constraints

A precis of Kaimowitz v. Departmentof Mental Health: there the
state sought to use current stereotactic psychosurgical procedures
on an inmate who had long been confined in a mental hospital. (He
had been civilly committed as a "criminal sexual psychopath.")
Despite the inmate's revocation of "consent" and the state's claim
of mootness, the trial court nevertheless proceeded and ruled that
the surgery would be improper and forbade its use upon him. The
decision was based in part upon the proposition that psychosurgery
would intrude upon mental functioning, thereby interfering with
potential communication and hence violating both the first amendment and the constitutional right of privacy.
1.

Kaimowitz's Internal Inconsistency'37

The "right against treatment" articulated in Kaimowitz was
founded partly upon the first amendment;'38 a more elaborate form
of the argument is suggested in an earlier article of the author.'39 But
the conclusion the court tendered was both overbroad and arguably
inconsistent with its own first amendment rationale: "We . . . conclude that involuntarily detained mental patients cannot give informed and adequate consent to experimental psychosurgical procedures on the brain."'' 0 Whatever "cannot" connotes (factual impossibility or unlikelihood, yielding a legal "cannot" or "per se" rule?),
the result is the distinct possibility of an inappropriate denial, to
competent, uncoerced inmates, of access to psychosurgical procedures. Under the court's rule, it apparently would not be open to a
136. See text § II-E supra on "medical models" not employing a "disease model." Cf. note
89 supra.
137. The "inconsistency" here is not in the basic first amendment argument for the
protection of mentation, but in the court's application of that argument. This should, I hope,
be made clear in the text which follows.
138. BROOKS, supra note 4, at 916-19. (Please recall that I am locating references to
Kaimowitz by referring to its pagination in Prof. Brooks' text.)
139. Legislating, supra note 1, at 255-73.
140. BROOKS, supra note 4, at 916.
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captive to venture to prove his/her competence, knowledgeability
and uncoerced willingness to undergo such surgery."' But, within
limits, the first amendment argument yields a conclusion that such
access must be preserved: the logical (or conceptual) connection
between mentation and communication entails not only a right
against intrusive interference with mentation but a right, at least
under certain circumstances,' to avail oneself of certain means of
altering one's own mentation-and thus of altering the nature of
one's communication.
Is there any rationale for maintaining the first amendment argument in the court's form-i.e., is there some theory for eliminating
the apparent inconsistency? In some respects, the right against
treatment' may be more important than the right to it (depending
in part upon the intrusiveness of the treatment, its ineffectiveness
its experimental status).' The growing array of psychotropic tools,
for example, creates an enormous increase in the power and possibility of state manipulation of individuals.' And while denial of access
to treatment may leave one substantially dysfunctional, the result
does not necessarily represent a case of manipulative programming.
Such considerations, however, suggest neither flat nonrecognition
of a right of access, nor even nonrecognition under specific circumstances-e.g., when the subject is confined in a total institution. If
anything, they just suggest a more restricted set of conditions in
which access rights may be claimed rather than refusal rights (per141. Cf. Murphy, Total Institutions and the Possibility of Consent to Organic Therapies
8 (Univ. of Ariz., Dep't of Philos., 1975) (unpublished paper delivered at the American
Philosophical Association (Pacific Division) Convention, San Diego, Cal., Mar. 28, 1975)
[hereinafter cited as Murphy].
142. The "under certain circumstances" is a colossal hedge which requires an article all
its own. For an outline of the first amendment right of access argument see Legislating, supra
note 1, at 324-36.
143. For convenience, the phrase "right against treatment" is used to include rights
against use of mind/behavior control modalities of intervention for non-therapeutic purposes-e.g., custodial control. It may, as suggested, be difficult in some cases to distinguish
"behavior therapy" from mere ad hoc control (say, of unruly captives). See text accompanying notes 253-58 infra.
144. See text following note 115 and accompanying notes 116-19 supra. It is quite possible,
of course, that failure to treat at a given time would allow what might be a transient dysfunctionality to become irreversible; and that failure to treat would in general leave one more or
less indefinitely in a state of substantial dysfunctionality. In such circumstances, rights to
treatment would be of considerable importance-though competent refusal of therapy may
properly remain a decisive barrier to therapy.
145. See citations in note 1 supra.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 13: 673

haps, e.g., when one is to be confined only very briefly).
A better justification for the court's substantial attenuation of
rights of access is the strong possibility of errors of administration
and their possibly drastic consequences-e.g., mistaken judgments
that an inmate was competent to make certain therapeutic decisions, was uncoerced, and had in fact given his/her informed consent
to a proposed procedure such as psychosurgery.146 Since brain tissue
destroyed cannot be regenerated, and there are no claims made that
remaining neural tissue can fully "take over" the functions of the
stereotaxically ablated tissue, the risk is of irreversible and perhaps
very substantial adverse changes in mental functioning and behavior. The court seems to have accepted this rationale in stating: "The
three basic elements of informed consent-competency, knowledge
and voluntariness-cannot be ascertained with a degree of reliability warranting resort to use of such an invasive procedure."' 47 If,
however, first amendment (and other fundamental) rights require
individuated rulings upon claims of infringement, 4 8 the "finding"
is of dubious constitutional validity. Its only defense rests upon a
mixed fact/constitutional-value thesis that the odds of reliably
determining competent, knowledgeable, uncoerced consent are extremely low, both because there are few cases of such consent and
because of the likelihood of error in the results of judicial (or administrative) proceedings. If so (so the argument goes), we may justifia146. Compare C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE
9-10 (1974):
Though I oppose the death penalty on many grounds, this book deals with just two
aspects of the death-penalty problem-the possibility of mistake in the infliction of
this penalty and the presence of standardless arbitrarinessin its infliction. . . .[M]y
aim is to persuade you that these two problems-mistake and arbitrariness in deathpenalty cases-are not fringe problems, susceptible to being mopped up by minor
refinements in concept and technique, but are at the very heart of the matter and are
insoluble by any methods now known or now foreseeable. If we resume use of the death
penalty, we will be killing some people by mistake and some without application of
comprehensible standards, and we will go on doing these things until we give up the
death penalty.
Because of the difficulties in applying the medical postulates of therapy (see text accompanying note 10 supra) when we deal with mental/behavioral anomalies, we may be confronted
with the possibilities of mistake, arbitrariness and the irreversible impairment of autonomy
resulting from therapy.
147. BROOKS, supra note 4, at 916.
148. Cf. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 (1972) (conclusions about disruptions
which might occur from picketing are "appropriately made on an individualized basis, not
by means of broad classifications, especially those based on subject matter").
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bly sacrifice the "rights-to" of a few in the interest of protecting the
"rights-against" of the many. The court offered no extended commentary on this possibility of adjudicatory inaccuracy; and, as Professor Murphy has observed, 4 ' the court's hypothesis that incompetence of various sorts results from prolonged confinement in total
institutions was unsupported by any careful review of empirical
evidence. (Its argument that the proposed subject was incompetent
was more or less anecdotal.) We simply do not have any data supporting inferences on the incidence of such "incompetence."
We may have more soundly based notions concerning the possibility of duress 50 which, combined with the irreversible consequences of a mistake in adjudication, probably justifies certain impediments to access: consider, for example, the requirement of judicial authorization of psychosurgical procedures and certain other
organic therapies as required in the recent amendments to the California Penal Code. 5' As suggested above,'52 I do not think that this
conflicts with the first amendment argument as I have structured
it. The primacy of mentation, as already observed, may dictate an
asymmetry-such as the present one-between access rights (somewhat less strong) and refusal rights (somewhat stronger).
Certain impediments to inmate access are, then, defensible. The
standard of "clear and convincing" evidence'53 is appropriate for
psychosurgery, given that procedure's l'ack of firm scientific foundation, 5 4 its likely irreversible consequences which may significantly
attenuate functionality or autonomy2 , and the risk of adjudicatory
error in determining decision-making competence and verifying
informed consent generally. The policy against substitution of
judgment may, arguably, be infringed because of the degree to
which many of the basic mentational preconditions to autonomy
are "at risk."' 55 Thus a degree of skepticism attending an inmate's
149. Murphy, supra note 141, at 8.
150. Cf. id. at 9-10. Problems of coercion and duress-difficult enough when release is not
directly involved-may become particularly acute during the parole or probation processes:
e.g., when parole or probation is made expressly contingent upon assent to the use of behavior
control techniques such as implanted depth electrodes. Cf. Anthropotelemetry: Dr. Schwitzgebel's Machine, 80 HARV. L. REV. 403 (1966).
151. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2670-80 (Supp. 1975).
152. See text following note 115 supra and accompanying notes 116-19 supra.
153. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2679 (Supp. 1975).
154. See text accompanying notes 23, 24, 115 supra.
155. Cf. DELGADO, supra note 121, at 87-88.
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report of informed consent may promote both "autonomy," and
"autonomy," values. A lesser standard of proof imposed upon the
state (or inmate) might be appropriate for less intrusive organic
therapies. For well-established therapies involving psychotropic
therapeutic drugs, the requirement of judicial authorization prior to
therapy might be unduly burdensome upon the first amendment
values implicated in access to the therapeutic process. 5 ' We thus
might have a "sliding scale" of standards of proof: the more intrusive the therapy, the stronger the showing required of the state both
in defending its position that it had obtained informed consent (it
of course might well have the substantial assistance of the inmate
in meeting this burden), and in supporting its contention that the
proposed therapy satisfies certain medical and moral standards.
The degree to which the therapy is experimental would of course be
relevant. And, in some fields of therapy (e.g., the administration of
small doses of minor tranquilizers' 57 ) the burden might switch.
Thus, if the state wished to deny certain (fairly) readily available
therapies to an inmate, it would have the burden of demonstrating
the inmate's decision-making incompetence or the unsoundness of
the therapy in question. One might expect that the state would
more often be in the position of urging the administration of therapy-even over competent protest-but it might well wish in
various circumstances to preserve certain subjects from certain
156. Recent amendments to the California Welfare and Institutions Code limit the use of
certain organic therapies in private institutions as well as state facilities, and require various
procedures to be followed before such therapies can be administered to either voluntarily or
involuntarily detained persons. E.g., CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5326.4 (Supp. 1975) requires a three-physician certification decision for convulsive therapies. Litigation attacking
such limitations on access to therapy in the private sector has already begun. Doe v. Younger,
No. 361,769 (Super. Ct., San Diego Co., Cal., filed Dec. 30, 1974). Various amendments to
the newly enacted provisions are pending in the California legislature. See Assembly Bill 1032
(Vasconcellos), containing amendments apparently intended to ease to some degree restrictions on private therapeutic choices.
157. To the extent that Statute I (alternative legislation proposed in Legislating, supra
note 1, at 339-46) places upon the state a uniform standard of proof ("clear and convincing
evidence") concerning decision-making competence, the giving of informed consent, and the
soundness and reasonableness of proposed therapy, I now think it may be too broad. (Statute
I § [12].) As applied to extremely intrusive and/or highly experimental procedures, the
articulated burden of going forward is probably satisfactory. But milder standard therapies,
e.g., minor tranquilizers, probably do not merit these impediments to access. A sort of "sliding scale" of obstacles to therapy might provide an adequate accommodation between protection against involuntary treatment and protection of access to treatment. See text following
note 115 supra and accompanying notes 116-19 supra.
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therapies. (Of course, in a post hoc civil rights action by an inmate
protesting forcible, fraudulent (or perhaps even negligent) administration of organic therapies significantly affecting mentation, he
would have the usual burden of any plaintiff-here, to prove lack
of informed consent (either by proving incompetence, lack of assent,
that he was intentionally (query, negligently) misinformed), or that
the therapy was inherently unsound.'58 ) Again, the ethical
rule structure for testing the wisdom of such burdens and presumptions includes an assessment of the degree to which both autonomy,
(freedom from substitution of judgment) and autonomy, (roughly,
"functionality," understood in part by reference to persons' opportunity sets and preference orderings) are at risk.
2.

Some Arguments Against the First Amendment Argument

An initial observation: a reductio argument must lead to an
absurdum, or such an attacking argument fails. Now, Professor
Edgar states:
I. . . doubt whether much is to be gained by treating psychosurgery as a First Amendment issue as the [Kaimowitz]
opinion does. The theory advanced by the court is that "impairing the power to generate ideas inhibits the full dissemination of ideas," thus making free speech standards relevant in
appraising psychosurgery. The proposition is not discriminating enough. Some people are so disturbed that they cannot
think, and depriving them of an operation may reduce their
potential to generate ideas. Moreover, independently of
whether psychosurgery may facilitate "idea generation," the
decision whether one wishes to generate ideas, and of what sort,
would itself seem entitled to First Amendment protection on
the court's theory. One can be concerned about consent, but
if the First Amendment is relevant, it provides as forceful
reasons for accepting the patient's "I consent" as rejecting it. 5'
158. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). There may be some areas in which the burden of proof on
the plaintiff may be, in the opinion of some commentators, unduly heavy. Cf. C. ANIEAU,
FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS AcTs: CIVIL PRACTIcE 96 (1971), criticizing the requirement of proving
"intentional and purposeful discrimination."
159. Edgar, Regulating Psychosurgery: Issues of Public Policy and Law, in OPERATING ON
THE MIND: THE PSYCHOSURGERY CONFLICT (W. Gaylin, J. Meister & R. Neville eds. 1975).
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His suggestion, then, appears to be that a defect in the first
amendment argument lies in its leading not only to a right against
treatment argument, but to a right of access argument also. It does
indeed! -as has just been suggested.' (And the argument does not
rest on showing that a person "cannot think.") At the threshold, this
is not only not absurd, it seems eminently sensible. The difficulties
of course arise in marking out the limits of the right of access. The
matter is worthy of extended analysis, but for the present I suggest
this: the most persuasive scenario for acknowledging such a right
would involve someone involuntarily confined because of mental
illness or disorder; an existing capability by the state to provide
effective and relatively non-intrusive treatment for ameliorating the
condition; a flat denial by the state to provide such treatment; and
a competent demand by the inmate for such treatment. I am not
suggesting that incompetents do not have such rights-they
do-and may indeed need them more than others; nor that states
are not obliged, constitutionally or otherwise, to take certain steps
to develop capabilities for effective treatment by, e.g., importing the
required personnel and equipment, perhaps in response to an individual claim of access. Nor am I suggesting that free persons cannot
properly claim first amendment rights to, say, certain nontherapeutic psychotropic drugs or other agents-I believe they
can.6' I am simply tendering what seems to be the easiest case, and
leaving aside, for now, questions concerning access to "adequate"
vs. "superior" treatment, state obligations to undertake research
and development, and the like.
To raise another, but related question: Why would the right of
access argument be stronger (if indeed it would be stronger) when
based upon a claim that the petitioner was suffering from an illness
likely to be ameliorated by the therapy requested? Would this be
a stronger claim than (say) one for access to performance-enhancing drugs (where existing performance levels were within normal
boundaries)? Problems of scarcity and priority aside, a central (but
non-decisive) consideration would simply be one of (perhaps)
urgent need, and this might appear to be more persuasive than
claims based upon efficiency or personal satisfaction in improved
160. See Legislating, supra note 1, at 257, 324-36.
161. See id. at 257, 324-36. See also Pizzulli, A First Amendment Right to Psychotropic
Drugs (unpublished manuscript, 1975) (on file with this author).
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performance. There may be "needs" for various "improvements"
also, but I will not pursue further the important problem of distinguishing "disease-needs" for intervention from "improvementneeds." The notion of disease-need may make the state's case for
coercive intervention seem more persuasive, though that case cannot, it is suggested, withstand the competent objection of the patient/inmate. I will not pursue these branches of the right-to and
right-against intervention.
To turn to Professor Edgar's other argument: If the assertion that
the first amendment argument "is not discriminating enough" is
based upon a rejection of the right of access branch of the argument,
then, as just argued, the criticism is misplaced. If it is based also
upon the difficulty in determining what sorts of coercive changes in
one's mental functioning and behavior constitute prima facie violations of the first amendment, then the criticism is technically accurate when addressed to the court's explanation of the first amendment argument. A more elaborate articulation of the argument-one which attempts to distinguish betWeen certain highly
intrusive interventions and less intrusive interventions-is, I suggest, sufficiently discriminating to satisfy constitutional standards
of precision (which may not be saying much!). Efforts toward such
elaborations have been made, and will not be repeated here.'
162. Legislating, supra note 1, at 262-69. See also Conditioning,supra note 1, at 655-58.
The notion of "intrusiveness" provides only a rough tool for distinguishing those effects on
mental functioning which should be classified as raising a threshold first amendment (or
privacy) claim from those which should not. Suppose that an extended period of psychotherapy were reliably found to have had a massive impact upon mentation and behavior-or that
a stint in military school (or any school) had greatly altered a student's personality. Whether
by way of attack upon the first amendment argument (another reductio effort) or far-reaching
application of it, it might be urged that government-coerced psychotherapy or educational
regimens having such an impact fall within the aegis of the first amendment. Perhaps so. If
the end-stage is, simply described, a significant change in mentation or behavior, what
difference does it make what route was taken, how it was traveled, or how long it took (so
the argumentative inquiry might go)? Our ordinary notions of automony are, I think, informed by considerations of method as well as result-and methods which provide greater
opportunities for resistance against the pursuit of certain coercive purposes might be regarded
as less intrusive upon autonomy than, say, electronic stimulation of the brain or use of
psychotropic drugs. (The possible connection between opportunity to resist and duration of
therapy is noteworthy. The existence of substantial opportunities to resist may-but need
not-entail a relatively long-running procedure. And procedures effective only over a long
period may-but need not-involve relatively substantial opportunities for blockading their
effects. In any event, "opportunity to resist" is not a decisive criterion for first amendment
analysis-partly because people vary in their abilities to resist: what is hard to resist for one
mind may be less so for another. Individuated consideration of first amendment claims
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The first amendment argument (whether in its access-to or rightagainst forms) has occasionally been criticized on the ground that
it was at least implicitly rejected in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez.' There, the plaintiffs unsuccessfully
argued, inter alia, that the first amendment requires the states to
provide adequate educational services and to assure equality of
educational opportunity.' Our argument is consistent with Rodriguez. The core of the first amendment argument is the premise that
mentation is a logically prior antecedent to communication. 15 Critical questions in applying the argument include both the relative
intrusiveness of the manner in which mentation is altered by
treatment, and the nature and extent of potential changes in mentation foregone by denial of access. The problem in assessing the effect
of Rodriguez on the present first amendment argument concerns the
connection between education and mentation. The Supreme Court
considered itself, rightly or not, to be dealing simply with marginal
increments in the quality of education. Better or worse programs of
educational services may well have a substantial impact upon the
nature and quality of communication-or so at least most of us
concerned with education as our bread and butter would like to
think.'6 6 But marginally inferior education does not directly and
intrusively destroy or prevent development of mental processes.
(Compare the effects of psychotropic drugs or psychosurgery.)
Suppose, however, there were no formal education provided. (The
Court did suggest in a footnote that inequalities involving wholly
inadequate educational services might indeed be unconstitutional
inequalities,' 7 but it did not describe such regimes of non-education
might indeed yield the result that a given behavior control technique raises a first amendment
claim when applied to one person, but not when applied to another. Notions of causation are
also implicated in the ways we distinguish the more autonomous from the less autonomous
(or the more voluntary from the less voluntary), and are related to opportunity to resist and
to duration of therapy. Gradualness of change suggests (but does not prove) that causes other
than (but influenced by) another's behavior control efforts contributed strongly to significant
changes in a given person's mentation and behavior. "Intrusiveness" is thus still another
hard-to-bridle cluster concept, though a serviceable means of aiding constitutional appraisal
of mind/behavior control technologies.
163. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
164. Cf. id. at 36; id. at 112-17 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
165. Legislating, supra note 1, at 256, 258-61.
166. But see C. JENCKS, INEQUALITY (1972); U.S. OFFICE OF EDUCATION, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966) (the Coleman Report). See also San Antonio Indep. School Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1972).
167. 411 U.S. at 20, 25 & n.60.
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or extremely poor education as violations of the first amendment.)
The argument that the first amendment might be implicated is at
least colorable, for we are, by hypothesis, discussing a situation in
which illiteracy and ignorance grossly reduce the probability of valuable political or other communication. Even so, communication
would hardly be impossible, and there is no reason to suppose it
would be largely irrational or otherwise evidence dementia among
poorly educated groups. There surely would be more than minimal
grunting to and fro.
Let us take the matter several steps further. Suppose that we were
to place newly born infants in surroundings of almost total sensory
deprivation for an indefinite period;' 7 ' the only sensations or per167.1. We must, of course, take account of the hazy distinction between what might be
termed "affirmative deprivation" of mentation-generating experience and a "failure to provide" or expose persons to such experiences. I am not suggesting that Rodriguez must be
regarded as an affirmative deprivation case (the exemplar of sensory deprivation described
in the text is used for purposes of analysis). It is nevertheless arguable that once the threshold
of establishing a general educational system were passed, variations in both quality and
quantity of education might be more comfortably classified as affirmative deprivations-the
more so if certain identifiable groups did not receive some or any of the educational services
available. The distinction suggests the question whether the state is obliged (on first amendment or other grounds) to provide any education at all. (Compare the parallel question
whether the state might ever be obliged to supply organic techniques for enhancing abilities
of various sorts (see Shapiro, Who Merits Merit? Problems in DistributiveJustice and Utility
Posed By the New Biology, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 318, 332-33, 344-47, 357-70 (1974)); and compare
the question whether the state might be obliged to provide therapy not only to confined
mentally ill persons, but to anyone requesting treatment for mental illness.) I will not pursue
these questions here.
In the discussion which follows concerning the nexus between mentation and expression
and the nexus between mentation and its causes, this distinction between affirmative deprivation and failure to provide will, for simplicity, be blinked. It should be noted in advance
that any existing educational regime may involve both the nexus between mentation and
expression and that between mentation and its causal antecedents. See text following note
170 infra. Thus, it may involve, say, deliberate deprivation of, or failure to provide, experiences crucial for the development of certain cognitive capacities, and also involve conditioning programs to alter or create certain preference orderings. There may, then, be both deprivation or failure to provide, on the one hand, and intrusion on the other. Complete analysis,
then, requires, at least, consideration of (i) failure of mentational capacities to develop, either
because of deliberate deprivation of or failure to provide mentation-generating experiences;
(ii) relative differences in quality and quantity of education/experience (which arguably
suggest affirmative deprivations within an ongoing educational system); and (iii) intrusiveness of various learning or conditioning programs. (For a review of some of the philosophical and scientific difficulties in accounting for the development of mentation see generally
Hamlyn, History of Epistemology, 3 ENcYc. OF PHILOS. 8 (1967; reprint ed. 1972); PERCErION:
MECHANISMS AND MODELS (Sci. Amer.

1972);

S. ROSE, THE CONscious

BRAIN

(1973);

INTRODUcTION TO PSYCHOLOcY Part Four (N. Munn, L. Fernald & P. Fernald, eds., 2d ed. 1969.
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ceptions of the infants would be those attelding the mechanisms for
providing nourishment, removing waste, and maintaining an environment in which the physical organism could survive. (We assume
arguendo that such a program is possible.) Such a grotesquery
might almost totally obliterate the possibility of any conscious mental functioning, and so, of necessity, substantially destroy the possibility of communication. 6 ' That sort of denial of "education" would
indeed seem to be a violation of the first amendment. The appropriate inquiry, then, is (as before) the impact upon potential mentation. If mentation is destroyed, or substantially foreclosed by sensory deprivation, or intrusively altered by organic therapy-we
have, at the threshold, a violation of the first amendment. Now, to
relate this to Rodriguez: I do not wish to be understood as belittling
the claim for equality of educational opportunity, nor as defending
the result in Rodriguez.' However, had the Court explicitly considered our form of the first amendment argument, it might have concluded that the impact (or lack of impact!) upon mentation and
communication of having a rather mediocre education (rather than
no education, or no sensory stimuli at all) was too attenuated to
implicate the first amendment. That view is not entirely unreasonable. Not every impact upon mentation, and not every "denial" of
In general, compare the problem of deprivation of or failure to provide education with that
of denial of access to or failure to provide organic therapy. The discussions here are intended
to be complementary. The latter deals primarily (though not exclusively) with the nexus
between mentation and expression, while the former deals mainly with the nexus between
mentation and its causal precursors. Cf. Legislating, supra note 1, at 326-27 n.306.
168. Cf. Developmental Consequence of Extreme Isolation 1 (private memorandum, April
25, 1975, in the author's files):
[The investigation] concerns a long range study of a single patient admitted to [the
institution to which the patient had been referred] on the basis of extreme environmental deprivation resulting in retardation, emotional disturbance, and numerous
developmental disabilities.
When first admitted for treatment, the patient, as a result of extraordinary isolation, had
virtually no communicative abilities. (Private interview with patient's therapist, May 7,
1975.) (All names are being withheld to maintain confidentiality and to avoid impairment of
current treatment.) Had the deprivor been a government, the disastrous effects of such
privation upon mentation and expression would surely establish a strong case for violation of
the first amendment (and infringement of "mental privacy" values). See generally Solomon,
Sensory Deprivation, in COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 253 (A. Freedman, H.I.
Kaplan & H.S. Kaplan eds. 1967).
169. The author is one of the counsel of record in Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487
P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971) (upholding plaintiffs' claims of unconstitutional denial of
equality of educational opportunity).
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access to means of salubriously affecting mentation raises a first
amendment claim. 70
To review some of the problems generated by Rodriguez: The
rationale for protection against total experiential deprivation might
be articulated in this way. While mentation is logically necessary
for communication (to deny this would generate a contradiction),
some minimum of sensory/perceptual impact upon the sensorium170. is empirically necessary (required under the laws of nature170 .1 ) for mentation to occur at all. (More complex experience/education is useful and important for mentation generally, and
possibly empirically necessary for more complex or "higher" forms
of mentation. Declining to protect the more complex education
would not necessarily be inconsistent with the first amendment argument.) Such empirically necessary processes merit protection
under the first amendment. But isn't food (or some form of nutrient)
empirically necessary (or technically necessary given current technological capabilities) for mentation, since it is necessary for life?
And isn't protection against fatal attacks from the elements also
necessary and therefore protected? Where do we stop? Let us highlight this problem by making explicit the distinction between two
170. The same holds for the parallel argument protecting mentation under the constitutional rubric of "privacy." See Legislating, supra note 1, at 273-79. Some behaviorist worldviews denounce mentalist language as cognitively meaningless talk about "unobservables"
(cf. B.F. SKINNER, ABOUT BEHAVIORISM 14 (1974); text § V-C infra and note 212 infra).
Such views might cause temporary difficulties with the first amendment argument for establishing certain rights against the use of behavior control technologies: some of its premises
refer to mentation, and so would be meaningless. But the difficulty is at least partly surmountable. An astute behaviorist would no doubt discover that some striking behavioral
changes-in particular, changes in verbal behavior-follow certain procedures which affect
the brain (an entity undoubtedly within the behaviorists' ontology): consumption of certain
drugs, activation of electrodes implanted in the brain, psychosurgery, etc. We will leave open
the question whether first amendment protection would shrink in a conceptual system dispensing with talk about mental functioning and its connection with expression. (Such shrinkage might occur, for example, because one could not refer to any intrinsic values of
mentation.) See generally Legislating, supra note 1, at 272-73. Parallel remarks apply to the
privacy arguments for the constitutional protection of mentation: one would have to observe
significant changes in private relations and processes (including verbal behavior) resulting
from use of drugs, brain surgery, etc. (Not all behaviorist models deny cognitive content to
mentalist language. Cf. F. KANFEI & J. PHILLIPS, LEARNING FOUNDATIONS OF BEHAVIOR THERAPY

20 (1970). Cf. also note 212 infra.)
170.1 This ungainly phrase is used to avoid locutions sounding like "mentation requires
mentation (e.g., sense impressions)" by focusing upon the physical causal antecedents of any
mentation, including mentation consisting simply of minimal sensation and experience.
170.2.

Cf. J. HOSPERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 169-72 (2d ed. 1967).
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nexuses. (1) The logical connection between mentation and communication, which entails that mentation must, to some significant
extent, be protected by the first amendment. (In the unlikely event
that the Court in Rodriguez rejected this proposition, it was, I suggest, quite wrong.) (2) As an empirical conjunction some processes
(e.g., sensory impacts upon the nervous system) are in fact necessary for mentation, and from this minimum proposition, we can
infer that the first amendment prohibits direct foreclosure of the
possibility of mentation-e.g., by conditions which prevent all or
most influences on the sensorium. (In the unlikely event that the
Court rejected this proposition, it was, again, wrong.)
It is worth emphasizing that one does not reach the issue of intrusiveness of interference with extant mentation until there is mentation to interfere with! A complete range of legal analysis concerning
the protection of mentation thus requires consideration of the empirical causes and conditions for the generation of mentation and
then an evaluation of the relative intrusiveness and effectiveness of
means of altering ongoing mentation, or creating "new" mentation,
or preventing further mentation of various sorts. (Both nexuses are
necessary for a complete analysis of Rodriguez, although the Court
attended only to the second.) With respect to the second nexusbetween mentation and its causes-the constitutional problem is
to draw some distinctions among processes, events and conditions,
all empirically necessary at some point in a complex causal chain
leading to mentation and then to communication: perhaps the best
that can be done for now is (a) to invoke the hoary contrasts between the proximate and the remote, or the direct and the indirect;
(b) to distinguish between conditions and regimes which are (i)
relatively precisely or uniquely targeted (in effect, if not intent)
toward preventing or impairing the development of mentation (e.g.,
by total perceptual deprivation or by inducing unconsciousness)
from (ii) conditions and regimes which destroy the possibility of
mentation as part of a massive disruptive onslaught (killing); and
(c) to estimate and appraise the scope, extent and nature of programs involving partial perceptual/cognitive/affective deprivation
(e.g., excluding only visual sense data or attempting to prevent or
impair development of capacities for different kinds of cognition
or emotional response). (Contrast perceptual influence on the
sensorium directly generating sensa, conscious or nonconscious,
with non-perceptual nutritive metabolic processes.)
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These inquiries bear analogies to-but are distinct fromanalyses of the intrusiveness of interference with ongoing, relatively developed mentation (which analyses involve their own
problems of distinguishing the near from the removed, etc.) The
investigation (in (c) above) concerning the range of partial impairment of the development of sentience and cognition spans the continuum from total mentational deprivation to consideration of the
relative quality of, say, educational systems designed not only to
generate new mentation but to promote its utility and value. We
thus shade into the Rodriguez problem. Variations in educational
quality which do not approach substantial deprivation resulting in
massive cognitive, affective and/or perceptual disabilities do not
necessarily (under the present analysis) generate first amendment
problems. So, some wandering in this continuum of connections
between mentation and its causal antecedents is required. Focusing solely on the nexus between mentation and communication and
protecting only intrusive interferences (a concept involving its own
continuum) with existing mentation is theoretically unsound: there
are certain processes and conditions empirically necessary for mentation to occur at all, and so should fall within the scope of first
amendment protection. These problems surely bear much additional analysis; but the only way to avoid totally these it-proves-toomuch arguments is to decline to recognize first amendment sway
over certain conceivable regimens which would substantially destroy all possibility of mentation. That, it is suggested, is unacceptable. If the price is too broad a sweep for first amendment protection
of mentation, we should pay it.
3.

Kaimowitz's Finding of Mental Anomaly Resulting from
"Institutionalization"to Restrict Access to Therapy

The court in Kaimowitz seemed a good deal less concerned with
the possibility of duress/coercion than it was with the effects of
"institutionalization" on the inmate's very capacity to engage in the
rational thought necessary to decide upon therapeutic (and presumably other) decisions. Although the court did not label "institutionalization" as a disease (or the cause of a disease), it seemed to
believe that any long-term inmate's capacities become diminished
to a pathological degree. (The court did suggest that he might be
capable of making simpler therapeutic decisions, such as those in-
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volving non-experimental, accepted neurosurgical procedures.'7 )
So, rather than calling for or authorizing therapy to fit the "illness,"
the court took the existence of an aberrational or anomalous condition of the mind as a justification for denial of access to a particular
therapy. It is not suggested that psychosurgery is a cure for "institutionalization." But if the procedure foreclosed were a nonexperimental competence-restoring mechanism (perhaps even an
experimental one), and its effectiveness were not substantially overridden by intrusive side effects which themselves might compromise
competence and autonomy, such flat denial of access would seem
to be both irrational and constitutionally forbidden.'72 But even if
these conditions did not hold, Kaimowitz would remain internally
inconsistent and too restrictive-though it may have reached the
correct result.
B.

Privacy Constraints,and Their Relation to Autonomy

Ockham's razor has not found favor in legal scholarship: indeed
its negation holds-it is a virtue to discover as many concepts and
rules as possible ("see the issues") to account for, explain or rationalize a given result or thesis. (Courts are supposed to do otherwise
BROOKS, supra note 4, at 920.
172. As suggested in the text accompanying note 171 supra, the Kaimowitz court endorsed
the possibility of using accepted neurosurgical procedures on inmates.
The court's remarks on coercion may be more difficult to reconcile with this "holding" on
the possibility of consent to accepted neurosurgical procedures than its remarks on "institutionalization" and its impact on capacity. With respect to capacity, one can posit therapies
which a given inmate is able to appraise, and those which present problems too complex for
him to resolve. But-addressing the coercion issue-the court states:
Involuntarily confined mental patients live in an inherently coercive institutional environment. Indirect and subtle psychological coercion has profound effect upon the
patient population. Involuntarily confined patients cannot reason as equals with the
doctors and administrators over whether they should undergo psychosurgery. They are
not able to voluntarily give informed consent because of the inherent inequality in their
position.
BROOKS, supra note 4, at 915. But while difficulty of decision-making may increase with the
degree of "experimentalness" of a therapy, the degree of coercion intended or exercised by
the captors may not. But if we consider the possibility that the more difficult the decision,
the greater the inmate's confusion and mental disarray, then we might find that increased
manipulability sometimes attends increments in decision-making complexity. (The court's
remarks unfortunately blur the distinction between questions of coercion and those of
capacity.) Cf. Friedman, Legal Regulation of Applied Behavior Analysis in Mental Institutions and prisons, 17 Apiz. L. REV. 39, 82 n.202 (1975).

171.
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in explaining a given adjudication, or so legend has it.) So, it would
be appropriate to discuss the view that an argument based upon
privacy-"mental privacy" in particular-for defeating a governmental claim of entitlement to interfere intrusively with mentation
is superior to a first amendment claim. This preference is apparently based upon the notion that mentation seems to be the preeminent candidate for that human process which is, in fact, the most
private, and which ought to be, in morals and law, treated as the
most private. And, once it is conceded that the constitution protects
at least some private relationships, processes and functions, a
mentation-protecting privacy argument isomorphic to the
mentation-protecting first amendment argument is relatively easy
to construct,' though it is difficult to specify its limits.
One difficulty with this view is the "once it is conceded" premise.
The Supreme Court opinions generally relied upon as establishing
the right (or rights) of privacy'7 4 are classic studies in ipse dixits,
non sequiturs and the art of petitio principii. I agree with most of
the results in the cases cited; and I do not presently have any "notes
for a revised opinion"'' 5 in any of these cases. But it is difficult to
rest easy with an argument of even the greatest clarity if that clarity
rests upon premises which (though reasonably intelligible) are
themselves the products of very murky processes of reasoning.'76
Since we have the premises, however (the ipse dixits are, after all,
ex cathedra), we may properly use the privacy argument, but a word
on the connection between privacy and autonomy is in order. What
is the relation between the two concepts? It is surely not the relation
of identity: a newspaper publisher can rightly claim autonomy both
on moral and constitutional grounds, but it is surely stretching matters to call his publication decisions exercises of his right of privacy
(say, because his decisions are reached through the private pro173. Legislating, supra note 1, at 273-79.
174. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See generally Note, Asexual Reproduction and
Genetic Engineering: A ConstitutionalAssessment of the Technology of Cloning, 47 S. CAL.
L. REV. 476, 493-98 (1974).
175. Cf. Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV.
473 (1962).
176. For brave efforts at dealing with the Supreme Court's privacy cases see Henkin,
supra note 123; Tribe, Foreward: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and
Law, 87 HAv. L. REv. 1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Tribe]. Compare C. FRIED, AN ANATOMY
OF VALUES

ch. IX (1970).
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cesses of mentation). A claim of autonomy, then, is not necessarily
a claim of privacy, though privacy may be involved in some way.
But there do not seem to be any privacy claims which are not also
largely claims of autonomy: privacy claims may form a proper subset of autonomy claims.' 7 How is this subset marked off from the
larger set? Professor Henkin suggests indirectly that the Court has
failed to explain this because it has come close to confounding privacy with autonomy:
[T]he Court [in Griswold v. Connecticut,' Eisenstadt v.
Baird,'7 9 Roe v. Wade,180 Stanley v.Georgia8 '] has been vindicating not a right to freedom from official intrusion, but to
freedom from official regulation . . . .(I have called freedom
from regulation "autonomy," although there are, of course,
aspects of autonomy in freedom from official intrusion as well.)
That the Court cites search and seizure cases as precedent for
its new zone of autonomy suggests that it does not distinguish
between privacy and autonomy and may be treating them both
as aspects of "the right to be let alone." But they are, I think,
different notions conceptually, with different philosophical,
political and social (and, one might have thought, legal) assumptions and consequences; they may look different also if
viewed as aspects of the confrontation of private right with
public good.' 2

The Court may indeed be melding privacy rights (a smaller set)
with autonomy rights (a larger set which probably contains the
former rights)-or "freedom from regulation," as Prof. Henkin puts
it.8' If so, its opinions are likely to be of little help in explaining a
distinction it fails to make. Prof. Henkin frankly concedes that he
does "not have even an every-day definition of 'privacy,' or of the
'right of privacy.' "I"sYet that apparent ineffability stops neither
him, the Court nor anyone else from invoking the term or its surrogates, though he properly requests clearer constitutional justifications for recognizing privacy rights:
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

See note 123 supra.
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
394 U.S. 557 (1969).
Henkin, supra note 123, at 1424-25.
Id.
Id. at 1419.
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Perhaps unusual respect for autonomy and idiosyncrasy as regards some "personal" matters is intuitively felt by all of us,
including Justices; that such deference is "self-evident" is not
self-evident."'
We should, I think, abandon the notion that we can, in any strict
sense of the term "define," define "privacy" either as an ethical
concept or a legal concept. Nevertheless, we might profitably attempt to explicate different senses of privacy-each of which might
be a cluster concept. The usual search for a definition is a hunting
down of characteristics held in common (necessary conditions) by
everything the general term in question is thought to denote, and
perhaps also of sufficient conditions for applying the term. For a
variety of general terms, as we have already seen, 8 ' we either
cannot find (many) such characteristics, or, even if we can, they
are so general that they are not serviceable for fine analysis: the
phrase "the right to be let alone" may tell us something about
privacy, but it tells us nothing about how to distinguish it from
autonomy. Privacy, in short, seems to be a polythetic concept. Wittgenstein, as we have seen, warned us about the dim prospects of
finding defining characteristics for all our general terms.'8 7 Commentators who have suggested that he was wrong have offered some
noteworthy analyses, but then provided us with rather empty expressions (perhaps comparable to "the right to be let alone") purporting to be defining characteristics.
[T]here is a more determinate feature common to all kinds of
game: namely, the capacity to serve a specific human need or
needs, directly or indirectly, under what we shall call "standard" (causal) conditions or in "normal" contexts. 88
185. Id. at 1429.
186. See text § III-A supra.
187. L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 31e (G. Anscombe transl. 1953)
[hereinafter cited as WrrrGENSTEIN]. See note 188 infra.
188. Khatchadourian, Common Names and Family Resemblances, in WrrrGENSTEIN: THE
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS-A COLLECTION OF CRITICAL ESSAYS 205, 209 (Anchor ed. 1966).
It is certainly of value to add shades of cognitive content to inquiries into the nature of
privacy by adopting certain perspectives:
[Tihe conclusions thus far reached might be expressed as a "personal question"
doctrine-a doctrine embodying the concept that some types of choices ought to be
remanded, on principle, to private decisionmakers unchecked by substantive governmental control.
Tribe, supra note 176, at 32. We must of course deal with the problem of identifying those
"personal questions" which ought to be so remanded, and we can perhaps not do much better
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This perhaps tells us something about games-but tells us nothing
about how to distinguish them from making love or war (neither of
which is always a game).
Various portions of the court's opinion in Kaimowitz seem (at
least implicitly) to reflect adherence to certain postulates establishing necessary conditions for intervention-in particular, neurosurgical intervention: if there is (1) no organic brain disease and (2) no
mental disease of any sort (whether regarded as "psychological" or
"neurochemical"), surgical procedures upon the brain cannot be
justified. The court apparently found no basis for concluding that
there was an organic brain disease which caused Smith's violence;, 9
and it apparently found no "medically recognized syndrome for
aggression and objectionable behavior associated with nonorganic
brain abnormality."' 9 0 It thus concluded that "neurosurgery rightfully should concern itself with medical problems and not the behavior problems of a social etiology."'' It is not entirely clear what
this means, but it seems appropriate to ask how the court (or indeed
anyone involved) might have responded to a flat behaviorist claim
that (a) the existence vel non of any sort of disease is irrelevant to
the justification of therapy; (b) therapy might appropriately be justified simply by the need to prevent aberrant behavior; and (c)
most, perhaps all, such aberrant behavior may be ameliorated by
behavior therapy, so that medical/surgical procedures are uncalled
for and unnecessary (if not inefficacious').
C.

Behaviorism: Therapy Without Disease

1. In General
The "disease model"19 3 -positing conditions called "diseases"
which purportedly account for, explain and predict the existence or
occurrence of various mental processes and behaviors-is systematithan to suggest, pace Wittgenstein, that "[ilf you look at them [games-and private relationships and processes?] you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities,
relationships, and a whole series of them at that." WrrrGENSTEIN, supra note 187, at 31e.
189. Cf. BROOKS, supra note 4, at 901 n.10.
190. Id.at 908.
191. Id.
192. See text accompanying notes 203-04 infra.
193. The "disease model," as suggested in the text § 11-F supra and note 89 supra, may
not be a necessary concomitant of all "medical models"-though many would reject the
propriety of using the latter phrase where no "diseases" are involved.
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cally unused by therapists who undertake "behavior therapy" or
"behavior modification"' 9 or "conditioning" to alter "maladaptive
behavior.""'
By behavior modification I refer to the application of principles
derived from psychological learning theory to the treatment of
maladaptive behaviors. There are two important aspects of this
definition. First, the focus upon principles of learning as the
basis for treatment methods. When we talk about learning, we
refer broadly to the effects of experience upon the organism.
• . .The second aspect of behavior modification is a clear focus
upon behavior-whether the behavior is verbal or motor,
whether it reflects immediate social needs, or is highly symbolic and idiosyncratic. The behavior should be definable, it
should be amenable to observation by another person or by the
experimenter's instruments.
The behavior therapist generally asks three main questions
in starting a program of treatment: (a) what behavior is maladaptive, i.e., what are the behaviors displayed by the subject
which need to be increased, decreased, or otherwise influenced;
(b) what environmental factors currently maintain the behavior-either to support undesirable behavior or to reduce the
likelihood of performing more adaptive responses; and (c) what
environmental changes may be manipulated to influence the
behavior. '
There are a sufficient number of actual or professed differences
among behaviorists to keep both therapists (of any persuasion) and
philosophers busy indefinitely.
Like moderate behaviorism, [radical behaviorism] focuses
upon the way in which stimuli control actions, and considers
the laws of learning whereby this control takes place to be
194. The terms "behavior therapy" and "behavior modification" are apparently not fully
interchangeable, but the technical distinctions drawn by some between them (cf. RIMM &
MASTERS, supra note 38, at 2) need not detain us; for present purposes the two locutions will
be considered synonymous. We might note that "behavior modification" seems a bit more
apt as a description of "brainwashing" than "behavior therapy"; the latter has at least
marginally honorific connotations. Compare Caldwell, Military Psychiatry, in
COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1605, 1610 (A. Freedman, H.I. Kaplan & H.S. Kaplan eds. 1967).
195. This term seems to be a word of art among behaviorist psychologists. E.g., BANDURA,
supra note 6, at 77.
196. Shah, Some Basic Principles and Concepts of Behavior Modification, in BEHAVIOR
THERAPY wrrH DELINQUENTS 21-22 (J. Stumphauzer ed. 1972).

Duquesne Law Review

Vol, 13: 673

invariant across individuals and species. But what makes radical behaviorism radical is an unwillingness to make assumptions about the existence and importance of drives, primary or
secondary, and the insistence that even the minimally mentalistic concept of habit is unnecessary for understanding. Apparently, there are not, in radical behaviorism, even the rudiments
of a position on the core and periphery of personality. And yet,
radical behaviorism claims to be able to predict, control, and
understand all behavior. As such, it should represent a frank
alternative to personality theorizing (and, for that matter, any
other kind of theorizing in psychology).' 97
I will give in to the temptation to avoid extended philosophical analysis of the varieties of behaviorism,'9 8 and will simply
ask these questions (ones which should be tendered not only by
philosophers but by therapists and lawyers): what are the
similarities between (1) diagnosis of (mental) illness on the one
hand, and a determination that certain observed behavior is maladaptive on the other; and (2) deciding upon the appropriate medical
or psychiatric treatment on the one hand, and deciding upon the
appropriate behavior therapy on the other. (The effects of holding
to behaviorist notions-philosophical or therapeutic-upon the vast
body of law positing mental diseases/defects/ . . . (e.g., civil
commitment) will, as indicated, be briefly considered below. 99 )
The reason for the inquiries is this: if the disease model"' and the
behaviorist model are isomorphic in important respects, then, at
least for certain kinds of therapy, it may be that justifications for
therapeutic intervention based upon a disease model and justifications for therapeutic intervention based a behaviorist model may
be similar in some respects. (Obviously, the therapeutic justification for psychosurgery will differ in rather important respects from
197. S. MADDI, PERSONALITY THEORIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 541-42 (rev. ed. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as MADDI].
198. Cf. Taylor, Psychological Behaviorism, in 6 ENCYC. OF PHILoS. 516 (1967; reprint ed.
1972) [hereinafter cited as Taylor]. Compare B.F. SKINNER, ABOUT BEHAVIORISM (1974);
Bandura, Behavior Theory and the Models of Man, 29 AM. PSYCHOL. 859 (1974).
199. See text § V-C infra. I will not consider the impact of behaviorist theory upon the
criminal law generally except to note that on strictly theoretical grounds, the insanity defense, the diminished capacity plea, and probably the automatism defense employ language
which to a behaviorist would be considered meaningless. Cf. note 212 infra. ("Intent," "purpose," "state of provocation" and assorted other "mentalist" terms would require some
reinterpretation to survive a behaviorist assault.)
200. On "models" see notes 10, 13, 39 and 49 supra.
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that for constructing token economies. 01 ) Such a similarity may
hold even though behaviorists do not posit, as a cause of behavior,
ongoing conditions called "diseases," and, indeed, probably flatly
reject this causal explanation as either meaningless or, even if
meaningful, useless.
It would appear that in order to characterize behavior as "maladaptive" to the satisfaction of an impartial observer of behavior
therapy, one would have to demonstrate that certain features of
such behavior are likely to lead (or have led) to adverse consequences (however explicated) for the person doing the behaving.
(Some behavior therapists would simply apply the label "maladaptive behavior" to whatever behavior the client complains of. That
view would make use of this predicate rather simple for the therapist in question, but would hardly do for an observer endeavoring
to construct some non-trivial concept of what such maladaptive
behaviors are like, and how they resemble and differ from each
other. 02 ) Such an effort is likely to lead to an early conclusion that
"maladaptive behavior" names a polythetic concept, and therapists
might be seen as trying to verify the existence or occurrence of a
cluster of conditions (goals are always bungled; other persons respond negatively to the subject and may injure him; he may injure
them; he (over) (under) reacts; laws are broken). Further, in determining the appropriate sort of behavior therapy, the therapist
would have to draw upon his empirically acquired lore on the relative effectiveness of various methods of altering behavior in specified ways-knowledge acquired, in part, by noting similarities and
differences between the case at hand and others.
The comparison between medically oriented diagnosis and treatment and the performance of behavior therapists, however, should
not be pressed too far. There are bona fide factual and value disputes about the "adverse consequences of disease interpretations of
deviant behavior," as Bandura puts it.03
The conceptualization of deviant behavior as manifestations of
disease has, in several ways, impeded development of efficacious methods of behavior change. In the first place, it led to
heavy reliance upon physical and chemical interventions, un201:
202.
203.

Cf. Wexler, supra note 6.
Cf. RIMM & MASTERS, supra note 38, at 14.
BANDURA, supra note 6, at 16.
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remitting search for drugs as quick remedies for interpersonal
problems, and long-term neglect of social variables as influential determinants of deviant response patterns. Secondly, the
mislabeling, partly by historical accident, of social deviations
as symptoms of mental illness established medical training as
the optimal preparation for psychotherapeutic work. In fact,
such training, because of its primary concern with somatic processes and pathologies, leaves one ill-prepared for devising and
implementing methods that are successful in promoting favorable social change. 04
Diagnosis and determination of maladaptive behavior both require construction of sets of relevant criteria; and medical/psychiatric therapy and behavior therapy both require scientific analysis
of a variety of causes and correlations (among behaviors, or between
neural events and behaviors, etc.). Perhaps this is no more than to
say that all therapists are bent upon some sort of empirical enterprise directed toward characterizing a subject ("patient" or
"client") in some way; and, taking this characterization as a justification for therapy, then pursuing an empirical enterprise directed
toward selecting and using therapies for altering a person's behavior
and dispositions (we have to leave out "mentation" to avoid erroneous conflation of different schools of therapy and philosophy).
The ontologies and metaphysics may be different, and, to that extent, the therapeutic justifications for intervention may be strikingly different among the competing schools of therapists; but the
postulates expressing the therapeutic justifications of psychiatrists
to a considerable extent are logically isomorphic to those of the
behaviorists. Both of the crucial concepts involved (disease; maladaptive behavior) are in theory authorizing and limiting tools in
justifying the proper sphere of therapeutic intervention. And in fact,
both (particularly "maladaptive behavior.") may be so vague that
purported theraputic justifications based on these predicates may
(at least in some cases) be nearly empty of content.
Moral and legal/constitutional analysis of the therapeutic postulates, however, suggests some enormous differences between the disease and behaviorist models, and now we turn to such considerations.
204. Id. Compare the foregoing with the remarks of Akiskal & McKinney on organic
therapies in text accompanying note 67 supra. See text §§ II-C, Ill-B supra.
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Behaviorism (in Some Forms?) and Some (Possible)
Constitutionaland Moral Quandaries Concerning the
Necessity of Positing Mental Disease As a Cause of
Dangerousness or Disability

What sorts of prolonged involuntary confinement are permissible
under the Constitution? Its text is instinct with explicit and implicit
references to criminal prosecution and conviction, but nothing directly refers to any other basis for involuntary confinement. 0 5 Long
standing doctrine (the historical and analytical pinions of which will
not be extensively discussed) suggests that the only other currently
recognized justifications for confinement can be described as follows: the conditions of being dangerous to others, or to oneself, or
of being "gravely disabled" 0° , or of being "in need of treatment"
are statutory bases for confinement, but only if those conditions
are caused by mental/emotional/disease/defect or, in our earlier
locution, "mental anomaly" (or "maladaptive mentation"? 0 7 ).
This description is intended to comprehend any required ongoing
condition as a basis for confinement even when "disease" or related terms might be thought inapplicable to the condition, e.g.,
addiction. (On the dim possibilities of structuring behaviorist
analogue for these mentalist notions-i.e., "behavioral disease/
205. On comparing "textual" analysis and "structural" analysis in constitutional law see
generally C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).
206. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5200 (1972).
207. See generally Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87
HARv. L. REv. 1190, 1202-03 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Developments]:
Although the existence of a mental illness or disorder is universally required to justify
involuntary hospitalization, most statutes either contain only a vague definition of the
term or fail to include a definition of mental illness which is not dependent on the other
commitment criteria. For example, a number of statutes specify that mental illness is
"any condition which substantially impairs an individual's mental health," while
other commitment laws declare that a mentally ill person is an individual whose
condition warrants hospitalization. Even those states which have attempted more
detailed definitions of mental illness have not clearly or precisely identified the type
and degree of mental disorder which makes compulsory hospitalization appropriate.
For example, the Ohio commitment statute classifies as mentally ill a person with a
disorder which "substantially impairs the capacity of the person to use self-control,
judgment, and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social relations," and a
recently adopted New Hampshire law equates mental illness with "maladaptive behavior and/or recognized emotional symptoms that can be related to psychological,
psysiological and/or sociologic factors."
On the New Hampshire law see text accompanying notes 215-19 infra. Cf. United States v.
Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 960-65 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J.). See note 40 supra on the
"exceptions" to this generality.
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illness"-see the remarks below."' 8 New Hampshire seems to have
made a rather clumsy attempt at this." 9 ) Such mental anomalies
comprehend both paradigm cases of mental illness, and conditions
such as psychopathy/sociopathy or "defective delinquency.' '210 (I
do not wish now to readdress the objection that this collection of
terms is cognitively meaningless and in fact has already been operationally "read out" of the statutes and opinions containing them.)
If dangerousness or disability were not caused by such anomalous
or abnormal mental functioning, would there be any constitutional
basis for confinement? (Would it be "a violation of substantive due
process," "beyond the police or parens patriaepowers," "cruel and
unusual punishment"? Or, would confinement for dangerousness or
disability simpliciter-whether caused by mental anomaly or
not-be a proper exercise of the state's police or parens patriae
power?)
Now, consider the position of "radical behaviorism":
In general, radical behaviorists abhor concepts referring to
unobservable, internal states construed as causes of behavior. . . . To radical behaviorists, theorizing about unconscious
motivation, or even hunger drive, is to admit ignorance of the
external stimuli controlling the various behaviors supposedly
explained in this fashion."'
If this "abhorrence" amounts to a flat rejection of the meaningfulness, or at least the usefulness, of terms referring to mentation, it
is also a rejection of the notion of mental illness/disorder/deficiency; and there seems to be no analogous notion of an enduring
condition of "behavioral disease/disorder/deficiency/..." which
causes observed "maladaptive behavior."
If the disease model of mental/behavioral anomalies is rejected by
some behaviorists as cognitively meaningless or operationally useless then it would seem appropriate for them (and indeed for
everyone) to inquire into the constitutionality of confinement based
upon a purported "finding" that a condition of dangerousness or
disability existed and was caused by mental disease (or mental

anything) .212
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

See text accompanying notes 211-19 infra.
See text accompanying notes 215-19 infra.
See Sas v. Marylandi 334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964).
MADDI, supra note 197, at 546.
1 am sure there are many behaviorists adapting their behavior (including verbal
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courtroom behavior) with respect to the use of the concept of maladaptive behavior so as to
conform to the requirements of commitment statutes. Cf. C. FERSTER & M. PERROTr,
BEHAVIOR PRINCIPLES 55

(1968):

After [the patient] is admitted to the [mental] institution, the behavior he displays
is labeled in accordance with the findings of a psychiatric examination. There is no
denying that such a method is useful as a shorthand method to describe the patient's
difficulties, as well as a guide to determine what should be done with him . .. [Olne
might speculate whether unconscious transfer of the medical analogy causes us in all
instances to regard faulty behavior or thinking as a symptom of some underlying
disorder. At the moment, aside from some well-understood organic disorders and some
identifiable genes, very little is known about the extent to which anxiety, depression,
and other inferred mental states really cause the behavior for which a patient is
committed to a mental institution. Hence the behavioral scientist, who deals with
behavior pure and simple, is perhaps not really concerned with dynamics as he extends
his activities to include the mental patient.
The authors, obviously, are not denying the meaningfulness of "mentalist" language and thus
are not committed to denying the existence of mental states and conditions which might be
diseases. See text accompanying note 211 supra. It may indeed be that there are few behaviorists who would take such a position, and I do not wish it thought that I am constructing and
demolishing a straw man. I am positing such a philosophical view principally for analytical
purposes. I will leave the problem by noting that the published remarks of behaviorists
engaged in philosophical analysis of their views remain somewhat puzzling, even when attempting to distinguish "methodological behaviorism" from "radical" (or other?) forms of
behaviorism. Cf. B.F. SKINNER, ABouT BEHAVIORISM 16-17 (1974):
The statement that behaviorists deny the existence of feelings, sensations, ideas, and
other features of mental life needs a good deal of clarification. Methodological behaviorism and some versions of logical positivism ruled private events out of bounds
because there could be no public agreement about their validity. Introspection could
not be accepted as a scientific practice, and the psychology of people like Wilhelm
Wundt and Edward B. Titchener was attacked accordingly. Radical behaviorism,
however, takes a different line. It does not deny the possibility of self-observation or
self-knowledge or its possible usefulness, but it questions the nature of what is felt or
observed and hence known. It restores introspection but not what philosophers and
introspective psychologists had believed they were "specting," and it raises the question of how much of one's body one can actually observe.
Mentalism kept attention away from the external antecedent events which might
have explained behavior, by seeming to supply an alternative explanation. Methodological behaviorism did just the reverse: by dealing exclusively with external antecedent
events it turned attention away from self-observation and self-knowledge. Radical
behaviorism restores some kind of balance. It does not insist upon truth by agreement
and can therefore consider events taking place in the private world within the skin. It
does not call these events unobservable, and it does not dismiss them as subjective. It
simply questions the nature of the object observed and the reliability of the observations.
The position can be stated as follows: what is felt or introspectively observed is not
some nonphysical world of consciousness, mind, or mental life but the observer's own
body. This does not mean, as I shall show later, that introspection is a kind of physiological research, nor does it mean (and this is the heart of the argument) that what
are felt or introspectively observed are the causes of behavior. An organism behaves
as it does because of its current structure, but most of this is out of reach of introspection. At the moment we must content ourselves, as the methodological behaviorist
insists, with a person's genetic and environmental histories. What are introspectively
observed are certain collateral products of those histories.
Compare Psychiatry Goes Mod, Accepts Behavior Model, 104 SCIENCE NEWS 188 (1973).
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Does the Constitution require, as a necessary condition for a
permissible civil commitment regime, the structuring of a disease/
mentalist model of the causes of dangerousness and disability?
We will advert to this issue again below; for the present, we ask: Is
there some behaviorist reinterpretation of "mental anomaly" which
might be offered in case constitutional and moral constraints require that mental anomaly be the principal cause of dangerousness
/disability posited as a reason for confinement? Such a rational
reconstruction of all the mental anomaly terms (or "enduringcondition-causing-aberrant-thought-and-conduct" terms) in commitment statutes (and in tests for various sorts of competence, criminal guilt, etc.) would have to assign some meaning to the terms and
also be consistent with various forms of philosophical and therapeutic behaviorism. (These "mentalist" terms are, after all, constituents of propositions which can be verified only by observation
of behavior and (perhapsi physiological indicators (unless one is
indulging in self-diagnosis and is "observing" one's own mentational states2 31).) But the attempt would likely come to nothing:
the disease/diagnostic model posits mentational anomalies ("diseases," "defects," "disorders") as enduring, underlying conditions
which cause the behavior or physiological signs. (But recall that
"disease" might be explicated without reference to its causes.)
Many behaviorists apparently do not deal or bother with such nonenvironmental causal substrates, except to the extent that some
ontological commitment must be made to account for the phenomenon of learning. 214 And, as suggested, some behaviorists simply
apply the term "maladaptive behavior" to whatever behavior the
client complains of. That interpretation of the phrase marks a theoretical position still further from the mental anomaly model of civil
commitment.
New Hampshire, against all odds, has made a rather bizarre legislative effort to accommodate the customary statutory requirements
of civil commitment to (what appears to be) a behaviorist model:
After first declaring that it is "the policy of this state that mental
illness in and of itself is insufficient to commit any individual involuntarily," ' the commitment act states that " '[m]ental illness'
213. There are philosophical disputes about what one "perceives" (if anything) when one
is "introspecting." Compare G. RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND (1949) with GOLDMAN, supranote
27. Cf. Taylor, supra note 198. The issues will be blinked here.
214. Cf. Taylor, supra note 198, at 519.
215. N.H. REV. STAT. § 135-B:1 (Supp. 1973).
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means maladaptive behavior and/or recognized emotional symptoms that can be related to psychological, physiological and/or sociologic factors." ' 6 (One wonders why, if mental illness is identified
with maladaptive behavior, the state would ever wish (as suggested
by the language after the first "and/or") to go to all the trouble of
"relating" emotional symptoms to psychological, physiological or
sociologic factors. And of course one also wonders whether "sociologic factors" is just a garbage can classification to take care of
symptoms which cannot be "related" to "psychological" or "physiological" factors, thus making the "relating" requirement empty
of content.)
For the reasons suggested above, this legislative effort seems to
be conceptual nonsense, and raises some moral and constitutional
questions concerning a behaviorist schema for commitment. First,
mental illness cannot be identified with any finite set of behaviors,
maladaptive or not. Second, mental illness cannot be identified
simply as a disposition to engage in certain behaviors viewed with
some alarm unless those behaviors are defined in some non-trivial
way as recurrences of identifiable patterns which are thought to
evidence some enduring condition which causes such (and other)
behaviors (apart from what, in turn, might cause the condition 17 ).
If this does not hold, then "mental illness" is pure surplusage, and
the commitment statute simply authorizes commitment on the
basis of the past occurrence of certain behaviors, which (apparently)
generate a prediction that they are quite likely to occur again. Further, if mental illness is identified with maladaptive behavior,2 1
then the section authorizing involuntary commitment219 is incomprehensible:
The criterion to be used by a court, physician or psychiatrist
in determining whether a person should be admitted for inpatient treatment on an involuntary basis shall be whether the
person sought to be admitted for in-patient treatment on an
involuntary basis is in such mental condition as a result of
216. Id. § 135-B:2(XII).
217. See discussion in text accompanying notes 53-64 supra.
218. I am assuming that "maladaptive behavior" is used in any of the accepted behaviorist ways (trivial or otherwise), and is not a (poorly chosen) surrogate term for "mental
anomalies" as understood within the framework of a disease model. But cf. note 212 supra.
219. N.H. REv. STAT. § 135-B:26 (Supp. 1973). The provisions authorizing emergency
diagnostic detention in § 135-B:19 are similar.
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mental illness as to create a potentially serious likelihood of
danger to himself or others.
Why should we bother, under the New Hampshire definition,
with mental illnesses and mental conditions? The definition, we
should note, yields some strange results. We may, for example, generate the provision: "mental condition as a result of maladaptive
behavior [the latter, italicized expression is substituted for "mental
illness," with which it is identified]." The State of New Hampshire
can surely do better than this.
The upshot of these considerations is that there seems in principle
to be no possible behaviorist reconstruction of mental anomaly
terms which could play a role in commitment statutes parallel to
that played by such terms now. The isomorphisms between the
therapeutic language of medicine and that of behaviorism can carry
us only so far. Even if the behaviorist were to assign names to
observed recurrences of behavior patterns (a process which might
be, as suggested, logically isomorphic to but nevertheless quite different from the diagnostic process employing a disease model 221), he
would still not be designating or positing an ongoing condition of the
observed organism which would, like its environment, be a continuing cause of observed behavior or physiological signs.
Some of these moral and constitutional issues concerning the role
of mental anomaly as a cause of dangerousness or disability were
recently addressed in United States v. Alexander"' by Chief Judge
Bazelon:
However accurate the prediction of dangerousness, it is not
at all clear that the statute would permit Murdock's confinement. Read literally, the statute seems to establish a return to
sanity and an absence of dangerousness as independent preconditions of unconditional release. . . . That reading would
require the hospitalization of a dangerous person who lacked
any mental illness whatsoever. Our cases have made it clear,
however, that "dangerousness" refers to "dangerousness by
reason of mental illness." Thus, a defendant who was dangerous but no longer insane could not be involuntarily hospitalized. . . . If Murdock cannot be considered insane, the hospital would have to release him.
220.
221.

See text accompanying notes 200-03 and following note 203 supra.
471 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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We are left, therefore, with an obligation to choose among
four unattractive alternatives:
A. We can impose narrow and admittedly illogical limitations on the responsibility defense to insure that a defendant
like Murdock will not be acquitted on the theory that he lacked
responsibility. By confining such a defendant in a penitentiary,
we can avoid the difficult questions presented by the effort to
hold him in confinement following a successful use of the responsibility defense.
B. If we remove the practical impediments to Murdock's
defense and he is, in fact, acquitted for lack of responsibility,
he could be released from custody in spite of his apparent dangerousness. That result would conform with the principle that
civil commitment is ordinarily barred where a defendant is
dangerous but not mentally ill. ...
C. If the community will not tolerate Murdock's release we
can strive to find a vaguely therapeutic purpose for hospitalization. Skinnerian-like techniques may be available to reprogram his behavior. We might conclude that they should be
used and that their use justifies his confinement. But that will
require us to stretch the medical model substantially so that
new techniques can be applied to many persons not conventionally considered "sick."
D. Finally, if there are no known or foreseeable techniques
for "curing" someone like Murdock (or if we are unwilling to
utilize the techniques that may be available), and if the incapacitation of the defendant is a practical imperative, we will
have to confine him in exclusive reliance on a prediction of
dangerousness. That confinement would be nothing more or
less than unadorned preventive detention.
The options that would permit us to acquit Murdock but
hold him in custody nonetheless-preventive detention and a
stretching of the medical model to permit the use of new techniques-raise profound moral and legal questions. Resolution
of those questions would require a prolonged and thorough public debate. But however they are resolved, it is at least clear
that each of these options requires an expansion of the boundaries of the civil commitment doctrine. We could strive to limit
the expansion by applying the new rationale only to persons
who have undergone a criminal trial and been acquitted for
lack of responsibility. But as a practical matter it seems very
unlikely that the expansion could be so confined. The new
rationale would permit-perhaps demand-that all persons
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who are rendered dangerous by a "rotten social background"
should be preventively detained. Or that all persons who exhibit antisocial behavior patterns should have their behavior
reconditioned.222
It might, of course, be urged that our civil commitment processes
in fact confine persons without using a coherent notion of mental
anomaly as the cause of dangerousness (to others or to oneself) or
grave disability 2 3-and does this without the aid of the specific
barbs thrown at the disease model by behaviorists (or others). If the
notion of mental anomaly is consciously excised for any reason, a
description of commitment processes might be (at least in some
cases) at least as terrifying as the description of what happens (at
least in some cases) when the disease model is used. We are simply
confining persons (perhaps indefinitely) for acting "crazy"; or doing
things which we find annoying or offensive; or engaging in "maladaptive behavior"; or (looking forward) being in a certain neurophy225
siological condition or status; 24 or (looking backward and forward)
being members of a class of persons X% of whom are likely to
commit crimes (or certain crimes) within the next Y days, months
or years. How do we describe the crazy, offensive, or maladaptive
conduct so that persons can avoid being committed? How do we
describe the neurophysiological conditions or statuses a person
should avoid (if he/she can) in order to remain free?
222. Id. at 962-64 (citations and footnotes omitted). Cf. Dershowitz, The Law of Dangerousness: Some Fictions About Predictions, 23 J. LEGAL ED. 24 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Dershowitz]; Dershowitz, The Origins of Preventive Confinement in Anglo-American
Law-PartI: The English Experience, 43 U. CIN. L. REv. 1 (1974); Dershowitz, Indeterminate
Confinement: Letting the Therapy Fit the Harm, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 297 (1974); Diamond,
The PsychiatricPrediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 439 (1974). See also Cross
v. Harris, 418 F.2d 1095, 1102-04 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Bazelon, C.J.) (on preventive detention).
Note again that, despite considerable differences in the formal definitions of "punishment"
and "treatment," there are substantial overlaps in purpose. E.g., to the extent that punishment is intended to alter behavior by "rehabilitation" and "specific deterrence," it is in some
ways comparable to various behavior modification programs, particularly aversive conditioning programs. See notes 94-95 supra. Cf. Bandura, Behavior Theory and the Models of Man,
29 AM. PSYCHOL. 859 (1974). See also McConaghy, Aversive Therapy of Homosexuality: Measures of Efficacy, 127 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 1221 (1971). See generally BEHAVIOR THERAPY WITH
DELINQUENTS

223.

(J. Stumphauzer ed. 1973).

CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5200 (1972).
224. Violent Behavior, supra note 6. Cf. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077
(E.D.N.Y. 1971) (use of "profiles" to detect airplane hijackers). Cf. note 237 infra.
225. E.g., S. GLUECK & E. GLUECK, VENTURES IN CRIMINOLOGY: SELECTED LEGAL PAPERS
(1967); Glueck, Predictive Devices and the Individualizationof Justice, 23 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 462 (1958).
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If this picture seems objectionable, we should ask again: does the
Constitution require adherence to a dualistic standard for confinement-commission of crime or dangerousness/disability due to
mental anomaly? If so, then the issue "mental anomaly vel non" is
a matter of "constitutional fact."
Pure doctrinal considerations aside, what is the moral theory
justifying or requiring that the dangerousness or disability of an
individual the state seeks to commit must be the "product" ' of
mental anomaly? (That moral theory-such as it might beultimately informs constitutional analysis.) Put otherwise, why
(again, as a matter of moral theory, not just practice) don't we
simply confine persons we deem dangerous or disabled rather than
inquire into whether we have discovered dangerousness/disability
simpliciteror dangerousness/disability resulting from mental anomaly? (Still another form of the question is: Why retain a disease
model and why not implement a behaviorist one in deciding whom,
if anyone, to confine? And a related question is: Why may dangerousness/disability caused by mental anomaly serve as a surrogate
(of sorts) for responsible commission of an act, and not dangerousness/disability considered alone?)
Adequate responses to this issue seem difficult to isolate and articulate, but here, in outline form, is a fragmentary review of some
moral and constitutional rationales (and some of their infirmities)
requiring that the dangerousness or disability' putatively justifying confinement must be due to mental anomaly. " '
226. Compare Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954) with United States
v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In Brawner, the court rejected the "diseaseproduct" insanity defense test and adopted that of the American Law Institute.
227. For present purposes, I have not separated out the dangerousness element in commitment standards from the disability element. It appears that commitment based upon disability is usually regarded as part of the parens patriaepower of the state, rather than part of
the police power to prevent harm to the public. Cf. Developments, supra note 207, at 120745. Strikingly different (if intersecting) legal and moral issues arise in attempting to justify
involuntary confinement (and involuntary treatment) of the mentally ill on the following
distinct (if intersecting) grounds: their supposed (a) dangerousness to others; (b) dangerousness to themselves; (c) inability to care for themselves (which of course may result in their
being dangers to themselves); (d) mental illness simpliciter (with none of the above consequences (a) through (c)); (e) mental illness resulting in incompetence to make therapeutic
decisions (with or without any of the consequences (a) through (c)). Cf. note 229 infra. (In
limning these grounds for commitment, we ignore for now the significance of threats to
property of certain kinds (such threats may merit a separate category or be filed-at least in
part-under (a) or (b). Cf. Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964).)
228. "Present commitment standards attempt to resolve these social issues through cri-
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(1) The possibility of amelioration of the mental anomaly, thus
making possible eventual release more likely, may inform the
dangerous/disabled-due-to-mental anomaly requirement."' 9 Dangerteria requiring the existence of a mental illness, defect, or disorder and a specified impact or
consequence of the illness." Developments, supra note 207, at 1201-02.
229. Cf. Developments, supra note 207, at 1231-32:
(Another] possible rationale for limiting preventive detention of the dangerous to the
mentally ill is premised on the ability of society to provide treatment which benefits
them. However, to the extent that the state relies on the benefit which the individual
will derive from treatment to support his commitment, it confuses the parens patriae
and police power justifications for commitment. Requiring a competent individual to
accept treatment for his own benefit should be viewed as an additional deprivation of
liberty rather than as a benefit which justifies confinement for the protection of others.
Cf. also Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?,83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1261 (1974):
The state can . . . advance a secondary purpose [in justifying commitment, in addition to that of protecting the populace]; the classification may then be more defensible. For example. the state might claim that the statute seeks to reach only dangerous
persons who can be treated for their dangerous proclivities (and thereby restored to
upright, productive citizens). . . . This law could not, however, survive the strict
scrutiny mandated for suspect classifications. Since some mentally ill dangerous persons are not treatable and some persons dangerous but mentally sound are treatable,
the law is both under- and overinclusive and therefore invalid.
But cf. Burger, C.J., concurring in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 95 S. Ct. 2486, 2497 (1975): "There
can be little doubt that in the exercise of its police power a State may confine individuals
solely to protect society from the dangers of significant antisocial acts or communicable
disease." See generally Goldstein & Katz, Dangerousnessand Mental Illness: Some Observations on the Decision to Release PersonsA cquitted by Reason of Insanity, 70 YALE L.J. 225,
237-38 (1960). Cf. United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1973):
One clear imperfection in the treatment rationale used to justify detention of "insane" defendants is that some of these defendants may be suffering from untreatable
illnesses. Nevertheless, the rationale is not jeopardized by that imperfection to the
same extent that it would be jeopardized by Murdock's detention. After all, with some
squirming we can find a therapeutic basis for hospitalizing persons with recognized but
untreatable ailments who may someday be amenable to treatment. It would undoubtedly be a great deal more difficult to hit upon a "medical" justification for holding
Murdock if he should be acquitted for lack of responsibility.
Id. at 963 n.117 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added). See also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 95 S. Ct. 2486, 2493 (1975) (referring to, but neither endorsing nor rejecting, confinement
"to alleviate or cure ... illness"). Cf. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (untreatable
mental defective could not be held indefinitely as incompetent to stand trial; other state law
provides possibility of release even without improvement in condition). Cf. also Bernstein,
Callahan & Jaranson, Lobotomy in Private Practice, 32 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIAT. 1041 (1975);
Rosen, CanAny Behavior Be Conditioned?, in BEYOND THE PuNrrtVE SOCIETY 135 (H. Wheeler
ed. 1973). See generally Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On the Justifications for Civil
Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 75, 88, 92 (1968) (observing that we do not ordinarily compel
physically ill/dysfunctional persons to be treated, despite the unfortunate consequences attending continued incapacity-e.g., loss of beneficial work product or family support). The
authors also state that because of the murkiness of the notion of mental illness "the concept
of mental illness must be limited in the field of civil commitment to a necessary rather than
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ousness/disability when linked to "immutable" character traits
(which may be "mental anomalies" in the general sense suggested
earlier, but not for purposes of most commitment statutes) leaves
the person confined with little hope of release. This seems, in
theory, a quite persuasive, and perhaps the most obvious rationale.
It is, for example, an autonomy 2 -promoting justification. Nevertheless, there are various alternative responses to this claim which also
appear colorable: (a) Amelioration is impossible or highly improbable in many-perhaps most-cases of mental disease."' (It bears
mentioning that the supposed non-treatability of sociopathy or
"defective delinquency""'' has not prevented a plethora of commitment statutes permitting confinement for such conditions.) (b)
Or, on the other hand, amelioration or modification is always possible, whether we are talking about disease or character disorderor no anomaly at all!: just deliver the patient or the person of objectionable character (or anyone you choose) to the behavior therapist,
psychosurgeon or psychopharmacologist. (c) The person confined
may elect to informedly refuse any treatment and so may be doomed
to indefinite confinement unless there is a spontaneous remission;
since few authorities would conclude that one must be released if
he/she refuses treatment, the "ameliorability leading to release"
a sufficient condition for commitment" (id. at 80). They were not, however, explicitly addressing the questions raised here as to why dangerousness or disability must, constitutionally
and morally, be attributable to mental/behavioral anomaly. Cf. Shah, Dangerousness and
Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Some Public Policy Considerations, 132 AM. J.
PSYcH AT. 501 (1975).
230. Cf. Developments, supra note 207, at 1231:
[Slince some mental illnesses are presently untreatable and others cannot readily be
cured, many of the dangerous mentally ill face indefinite institutionalization as a
result of commitment. Moreover, dangerousness, the link between preventive detention and the police power, may be treated through conditioning which is applicable to
the mentally ill and nonmentally ill alike.
On the various modalities of therapy see generally Legislating, supra note 1; Conditioning,
supra note 1. See also note 229 supra; Stone, Mental Health and Law: A System in Transition
36-37 (1975) (DHEW PuB. No. (ADM) 75-176) (NIMH, Crime & Delinquency Issues 1975)
[hereinafter cited as Stone].
231. In some cases of indefinite confinement predicated upon mental anomaly (in the
broad sense used here) as a cause of dangerousness, it is necessary that the person to be
confined have been convicted of a crime. Cf. Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964)
("defective delinquents"). Under CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 6302 (1972), criminal proceedings may be '"adjourned" after conviction to determine whether the defendant is a "mentally
disordered sex offender." Confinement may be for an indeterminate period, even if the person
"would not benefit by care or treatment in a state hospital....." Id. § 6316.
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rationale would not, at least under these conditions, seem to be of
decisive import. 3 '
(2) Without the limitation of mental anomaly as the cause of
dangerousness/disability, the state's net would sweep too wide, and
the resulting social situation would terrorize the population with the
possibility of being "clutched '2 33 by the state without fair warning. 13 (The supposition of the state might be that a determination
of mental anomaly significantly increases the chances that a prediction of dangerousness or disability is correct. This is probably
wrong. Indeed, numerous recent analyses of the accuracy of psychiatric predictions of dangerousness and of agreement on diagnoses
suggest quite the contrary. 3 5 In any event, even if some mentally ill
persons were more likely than normal persons to commit crimes,
this would not explain why those normal persons equally likely to
commit crimes were not equally suitable candidates for confine232. If an inmate has competently refused treatment despite illness, it may arguably be
marginally less unfair (assuming it is unfair at all) to continue to confine the person since he
has declined an offer to venture amelioration or modification of his condition-a change
which might hasten his release.
233. See Feinberg, supra note 51, at ch. 10 ("Crime, Clutchability, and Individuated
Treatment").
234. Compare the situation which might result if various excuses and justifications were

discarded by the criminal law. H.L.A. HART,

ESSAYS INPUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY

47-48

(1968).
235. Cf. Spitzer & Fleiss, A Re-analysis of the Reliability of PsychiatricDiagnosis, 125
BRrr. J. PSYCHIAT. 341 (1974). Cf. also Dershowitz, supra note 222, at 32-33:
The one universal criterion for involuntary hospitalization is the presence of mental
illness. In some jurisdictions this is enough; in others, something else-such as danger
to self or others-must also be established. In all jurisdictions, as a matter of practice,
once mental illness is established, there is a presumption in favor of confinement.
Thus, the critical criterion is "mental illness." But if the function of involuntary
hospitalization is the preventive detention of dangerous people, then why should it
matter whether such people are, or are not, "mentally ill"? Particularly so, since
mental illness is not an accurate predictor of dangerous conduct. Recent studies suggest that the mentally ill do not, as a class, engage in more acts of violence than those
not so diagnosed. If a "mentally healthy" person is sufficiently dangerous, why should
he not be confined?
Professor Dershowitz also indicates that studies of the accuracy of psychiatric predictions of
antisocial conduct "strongly suggest that psychiatrists are rather inaccurate predictors ....
[They] are particularly prone to one type of error-overprediction [of antisocial conduct]."
Id. at 46. And see N. Moams, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 62-73 (1974). See generally Stone,
supra note 230, at 27-36. Compare Guze, Woodruff & Clayton, Psychiatric Disorders and
Criminality, 227 J.A.M.A. 641, 642 (1974):
Sociopathy, alcoholism, and drug-dependence are the principal psychiatric disorders
associated with serious crime. In fact, except for sexually deviant behavior leading to
arrest and conviction, other psychiatric disorders are infrequently associated with
felonies.

1975

Therapeutic Justifications

ment.) But suppose precise criteria for such snatching were, one
day, worked out, announced, and scientifically applied: given improved predictive tools,23 forecasts of crime (or indeed any behavior) might one day be extraordinarily accurate. 37 The "prediction
indexes" could then be announced in advance: these would specify
scores concerning the possible occurrence of precisely defined behaviors (mostly, one would suppose, constituting serious crimes),
and so no one would be subject to the unfathomable whimsies of
state officials. Such conditions, of course, do not presently prevail.
And, in any event, there remains a large arena of unpredictability
and possible gross injustice even on the assumptions of predictability concerning precisely defined future conduct: the nature of the
therapies to be used. This matter deserves its own number.
(3) If certain subclasses of mental anomaly were the bases for
commitment-diseases or disorders explicated by precisely described recurring behavior and mentation patterns-then the notion
of therapeutic fit 23 might make it possible to predict the nature of
the therapy, or a specific range of therapies. (The therapies, as
suggested in number (1) above, would be used in aid of eventual
release.) Depressed persons would receive antidepressants; bad sexual preferences would be conditioned out of existence ("subtracted"?) and replaced by good ones; and so on. But the predictability afforded by the notion of letting the therapy fit the anomaly
is not all that great. There are an infinite number of behaviors,
personality traits-indeed, new identities-inconsistent with the
future behavior to be prevented. How do we choose among these new
behaviors and identities? "Choose an optimum combination of relative effectiveness and relative non-intrusiveness of therapeutic
change" is, I think, a useful guide, but-at least at present-an
incomplete basis, standing alone, for predicting what a therapist
might do to or for a confined person.. So, with or without the requirement of mental anomaly, there is a substantial degree of uncertainty as to what might happen to the person clutched. To the
extent that the notion of therapeutic fit does indeed afford some
236. See Violent Behavior, supra note 6.
237. If the prediction were based upon some neurophysiological anomaly, this might
afford a basis for applying a mental anomaly term, and the contrast stated in the text between
dangerousness due to mental/behavioral anomaly and dangerousness simpliciter (caused in
whatever manner) would not be applicable.
238. See text §§ 1-C, HI-B supra.
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guide to prediction, the requirement of mental anomaly as a requirement for commitment pro tanto makes some sense. (It is not
clear, however, that a mental anomaly model assures greater predictability than a behaviorist model-we may be no better off.
(4) A rule-utilitarian analysis suggests that life in a therapywithout-disease version of a therapeutic state might erode basic
values of autonomy and personhood13 9 ("Brutalization" is a term
much used to describe such possible adverse social changes.) Even
if so, defenders of the system might plausibly urge that this reduction in utility and justice is outweighed by increases in utility and
justice attending the diminution of crime and the decrease in the
numbers of its innocent victims (assuming that confinement were
predicated upon prediction of specified sorts of serious crimes). Indeed, so they might urge, given precise indicators of future behavior
and a requirement of high probabilities of very harmful acts specified very clearly in advance, no erosion of autonomy and human
dignity should occur at all. What, after all, is lost by confining
someone 99% likely to kill someone (or to kill X-a specific person)
within the next two weeks, even if there has been no attempt, or
preparation? (The example may be an unlikely one, but is posited
for the sake of analysis.) I think that this particular rule-utilitarian
analysis is far less persuasive than one which suggests that the
therapy-without-disease commitment system (and the therapywith-disease system, for that matter) simply cannot be bridled in
such a way as to narrowly and precisely delimit state intervention:
the state's power is likely to be corrupted and overextended. 40 If so,
this would appear to be a quite persuasive reason for rejecting a
therapeutic state of any sort, whether based on a disease model or
a behaviorist model; but further elaboration would be out of place
for present purposes.
(5) Persons suffering from certain mental anomalies-e.g., cognitive and affective disorders usually called "diseases" by physicians-are beyond the pale of reason and unable to respond to the
239. Compare Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 THE MONIsT 475 (1968).
240. Compare H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 97 (1968):
If we can predict tendencies and propensities without respect to identifiable conduct,
if we can prevent conduct from taking place and thereby avoid the constrictions of
historical proof, why not do so? The temptation is always there, and the history of the
criminal law is full of examples of how easily we yield to it.
Prof. Packer's questions are rhetorical: he does not recommend extensive systems of preventive detention.
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existing threats of sanctions for criminal or lunatic behavior. They
thus may pose predictably greater threats to the public and to themselves than "normals." The latter can behave rationally, respond to
threats, are autonomous "moral agents," and so should not be subject to preventive commitment. Now, if this rationale has to do with
predictability-i.e., the mentally ill are more likely to commit
crimes or antisocial acts-it is simply a partial reformulation of
number (2) above. There may be some cases of improved predictability with respect to some diseases, but even this narrow proposition seems to be under attack. In any event, we are, for present
purposes, assuming that we are dealing with persons equally likely
to misbehave, mental anomaly or not."' But the rationale may be
more than simply reflective of (perhaps mistaken) notions about
predictability. Which do we prefer: (a) risking the commission of
crimes or other harms by persons who may (or may not) be autonomous moral agents; or (b) confinement of persons based upon a
high-though of course not certain-prediction of some kind of serious offense, rather than upon actual commission of a criminal offense (inchoate or non-inchoate)? (The latter entails confinement of
some persons who would not commit crimes or engage in other antisocial conduct.) The criminal 2 justice system, by (e.g.) generally
241. Cf. note 235 supra. Although the persons are, by hypothesis, equally likely to
misbehave, the moral analysis of the conduct of the "normal" and the "anomalous" parties
seems quite different (at least at the outset). Roughly, we are inclined to say that the normal
person (probably) "could have done otherwise," while the sick person (probably) "couldn't
have done otherwise"-at least not without exceptional effort far beyond that confronting a
normal person in a similar decision-making situation. "Could have" and "couldn't have"
clearly seem to be matters of degree, and these notions raise enormously difficult problems
of free will, predictability and determinism. (Is it, for example, compatible with notions of
freedom and autonomy to posit that a person's conduct-whether he is well or ill-is precisely
predictable?) The community is, so it would seem, inclined to regard a failed normal as more
blameworthy than a failed abnormal, because the former-an autonomous moral
agent-freely chose to do wrong (even though his behavior might have been precisely predictable?). See generally GOLDMAN, supra note 27, at ch. 6 ("Determinism and Predictability");
DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF MODERN SCIENCE (S. Hook ed. 1958). Although the
failed normal may be more blameworthy, that may be the price he pays for being, in a sense,
more "protected" under the law: he cannot be clutched before committing a crime (though
the crime he eventually commits may be an inchoate one); and his confinement is (generally)
more "determinate"-it at least has a theoretical maximum imposed by statute and perhaps
by the sentence. (An interesting, if only marginally relevant question, is whether some successful abnormals-e.g., one who has resisted temptation to misbehave despite cognitive and
affective impairments and through great efforts to overcome such deficits-should be considered more praiseworthy than a successful normal (who, despite temptation, did nothing more
than what was expected and required of him).
242. See generally W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAw 414-95 (1972).
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requiring an act and struggling to bridle notions of inchoate crimes,
leans toward option (a). The civil commitment system-at least in
practice-most assuredly generally does not. " ' Should it?
The requirement of mental anomaly-or of those anomalies inconsistent with the existence of substantial autonomy-may in part
be based on the propositions that autonomous moral agents ought
to be left free to decide their own patterns of behavior, that their
autonomy ought indeed to be promoted, and that society must risk
the depredations of these moral agents (which may attenuate or
annihilate the autonomy of others) and protect itself through deterrent sanctions and the law of inchoate crimes, not "preventive detention." Someone sufficiently diseased not to be a "moral agent,"
on the other hand, does not (so the argument would go) have his
personhood or dignity compromised if he is taken under the state's
wing. " Some basic-and very hard to parse-notions of justice in243. See generally the materials in BROOKS, supra note 4, at ch. 9 ("Standards for Commitment").
244. Cf. Developments, supra note 207:
A final justification for limiting involuntary police power commitments to the mentally
ill can be derived from the reasons apparently underlying the decision not to authorize
preventive detention of other dangerous individuals. By requiring a conviction before
depriving persons who are not mentally ill of their liberty, the criminal law system
relies on deterrence to reduce antisocial behavior. A state could argue that this
punishment-deterrence approach fosters personal autonomy by allowing its citizens to
choose whether to obey the law. The state's interest in employing a deterrence system
that recognizes individual autonomy furnishes a rationale for excluding criminally
responsible individuals-those able to appreciate the sanctions imposed for criminal
activity and capable of conforming their actions to the dictates of the criminal
law-from a prediction-prevention approach to harmful conduct. This justification
would seem to provide a distinction between equally dangerous groups of mentally
healthy and criminally insane individuals sufficient to satisfy the demands of equal
protection. The latter group contains individuals whose mental condition excludes
them from the operation of the traditional punishment-deterrence system, because
they are both unable to make autonomous decisions about their antisocial behavior
and unaffected by the prospect of punishment.
The extent to which the deterrence and autonomy rationales for restricting preventive detention justify commitment of other categories of the mentally ill is problematic.
Cases involving sexual psychopaths and defective delinquents statutes indicate the
validity of indefinite confinement of dangerous individuals who possess markedly diminished criminal responsibility but who are not criminally insane.
Id. at 1232-33 (footnotes omitted).
Whether one is "autonomous" or "non-autonomous" is of course not an all-or-nothing
proposition-autonomy vel non is a matter of degree; and so, of necessity, the "promotion of
autonomy rationale" is difficult to apply. From the perspective of the disease model, few
persons would be totally non-autonomous as a result of disease, and presumably few "normals" would be "totally autonomous." These remarks concern "autonomy,".
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form these propositions about what promotes and what impairs autonomy. Opponents of a "therapeutic state" are not likely to be
swayed (though they may be impressed) by appeals to utility and
the avoidance of injustice to innocent victims of crime. It might be,
however, that at some point the aversion to preventive detention
would be overcome: overwhelming probability of specific harm to a
specific person within, say, 24 hours may be a fairly persuasive
ground for preventive detention. 4 5 Both the rule-utilitarians and the
defenders of justice (the groups of course overlap!) would, most
likely, respond that here no efforts at such line-drawing should be
ventured -abusive extensions beyond the given exemplar being
inevitable-and such preventive confinement should therefore be
avoided. (We refuse to draw certain lines concerning likelihood of
guilt, when we offer trials for everyone accused of crime. Autonomy
would otherwise be too seriously impaired.) And here, at least for
now, we shall let the moral disputations stand,.
Some brief observations on the constitutional analysis of the
mental anomaly requirement for civil commitment seem in order.
It is tempting to try to infer from Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v.
Probate Court14 1 and its descendants and relations that mental
Cf. Peszke, supra note 122:
The existence of mental illness per se does not necessarily justify involuntary treatment. Involuntary treatment can be justified only if the following assumption (an
assumption that has been made by all legal systems for centuries) is accepted: severe
forms of mental illness in some way affect the rational and executive powers of the
individual's will and ego, i.e., severe mental illness affects or impinges on the autonomy of the individual. If there is total agreement that severe forms of mental illness
do not affect this autonomy, involuntary psychiatric treatment cannot be justified for
anyone, whether dangerous or not.
However, if we are not sure to what extent and in what form or degree of severity
mental illness precludes full and complete ability to function and thus to make rational
decisions, the possibility of some form of involuntary treatment and hospitalization
should be philosophically acceptable. The opposite is, in fact, inhuman.
Id. at 827. There are, it is suggested, some unrealistic all-or-nothing propositions in the
quoted remarks (agreement that some severe mental illnesses "do not affect this autonomy";
"full and complete ability to function and thus to make rational decisions").
245. Cf. Dershowitz, supra note 222, at 45:
[H]ow likely should the predicted event have to be to justify preventive incarceration? Even if it is agreed, for example, that preventing a serious physical assault would
justify incarceration, it still must be decided whether the occurrence of the predicted
assault is sufficiently likely to justify this sanction. If the likelihood is very high-say
90%-theh a strong argument can be made for some incarceration. If the likelihood is
very small-say 5% -then it would be hard to justify confinement.
246. 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
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anomaly is a necessary (though not a sufficient) condition for such
confinement. But these cases (including those imposing strict procedural requirements 47 ) dealt with statutory schemes under which it
was necessary to find some mental anomaly as a cause of dangerousness or disability. Nothing seems to have been said in the opinions
which flatly forecloses the counter-inference that detention where
there is no mental anomaly is permissible. So, the following review
seems accurate: (a) The Constitution does not explicitly forbid civil
commitment dispensing with a mental anomaly requirement; (b) no
case seems to have clearly stated that such detention would be
unconstitutional;2 48 and (c) no articulations of the police or parens
patriae power of the states justify an inference that it is limited to
preventive detention only in the form of either a law of inchoate
crimes (the inchoate crime is itself of course not prevented), or a
civil commitment system based upon an assessment of dangerous247. E.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and
remanded, 414 U.S. 473 (1974). A new cycle began with Lessard v. Schmidt, 379 F. Supp.
1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and remanded, 95 S. Ct. 1943 (1975). See also In re Ballay,
482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973); People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306, 535 P.2d 352, 121 Cal. Rptr.
488 (1975). These cases do not sit well with the odd notion of a quid pro quo rationale purporting to justify withdrawal of stringent procedural protections against commitment in "exchange" for an opportunity for therapy. See generally Spece, Rights to and Against Treatment/Rehabilitation/DemolitionRevisited: Fundamental Errors and Fundamental Bases
(1975) (unpublished paper in the author's files), where it is urged that such a rationale is
deficient in (inter alia) treating a basic right as an exchangeable commodity; in even speaking
of exchange or compensation when there is no voluntary assent by the loser of rights; in
assuming commitment or treatment are always benefits; and in assuming one of the basic
questions at issue-that there is indeed a need for treatment which supposedly justifies
attenuating procedural protections. For an exposition of the quid pro quo argument see Rouse
v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
248. Compare In re Williams, 157 F. Supp. 871 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Overholser v.
Williams, 252 F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1958):
However commendable was the court's purpose to protect the public from the release
to society of a man "potentially dangerous to others," there is no District of Columbia
statute or inherent equity power permitting commitment to any institution upon that
showing alone. Many persons who are released to society upon completing the service
of sentences in criminal cases are just as surely potential menaces to society as is this
petitioner, having a similar pattern of anti-social behavior, lack of occupational adjustment, and absence of remorse or anxiety; yet the courts have no legal basis of ordering
their continued confinement on mere apprehension of future unlawful acts, and must
wait until another crime against society is committed or they are found insane in
proper mental health proceedings before confinement may again be ordered.
157 F. Supp. at 876. The court's remarks do not expressly address the constitutional issue,
although obviously an advocate could use them to good advantage in formulating a constitutional argument.
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ness due to mental anomaly. 4 ' Indeed, some have argued that it is
constitutionally impermissible (as a denial of equal protection) to
confine the dangerous-because-of-mental-anomaly but not, say, the
dangerous-because-he-is-a-mafia-hit-man 50 who happens to be perfectly normal and so skilled that he might well be the thirdgeneration Godfather. 5 ' Here, the various substantive due process
arguments to counter the equal protection argument await invocation, but history suggests that they will be inescapably mushy 52particularly in view of the difficulties recited above in rationalizing, simply on ordinary moral grounds, the requirement of mental
anomaly in the justification of civil commitment.
There is, of course, the omnipresent objection that none of this
makes any difference anyway, at least as far as justice, blame and
desert are concerned, since no one is a free, autonomous moral
agent; but I do not presently feel obliged to deal with the problem
of free will and determinism.
249. There are some judicial descriptions of the police power which suggest paternalistic
limitations upon it, which is why, in the immediately preceding text, I refer to dangerousness
only, and not "disability." E.g., American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids, 11 Mich. App 351,
158 N.W.2d 72 (1968) (holding unconstitutional a statute requiring motorcyclists to wear
crash helmets). See also 82 HARV. L. REV. 469 (1968) (discussing the Davids case). See
generally Comment, Limiting the State's Police Power: Judicial Reaction to John Stuart
Mill, 37 U. Cm. L. REV. 605 (1970).
250. Cf. Dershowitz, supra note 222, at 33 (speculating on how we would deal with "Ira
Ill" and "Mike Mafia").
251. E.g., Developments, supra note 207, at 1228-35. See also Note, Mental Illness: A
Suspect Classification?,83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1260-67 (1974):
As long as the dangerousness standard is a constant, dangerous persons not mentally
ill are by definition just as dangerous (as a group) as dangerous persons who are
mentally ill. Thus, if protecting the populace is the only goal of the statute, then
institutionalizing only mentally ill dangerous persons does not logically follow.
Id. at 1261.
Assume arguendo that persons dangerous because of mental anomaly were properly dealt
with differently and made subject to civil commitment because of their impaired ability to
respond to the threat of criminal sanctions. If a jurisdiction's substantive mental anomaly
requirements for commitment and for exculpation were different, then (procedural and proof
differences aside), it is possible that such persons could still be prosecuted for an act, despite
the argument that they are not proper targets of the criminal process. (Even if it were, in
general, easier to satisfy the exculpation standard than the commitment standard, certain
substantive differences in the standards might still permit conviction of some persons who,
by hypothesis, should not be prosecuted.)
252. See generally Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Powell v.
Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957); Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309, 229 N.E.2d 426, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739
(1967).
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Note on Non-Therapeutic Justificationsfor Intervention
The problems of non-therapeutic intervention are of considerable
moment, but cannot be dealt with extensively in this paper. Perhaps the first point to note is that there may be some difficulty in
distinguishing therapeutic from non-therapeutic rationales. Suppose, for example, that a therapist says to X, "You have no disease,
and there is no justification for using any therapeutic agent: no
disease, no therapy." The subject, however, insists on using therapy
T. X might so insist because X believes he/she is indeed ill (or
engages in maladaptive behavior). Or, X might insist, though conceding the lack of therapeutic justification, on a variety of grounds
("the drug makes me feel good," or "it enhances my performance").
(Or, all might acknowledge the existence of a disease (etc.) but
question the effectiveness of therapy. If the therapy were used, it
might evidence weak therapeutic justification, or simply a nontherapeutic rationale for using the therapy.)
Consider also the problems of distinguishing therapy from custodial control-and of distinguishing either from punishment. Note,
for example, the observations of Siegler and Osmond:
Tranquillizers may be used by a physician exercising Aesculapian authority as a medical treatment for patients installed
in the sick role. Exactly the same substance may also be used
as chemical restraints in a hospital ward ....
253
Custodial control (which we will assume for now to be a form of
"punishment") and therapeutics may overlap, but seem nevertheless conceptually quite distinct, particularly when the therapeutic
model utilizes a disease submodel. It is rather more difficult, however, to fix this difference within a behaviorist regime: what might
appear simply to be custodial control measures might be rationalized as aversive stimuli of a behavior modification program, well
planned out with precisely selected goals and carefully chosen stimuli to learning. Most reported litigation involving supposed behavior therapy techniques does not seem to resemble this picture, 5 4
but some does, and in some cases the description seems plausible."'5
253. SIEG.LER & OSMOND, supra note 8.1, at 179-80.
254. Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973) (Anectine conditioning); Knecht
v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973) (apomorphine conditioning).
255. Clonce v. Richardson, 379 F. Supp. 338 (W.D. Mo. 1974) ("START" behavior modification program).
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Even so, it is not always clear that we can distinguish behavior (or
other) therapy from punishment.
An individual's justifications for (non-therapeutic) intervention
may occasionally sound ennobling (furtherance of religious goals;256
enhancement of performance and abilities25 ). And they may also
appear pathetic-perhaps so much so that the justification is arguably therapeutic, as when one uses drugs to mask anxieties. Whatever the rationale, the priority of autonomy prevails in the domain
of non-therapeutic justifications, whether in a state/institutional
context or in a private setting. And the constitutional argument
structures for protection against enforced intervention and for autonomous intervention are similar to those involving therapeutic
justifications for intervention." 8
CONCLUSION

Drafting a conclusion to this Symposium entry is like working
with a polythetic concept. It is something of a chore to take this
farrago and determine what all the subjects discussed, questions
asked, arguments advanced, conclusions tendered and invitations
to further study have in common. But since the word "game" is
useful-even though games may have no non-dispositional properties in common (Wittgenstein would not only agree, he would insist
upon it)-perhaps this paper will be also.
256. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (use of peyote
by Navajo Indians in religious ceremonies must be permitted under free exercise clause of
first amendment).
257. Cf. A. HUXLEY, THE DOORS OF PERCEPTION (1954; Perennial Library ed. 1974); Shapiro, Who Merits Merit? Problems in DistributiveJustice Posed by the New Biology, 48 S.
CAL. L. REv. 318 (1974).
258. See generally Legislating, supra note 1. We have not pursued a comprehensive moral
and constitutional inquiry into the limits of coercion permissible during-or indeed as a part
of-punishment (e.g., territorial restrictions), and have focused mainly on particular constitutional strictures. But a complete analysis should more explicitly address the proposition
that "the prison inmate retains those initial First Amendment [or certain other] rights that
are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives
of the corrections system" (Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)), and should consider
the problems of defining "punishment" and justifying its application. The conclusions
charted above concerning the protection of mentation would, it is suggested, remain the same,
but would be more fully accounted for.

